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Uttar Pradesh, a relatively backward state, has been important in India's 
politics since independence. It has always played a decisive role in the 
formation of the government at the centre as it used to have 85 lok sabha seats. 
It is India's fifth largest state with basically an agrarian society. After 
independence, leaders tried to politicize these peasants and convert them in 
their vote bank. Rich peasants from upper castes dominated U.P. politics for a 
long period. 
Uttar Pradesh has a heterogeneous society which' is divided into different 
castes and communities. Hindu and Muslims are the two important religious 
groups. Muslims have so many sects and Hindu society is divided into many 
castes and sub-castes. Brahmans, kshatriya and Thakurs are upper castes, 
Kurmi, Yadav and Lodhis are considered as OBC's; Saini, Prajapati and Pal are 
MBC's while Jatav, Chamar, Pasi, Kori, and Dhobi are considered as 
scheduled castes. Different political parties try to manipulate these social 
cleavages and make sectarian appeal to mobilize voters. 
Congress has always been a dominant party in U.P, except a notable 
exception of 1977 U.P. Assembly Elections. Congress ruled U.P. for almost 
two decades after independence. It was known as an upper caste party as a 
result of upper caste domination. Congress was tactfully using caste politics to 
capture power. Rajni Kothari describe this as "Congress System". 
The election of 1967 greatly reduced Congress strength at the centre and 
in the states. From 1967 Congress support in the states steadily leaked away to 
the various regional parties. After 1967, there was first coalition era in U.P. 
state up to 1977. In this decade, congress remained a single largest party in the 
state except in 1977 when it could manage only 47 seats - lowest since 
independence. This decade was also marked by frequent elections i.e. mid-term 
elections and instability and it was believed that only Congress could give a 
stable government in the state, while other socialist parties and Jana Sangh 
could not deliver the result. 
The Grand Coalition : The Janata party could overthrow the congress but in 
1980 Congress come back in power. From 1989 upto now, its position in the 
state is deteriorating. Decline of Congress resulted in the emergence of 
multiparty system in U.P. Before 1996, in three successive state Assembly 
Election 1989, 1991 and 1993, no single party was able to secure a majority, 
resulting in the formation of coalition Government. Instead of Congress, 
B.S.P., S.P. and B.J.P. were more powerful in the state. Not only these parties 
formed coalition in the state by uniting themselves, these could be 
characterized as a coalition of group interests representing a segment of the 
social community. The big size of the state, the existence of various castes and 
communities and other related problems such as communalism tends to divide 
society, and has turned sections of the masses towards a party which can 
represent their interest. Making only sectarian appeal these parties can win a 
large numbers of votes from their own targeted group. This however, leaves 
them short of a majority. The only viable solution remains a coalition 
government. 
In U.P., whether it was coalition between SP-BSP or BJP and BSP, it 
could not survive for a long period. Coalition government in the state. 
therefore, needs to tackle the problem of stability. In 1993, SP-BSP combine 
formed the coalition government in the state. Muslim, Dalits and OBC came 
together to defeat communal and upper caste parties. But this coalition could 
not survive because of ambitious strategies of SP and BSP. After the collapse 
of BSP-SP alliance Mayawati became Chief Minister of U.P. in June 1995 with 
an alliance with BJP. Major aim of this alliance was to control Mulayam Singh 
Yadav, whose increasing political influence both partners wished to curb. This 
BSP and BJP flirtation was characterized as opportunistic political strategy of 
both the partners. One major question which arose with this alliance was why 
BSP entered into an alliance with a Manuwadi party who was against 
Bahujanwad? BSP had always declared its opposition to all forms of 
Brahmanism. 
Coalition between two partners is not an easy affair but coalition with a 
partner who has a completely different ideology is entirely impossible for both 
the partners. Both tried to increase their influence at the cost of other. In U.P. 
the essence of coalition politics is opportunism and self interest. The main 
problem of coalition is that the interest of these actors in the coalition are not 
identical. Here coalition arrangements survive on negative agendas, like BJP 
aligned with BSP to stop SP from coming to power or in 1993, SP-BSP 
combined to stop BJP from coming to power. As these combines did not have 
identical interest, it result in breakup of coalitions, frequent President's rule and 
instability in the state. 
In U.P., caste is a factor of instability, violence and fractured verdict. It 
gave rise to multiparty system, impetus to regionalism. Mandalisation with 
anti-Mandal agitation and rise of lower castes on the political front. Earlier 
Congress had been a dominant party with a very weak factional opposition. 
Now congress is loosing its ground in U.P. and with the three other parties BJP, 
SP and BSP are building their base rapidly. In the fierce struggle for power 
from parties, no single party is able to gain majority and multiparty system is 
an established trend and is forcing parties to make unbelievable alliances. Caste 
politics is also making regionalism more prominent. Caste based parties can 
realize their potential largely at different regional levels. So, parties like SP and 
BSP can be seen as dominant parties in U.P. 
Parties also use one caste against other castes. Post Mandal politics in 
U.P. witnessed clashes between upper castes and OBCs on the one hand and 
lower castes opposition to OBCs on the other. Caste may be a secularizing 
force cutting across religious barriers but it gave rise to a different kind of 
struggle and violence in the state. Though dalits feel proud and have a sense of 
dignity but their upsurge is not a welcome move and they are subjected to 
fierce opposition in the state. Parties like BSP used caste politics as their 
'natural right' opposing other castes openly and parties like BJP are heading for 
'indirect dalitization', realizing its weak support base in the state, by making 
alliances with BSP. 
In 1989 elections Congress banked on its traditional Brahmin Harijan 
Muslim votes. BJP relied on its Hindutva politics with an eye on upper castes. 
Janata Dal appealed to OBCs Muslims, jats and Rajputs while BSP emerged 
solely as 'Dalit' party and raised its old slogan, Brahmin, Thakur, Bania Chor, 
Baki sab hain DS4 (Brahmin, Thakur and Banias are thieves and others belong 
to dalit shoshit sangharsh samiti). Implementation of Mandal commission 
Report sparked off a sharp polarization along caste lines in U.P. But it helped 
OBCs to rise as a political community. Mandal politics of Janata Dal was 
countered by Hindutva politics of BJP. BJP could emerge as the single largest 
party in 1993 Assembly election, it gained 178 seats with 33.3 per cent vote 
share but it could not form the government as it was short of about 37 seats to 
gain majority. It's Mandal vs Kamandal politics could not bring majority votes 
and victory of SP and BSP alliances was seen as victory of secular forces 
against Congress and BJP. In U,.P., competition between two national parties 
and: two state parties like SP and BSP show the growing resurgence of caste 
based parties. Now National parties like Congress and BJP are unable to 
dominate U.P. politics because of presence of state based parties like BSP and 
SP who have strong support of their own caste. It will not be wrong to say that 
caste based mobilization is a key feature of U.P. politics and seems to be an 
established one. 
One other major issue, which dominated U.P. politics since independence 
is communalism. From Bhartiya Jana Sangh to BJP an attempt has been 
witnessed in communalization of U.P. politics. In 1990, communalism was 
nurtured and promoted by the BJP in association with VHP, RSS and Bajrang 
Dal. BJP openly used communal politics to come in power. Shilaniyas at the 
disputed site in Ayodhya and then demolition of Babri masjid added fiiel to the 
fire. Violence, riots and insecurity was everywhere and BJP could become a 
success overnight. One of the major causes of communalism is no doubt 
political opportunism. Though congress has been tacitly using communal 
identities, but BJP, wholeheartedly declared itself a Hindu party, fighting for 
the Hindu cause, using ideologies such as Hinduva to win elections. 
Hindu nationalists target secular state and allege that 'pseudo-secularism' 
or 'appeasing minorities' is anti-democratic. They don't believe in equality. 
They promote a party which exploits religion for getting votes and asks people 
to respond to the call for Hindutva at the polls. This Hindu Right also 
condemns those parties who declare themselves secular and accuse them of 
promoting minority rights at the cost of majority. 
Hindu right maintains that every Indian must acknowledge that he or she 
belongs to Hindutva. To make Hindutva possible or to make India a Hindu 
state, this wing proposed the idea of 'Hindu constitution', 'Hindu ethos' and 
'Hindu nation' or Rashtra. No doubt this Hindu right wing could make Hindu 
sentiments a major political force and harnessing of Hindu sentiment upto this 
level could not be done without communalizing Hindu society. Hindutva 
remains a central theme of the Hindu nationalist movement. Hindutva has been 
equated with Hindu religion. But BJP failed to provide a clear definition of 
Hindutva, several BJP manifestoes suggest that Hindutva is an ideology which 
aims to establish "one country, one culture and one nation" in India. This is no 
doubt, seen as a danger to multicultural democracy of India. 
It is evident that RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal guide BJP in running 
political affairs. Though BJP itself, reflecting the RSS mind tried for a 
synthesis of RSS ideology and real politics, tension surfaced between the two 
when ever BJP due to compulsion adopted a moderate line towards Muslims 
and lower castes. The compulsion of RSS can also be understood that the party 
had to appoint RSS men in key positions. 
BJP's main political agenda during 1991 Assembly elections and 
parliamentary elections was to implement uniform civl code. It also accused 
congress of pampering minorities or appeasing Muslims. However several 
official documents suggest that Muslim minority is backward and poor in the 
country. In the name of secularism, Government only provided it security in the 
Hindu majority India. Though other backward castes and schedule castes could 
progress due to Affirmative Action Oriented programmes of the government 
but Muslims remained at the receiving end. 
Once in power in 1993, BJP did not loose the opportunity to do what it 
wanted to do i.e. to demolish the Babri Mosque and to become ruling party in 
the centre. Kalyan Singh resigned and in 1993 fresh Assembly elections were 
held. BJP could emerge as the single largest party but was short of majority. 
Muslim's voted enbloc for Mulayam Singh Yadav and SP-BSP alliance could 
form the government. Since then Muslims in general do not have much faith in 
Congress and BJP. Both are considered as communal parties. 
1996 assembly Elections in U.P. showed that in this multiparty 
competition, where voters were mobilized on caste and religious basis, there 
was confusion with the caste and community appeal of their leaders and the 
outcome could not be claimed as popular verdicts. The voters were conftised 
among the four dominant choices (BSP, BJP, SP and Congress) in the states, 
these parties were also not having any clear cut ideology. There was complete 
realization on the part of the political parties that their sectarian appeals were 
not sufficient to get a clear verdict. Analysts have already declared that post 
mandal, post Mandir and post Bahujan phase has shown that major political 
parties in U.P. have realized that they have reached to a saturation point in 
appealing to their own communities support basis and are bound to look 
elsewhere. 
In early 1990s, with rath yatra BJP took a pro-Hindutva stance with an 
anti-Muslim agitation, with mandal commission report, Janata Dal (later SP) 
took a probackward caste position against forward ones and a pro-Bahujan 
platform was crated by BSP with an anti-Manuwadi one. But in 1996 when 
these parties realized that they cannot capture clear majority through this 
'cleavages exploitation' oriented policies and coalition government is not 
feasible to run, they changed their anti-stances or playing one caste and 
community against other. While these parties took care of consolidating their 
own manufactured vote banks they tried to appeal to other groups as well to 
broaden their appeals to the mass. This time BJP, appealed to Hindu upper 
castes as well as MBCs but remained careful not to mobilize them against 
Muslims. While SP strengthened its support among OBCs and Muslims it 
appealed to forward groups like Thakurs. BSP did not mobilize Dalits against 
upper castes so, that, in future Brahmins could be added in the umbrella. 
Congress having no other option, claimed to be having a secular approach to 
remain a 'catch all' party, though this non-sectarian approach could not help 
much. 
In 1996, Assembly election, BJP could comer votes of rich, upper middle, 
and middle class people while BSP make in roads among the poorest people. 
BJP could capture more votes of Hindu upper castes than Congress. Now 
Brahmins and Thakurs have transferred their votes to BJP. BJP could also gain 
votes of Lodhas as well as MBCs like Kurmi and Koeli also supported BJP. SP 
could manage to find a place among Thakurs while Yadavs voted embloc for it. 
Muslims were also a force with Mulayam Singh Yadav BSP emerged as a party 
for deprived ones in the state. It has support even among Muslims, Dalits 
especially chamars are all for BSP. 
One major portion of Indian population, which is without sufficient 
representation as well as nomination for elections, has been Muslims. No, party 
whether it was a 'catch all' Congress, or SP with its secular stance or Bahujan 
wadi, BSP could provide Muslim candidates with adequate nomination. 
Though after Hindutva politics, of BJP, Muslims became conscious of their 
position in India and started voting for SP and BSP. In U.P. assembly the 
average Muslim membership from 1952-2002 has been about 8.49% whereas 
average percentage of Muslims population is 15.59%. Thus, there has been 
deprivation of 45.20 per cent in Muslim representation. 
In 1996 U.P. assembly elections. Congress could gain five more seats 
from 1993 but it was a loser in true sense because its vote share declined by 
6.67%, this was lowest since 1952 this showed that even an alliance with BSP 
could not increase its popularity and Congress witnessed frequent decline in the 
state. Of its 1993 tally of 177 seats, the BJP has lost 93 seats 41 to the SP, 20 to 
the BSP, 13 to the congress. It could also gain 91 new seats but its position 
remained more or less same as it was in 1993. It shows the incapacity of 
Hindutva politics in main Hindi heartland to secure a majority for BJP. SP 
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could also perform more or less in the same manner as in 1993. In 1993, it got 
109 seats and in 1996 it captured 110 seats but its vote share increased by 4 per 
cent (17.8 in 1993 and 21.8 in 1996). 
One of the major gainers in 1996 assembly election was BSP, though it 
could gain 67 seats in 1996 while in 1993 the number was 69. it increased its 
vote share from 11.31 per cent to 19.64% BSP not only aligned with Congress 
and increased its support base, it also aligned with BJP, a manuwadi party, 
when no party was able to form the government. With the decline of Congress 
there had been resurgence of lower caste parties in the state. One major 
outcome of 1996 election was that, these parties realized that they were bound 
to change old pattern of mobilization to increase their support base, if they 
wanted to secure a clear majority. 
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PREFACE 
The present research is aimed at focusing on the trends and events 
which shaped the U.P. Assembly Election of 1996. An attempt has been 
made to analyse the state politics of U.P., behaviour of political parties, 
politicians and voters has been given a close look. The thrust of the research 
is to reveal the voter's preferences, role of religion and caste and its impact 
on the electoral process of the state. Main aim of the research work is to 
explore the problems which manifested in several elections, nature of 
emerging mass politics, alliances formed before and after the election, need 
of coalition government and different other trends which added to the 
outcome of 1996 UP Assembly elections. 
This study tries to investigate how the variables of caste and 
community mobilization are the keys to political power in U.P. Against this 
backdrop thesis has been divided into five chapters. 
The first chapter of this study deals with the historical background 
of the electoral politics in U.P. Though the present study aims to explore the 
trends which shaped the 1996 UP Assembly elections and the results 
thereof. It is desirable to make a detailed study about the background of U.P. 
politics and to find out what was new in the 1996 elecfion. In this chapter 
the focus is upon different factors which fostered political crisis and 
instability and those factors which helped political parties to capture 
political power in the state, such as, fragmentation, communalism, casteism, 
coalition politics, polarization and criminalisation. Main focus is on how in 
the past, political parties were constructing their electorate as collection of 
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ethnic block and were expanding their vote share by targeting certain blocks 
and ignoring others. How political parties in U.P. utilized caste and religion 
overtly to capture power. How Congress could appeal to different sections 
of the society though the population of the U.P. is divided into so many 
castes and communities. 
The second chapter makes an indepth analysis of the major events 
which contributed to the decline of Congress and the emergence of coalition 
Government in U.P., decline of Congress resulted in the multi-party system 
and BSP, SP and BJP became more powerful in the state. This chapter 
analyses as to why these parties could not become as successful in appealing 
to the masses as the Congress. Why coalition government could not provide 
stability to the state. Though, there was end of one party dominance, rise of 
a competitive party system, but these coalition could represent only the 
interest of a segment of the social community and could not fill the vacuum 
created by the fall of Congress. 
Chapter three takes into account the role of caste in U.P. politics. 
Keeping in view the importance of caste politics in U.P., this chapter 
analyses post Mandal politics, OBCs assertion and role of SP in Uttar 
Pradesh. It also deals with Dalit upsurge and role of BSP. It examines role 
of BJP and its hunt for vote bank after Hindutva. Why Congress is still 
striving as a catch all party? Why a secular approach has remained the only 
solution? These are some of the questions examined. Over all the chapter 
deals with caste vs caste competition in the state. 
The chapter four explores the role of BJP in communalization of 
U.P. politics. How BJP could make mass mobilization on communal lines 
and changed the old pattern of mobilization in 1990s. This chapter also tries 
to see the nexus of VHP, RSS, Bajrang Dal and BJP and how this nexus 
could help the BJP in its emergence as the only strong competitor of the 
Congress in 1990s. This chapter also makes an analysis of Hindu 
nationalism and Hindutva and its role in U.P. politics. How this communal 
politics created awareness among Muslim voters ? Why did they participate 
wholeheartedly to defeat the BJP in 1993 elections? Why this politics of 
compulsion for Muslims led them to support SP and BSP in 1993 elections? 
These were the other questions which have been explored. 
In chapter five an effort has been made to analyse different issues 
before and after the 1996 UP assembly elections. Why this election was 
different in many ways than the earlier one. Though 3Cs (casteism, 
commuanlism and coalition politics) dominated U.P. politics but there was 
complete realization on the part of the political parties that their sectarian 
appeals were not sufficient to get a clear verdict. Why this election did not 
yield a decisive verdict ? Why BJP could not secure a clear majority and the 
other national party. Congress is facing frequent decline in the state ? Why 
two state level parties BSP and SP could increase their vote share and what 
were their handicaps? were the issues addressed in this chapter. 
Political dynamics of U.P. has always interested this researcher so, 
we have examined more closely the various trends and facts responsible for 
them in U.P. politics. Though, we do not claim that our examinadon and 
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explanations are the only ones that could be developed for this purpose. 
Many other analysts like Paul R. Brass, Angela Sutherland Burger, 
Yogendra Singh Yadav, Zoya Hassan, Kanchan Chandra Sudha Pai and 
many others have also made a sincere study about different trends of U.P. 
politics. Still this analytical explanation of U.P. elections of 1996 is an 
attempt to make a close study of U.P. politics at the time of political 
instability in the state and we find that the caste and community 
mobilization are the keys to political power in U.P. 
The methodology adopted is primarily analytical and based on data 
analysis. The historical and descriptive methods have also been employed 
Chapter-I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ELECTORAL POLITICS 
IN UTTAR PRADESH 
Uttar Pradesh, a relatively backward state, has been important in 
India's politics' since independence. It has always played a decisive role in 
the formation of the government at the centre as it used to have 85 Lok 
Sabha seats. Though the present study aims to explore the trends which 
shaped the UP 1996 elections and the results thereof. It is desirable to 
make a detailed study about the background of U.P. politics and to find out 
what was new in the 1996 elections? 
In the present chapter we would focus upon different factors which 
fostered political crisis and instability and those factors which have helped 
political parties to capture political power in the state, such as, 
fragmentation, communalism, casteism, coalition politics, polarization and 
criminalisation. Main focus will be on how in the past, political parties 
were constructing their electorate as collection of ethnic blocks and were 
expanding their vote share by targeting certain blocks and ignoring others. 
How political parties in U.P. utilized caste and religion overtly to construct 
state wide ethnic constituencies, and what were the different alliances 
formed to capture power. Before analyzing the political background, a 
brief study of the different determining factors of U.P. politics will be 
fruitful. 
Determinants of U.P. politics 
Geography 
U.P. is India's fifth largest state having an area of 2,38,566 sq.km. 
Though area wise it is the fifth largest state, population wise it ranks first. 
Its total population is 166,052,859' having growth rate of 25.80%.^  Its 
percentage share in total population is 16.17.^  Its population density is 689'' 
persons per sq.km. which is not uniform while the average density of 
population as per the 2001 census was 324 persons per sq.km.^  The sex 
ratio in the state is negative, i.e. there are more males than females. On an 
average there are 898^ females per 1000 males. Female participation in 
politics is rather low. Literacy rate in U.P. is 57.36%'' and it ranks 18. The 
population of the state is overwhelmingly rural, only 20.78% population is 
urban. The rest reside in rural areas and are basically engaged in 
agriculture. 
Administratively, the state is divided into 14 divisions and 70 
districts^, ranging in area from under 1,056 sq.km. to over 6,788 sq.km. 
and in population from 708,831 to 4,137,489.'° 
There are three geographical areas in U.P. The northern 
mountains, the central plains and the southern hill. In the north it is 
bounded by Uttaranchal and Nepal, Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh in the 
south. All of the central plain area of U.P. forms part of the Gangetic basin, 
within the central plain area. The state can also be divided into seven 
regions to make electoral analysis (as was done by CSDS) namely - (i) 
1. Census of India 2001, Series-!, Paper-I (2001) by Jayant Kumar Bhatia of the Indian 
Administrative Service, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India, p. XI. 
2. Ibid., p. 43. 
3. Ibid., p. XI. 
4. ibid., p. 75. 
5. Ibid., p. IX. 
6. Ibid., p. 92. 
7. Ibid., p. 118. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid., p. 22. 
10. Manorma Year Book 2003, Kottayam (Kerala), pp. 698-700. 
Uttarakhand : Rohelkhand, Upper Doab, Oudh, Lower Doab, Bundelkhand 
and Poorvanchal." 
The North Indian plain for centuries has been a broad avenue for 
invaders and a base for ambitious rulers who have established their sway 
over large parts of India. In the 6 century B.C. U.P. was associated with 
two new religions, Jainism and Buddhism. In the medieval period U.P. 
passed under Muslim rule and led a way to a new synthesis of Hindu and 
Islamic culture. Urdu remains the perfect synthesis of Hindu and Muslim 
culture.'^ However, U.P. is predominantly Hindi speaking state and it is 
argued that the Hindu culture was first firmly established here.''* According 
to Paul R. Brass, Uttar Pradesh is essentially an artifact put together by the 
British gradually, by conquest and annexation, over a period of three 
quarters of a century.'^  There was no uniformity in the administrative 
politics of Britishers which gave way to make a weak U.P. as cultural and 
linguistic unit.'^ 
British land system also affected the social economic and political 
order of the state. Again they did not opt for any uniform policy for the 
whole North western provinces. They established two types of land 
revenue system in the United provinces. One was Talukdari and second 
was Zamindari system. In Oudh the rights of revenue collection and 
11. Statistical Supplement; prepared by CSDS Unit, vol. 15, Nos. 1 & 2, Jan.-June 2003, 
pp. 554-562. 
12. Angela Sutherland Burger; Opposition in a dominant Party System; University of 
California press, Berkeley and Los Angeles (1969), p. 21. 
13. Manorma Year Book, op.cit. No. 10, p. 698. 
14. Angela S. Burger, op.cit. No. 12, p. 21. 
15. Paul R. Brass, Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, Vol. I (Faction and Party) 
Chanakya Publications, Delhi 1983, p. 231. 
16. Ibid. 
ownership were granted to the Talukdars, while in the north-eastern 
provinces land was settled with individual Zamindars or with Joint 
Zamindari bodies. Angela S. Burger said that they tried to establish land 
owning where ownership in the occidental sense never existed. By the late 
1850s there was land tenure by proprietors, permanent tenure holders and 
'fixed rate' tenants, occupancy tenants with some rights of succession in 
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land but not the right of, and tenants at will". 
Whole agrarian history of U.P. is marked by exploitation of 
farmers by zamindars even after independence. Zamindari Abolition Act 
and Land revenue policies of government has been the source of crisis and 
instability in India and played a decisive role in government formation. 
Leaders like Charan Singh could make a good use of such situations. 
Sudha Pai claims in a study that land is passing from the hands of the small 
impoverished farmers to bigger prosperous farmers.'^  Politicisation of 
peasant, especially middle castes of peasant have been a persistent trend in 
U.P. politics, which questioned upper caste domination represented by 
Congress.^ ^ 
Economy : 
Uttar Pradesh is India's largest state and also one of its poorest. 
Despite recent signs of progress, U.P. still faces significant challenges in 
reducing poverty in its various economic and non-economic dimensions 
17. Paul R. Brass, op.cit., No. 15, p. 232. 
18. Angela S. Burger; op.cit., No. 12, p. 23. 
19. Sudha Pai; Uttar Pradesh; Agrarian Change of Electoral Politics, Shipra 
Publications, 1993, p. 23. 
20. Zoya Hasan; Class and Caste; the Dynamic of political Change in Uttar Pradesh in 
Zoya Hasan, S.N. Jha, Rasheeduddin Khan (ed) The State, Political Process and 
Identity, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1989, p. 256. 
and improving security and well being for all citizens. In comparison of 
other state U.P. achieved a very slow economic growth. People below 
poverty line in U.P. in the year 1999-2000 were 31.15%, in which rural 
were 31.22% and urban were 30.89%."^ Reasons for slow economic growth 
are numerous but main cause is that first few plans were very inadequate 
and could not bring much progress. Central policies of the government also 
did not work due to different government at both the level. There was no 
homogeneity in the policies. Though U.P. is the largest producer of food 
grains and oil seeds in the country still it is poor because it failed to seize 
on opportunities created by the liberalization of the Indian economy that 
began in 1991 apart from the frequent instability of the government and 
presidents rule in the state. U.P. is also a leading producer of wheat, maize, 
barley, gram, sugarcane and potatoes. The state produces about one half of 
the total sugarcane output in the country in 2002-2003 sugarcane 
production was 116218.5 tonnes '^^  and so it is rightly called India's 
'sugarcane bowl'. Until recently the organized industrial sectors of U.P. 
was confined to agrobased industries such as sugar, cotton textiles, edible 
oil and paper etc. but now new large scale industries are being setup. By 
the end of March 1998, there were 2,616 medium and large industrial 
undertakings with an investment of Rs.41,266.20 crore and employment 
opportunities for 7,38,582 persons.^'' 
21. For details see, Valerie Kozel, Barbara Parker, Economic and Political Weekly, Jan. 
25, 2003; A profile and diagnostic of Poverty in Uttar Pradesh, p. 385. 
22. Source : Economic Survey 2001-2002 quoted in India : 2004 Observer Statistical 
Handbook; Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2004, p. 182. 
23. RBI, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 2000, published in India : 2004, 
Observer Statistical Handbook; Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2004, 
p. 53. 
24. India-2005, (comp. & ed.) Research Reference and Training Division; Publication 
Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, p.873. 
The state faces three major challenges in redressing poverty - first 
tc expand economic opportunities, second to ensure that the poor are 
empowered to take advantages of new opportunities and third to ensure an 
effective safety net in place to reduce vulnerability and protest the very 
poor and destitute.^^ 
Caste and Community : 
Indian society is divided into different religion and regional 
groups, castes and sub-castes from time immemorial.^^ The 1931 census 
listed 14 large castes according for 62% of the population of both Hindus 
27 • 28 
and Muslims. Angela S. Burger classified U.P. castes in three categories 
: (i) The lowest groupings, (ii) middle grouping, and (iii) highest 
groupings. The lowest grouping consist of the scheduled castes - the 
farmer untouchables, who are given advantages by the govt, in various 
spheres. Among them is the chamar, the largest caste in U.P. Middle caste 
grouping consists of the backward caste. Among them the Kurmi, Yadav 
and Lodhis are important. Formerly Yadavs were also known as Ahirs and 
Ahars. Other backward castes, less prominent but of some important in 
politics, include the Gujars, Gadariyas, Kachhis, Koeris, Muraos etc Third 
grouping which is dominant caste in U.P. is described as "elite caste" by 
Angela S. Burger Pal Brass called them "dominant castes" which are 
Brahmin and Rajput with then he believes some land owning castes are 
25. Valerie Kozel, Barbara Parker, op.cit., No. 21. 
26. Dr. Indumati Parikh; Reservation; The Radical Humanist, vol. 67, No. 8, Nov. 2003, 
p. 15. 
27. Sudha Pai; op.cit. No. 19, p. 20. 
28. For details see, Angela S. Burger, op.cit. No. 12, pp. 24-25. 
also important like jat in western U.P. and Bhumihars in eastern U.P. 
Among upper castes, Banias and Khattris are also very important. 
Different political parties try to appeal to Muslims, SCs and 
backward classes. To increase their vote bank caste is a very dominant 
factor in U.P. politics since independence. Parties used the issue like 
Hindu-Muslim riots to persuade Muslims enblock to seek refuge in the 
party out of power and appeal to SCs (Harijans) by highlighting the 
atrocities committed against them and appeal to backward castes by the 
1ft 
slogan like 'garibi hatao'. Upper caste dominated U.P. politics since ages; 
Congress which ruled U.P. almost for two decades after independence was 
represented basically by "Urban Hindus" including small town, interests, 
drawing heavily from the English educated high caste professional and 
business groups.^' But in the last decade; 'Dalit assertion' has been one of 
the most significant factors of the society and polity of Uttar Pradesh (in 
1990s).^ ^ This factor changed U.P. politics after 1990s and was a dominant 
factor behind the 1996 U.P. election. Religious conflict between Hindu and 
Muslims was more important than castes before independence which 
resulted in the division of India. After independence, still communalism 
dominated Indian politics. Muslims constitute about 16% of the population 
and are in minority. Paul Brass claims that Hindus tend to think of U.P. as 
29. Paul R. Brass, op.cit. No. 15, p. 235. 
30. Paul R. Brass; Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, vol. II (Election 
Studies), Chanakya Publications, Delhi, 1985, p. 7-8. 
31. Paul R. Brass and Francis Robinson; (ed) The Indian National Congress and Indian 
Society; 1885-1985, Ideology Social Structure and Political Dominance; Chanakya 
Publications, New Delhi, 1987, p. 16. 
32. Sudha Pai; New Social and Political Movement of Dalits; A Study of Meerut 
district. Contribution to Indian Sociology; Vol. 34, No. 2, May-August 2000, p. 189. 
the heart and centre of Hindu India but their identifications are generally 
either wholly parochial and sub-regional, embracing the whole of the Hindi 
speaking area or Hindustan'." Violence is used either to deplore the new 
policies or to defend which are in existence to win votes of either the 
backward castes as a whole or the upper castes as a whole. After 
independence RSS led party 'Jana Sangh' ignited the tension between the 
two communities and spoke about "Hindu Nation" and engineered 
demolition of Babri Mosque and the Ram Mandir issue is dominating U.P. 
politics since 1990 and was a major factor behind 1996 Assembly election 
in U.P. 
Important Political Parties in U.P. since Independence 
Political parties are very important for a democratic government to 
function. Their leadership and policies, internal practices and the pattern of 
interaction with other parties and institutions can have profound 
consequences for the system of governance. Political parties are central to 
Indian political life. Their role in political mobilization, governance, the 
formulation and implementation of economic and social policy, ethnic 
conflict, separatist movements, and the working of democracy has long 
been the focus of analysis.^'' Indian national Congress in India's oldest 
political party which dominated U.P. politics as well as Indias politics first 
two decades after independence. Though Congress has always been a 
dominating political party in U.P. before 1990 except a notable exception 
33. Paul R. Brass, op.cit. No. 15, p. 231. 
34. Zoya Hasan; Introduction : Conflict, pluralism and the competitive party system in 
India in Zoya Hasan, (ed) Parties and party politics in India; Oxford University 
Press, Delhi, 2002, pp. 4-5. 
of 1977 U.P. Assembly election when it got only 47 seats.^^ This gave 
chance to other political parties to dominate U.P. politics at the social and 
national level. 
The Congress : The Indian National Congress was founded on 27 
December 1885 in Bombay.^ ^ Thus the Congress party is the oldest among 
the parties and most of the other parties came into existence due to 
factionalisation in congress, the Jana Sangh being an exception. From a 
movement, the Congress after independence became a political party and 
this transformation gave rise to personal and factional politics. From 
1947 to 1967 the Indian Party system can be characterized by 'dominance 
coexisting with competition but without a trace of alteration' because 
opposition parties could hardly prevent Congress from gaining sizeable 
majorities in legislature."' Rajni Kothari described ruling Congress party as 
a 'party of consensus' while opposition parties as 'parties of pressure' 
because opposition parties were sharply divided among themselves and 
could not become an alternative to the ruling party and acted only as 
pressure groups working from outside. James Manor claims that it was 
within the Congress that nearly all the groups that mattered in Indian 
35. Source : Statistical Supplement; Prepared by CSDS Data Unit; Vol. 15, Nos. 1 & 2, 
Jan-June 2003, p. 377. 
36. Horst Hartmann; Political Parties in India; Meenakshi Prakashan, 1982, Meerut, p. 
41. 
37. Craig Baxter; The Rise and Fall of Bhartiya Kranti Dal in Uttar Pradesh; in Myron 
Weiner and John Osgood Field (ed) Electoral Politics in Indian States, Manohar, 
New Delhi, 1975, p. 113. 
38 . Paul R. Brass, op.cit. No. 15, p. 240. 
39. Morris Jones; Dominance and Dissent; p. 217; cited in James Manor; Parties and the 
arty system in Partha Chatterjis (ed) State and Politics in India; Oxford University 
Press, Delhi, 1997, p. 94. 
40. Rajni Kothari, The Congress 'System' in India; in Zoya Hasan {ed)Parties and 
Party Politics in India; Oxford University press, Delhi, 2002, p. 40. 
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politics could be found/' The Congress had a dominant position in U.P. 
politics until 1967, but it was not without opposition. The election of 1967 
greatly reduced Congress strength at the Centre and in the States. From 
1967 Congress support in the states steadily leaked away to the various 
regional parties.'*^ After 1967, there was first coalition era in U.P. state 
upto 1977. In this decade Congress remained as a single largest party in the 
state except in 1977 when it could manage only 47 seats lowest since 
independence though it got 31 % vote share. This decade was also marked 
by frequent elections i.e. mid term elections and instability and it was 
believed that only congress could give a stable government in the state. 
Congress came back in power again in 1980 with '309' seats and in 1985 
with 269 seats.''"' From 1989 to upto now, its position in the state is 
deteriorating. In 1989 it could get only 94 seats, in 1991-46 seats and in 
1993-28 seats'''' which resulted in the beginning of second coalition era in 
the state. 
There have been various reasons for the downfall of the Congress 
in the state. The death of Nehru contributed to a loss of control. Disputes 
between 'organisational' and 'ministerial' wings of the state parties 
became a major and almost the only activity of the Congress at the state 
level.''^ Nehru was an astute politician and used plans like Kamraj plan to 
strengthen the party. Hartmann called it the great 'party political 
41. James Manor; Parties and the Party System in Partha Chatterjee (ed) State and 
Politics in India; Oxford University press, Delhi, 1997, p. 95. 
42. Paul R. Brass and Francis Robinson, op.cit. No. 31, p. 9. 
43. CSDS Data Unit; op.cit. No. 35. 
44. Ibid. 
45. Craig Baxter; op.cit. No. 37. 
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operation'''^ of his time when he sought resignation from 6 ministers and 6 
chief ministers to work for the welfare of the party. Mrs. Gandhi is 
criticized for her authoritarian, centralized and nationalized policies. 
Paul Brass argues that after Nehru she seemed unable to 
consolidate her power at the central level and the tenderness were clearly 
in the direction of localization, factionalisation and ruralisation. 
Factionalism has been one of the most important factor in the downfall of 
the Congress, that many commentator have advanced repeatedly. Shortly 
after independence the Congress socialist party left the shelter of the 
Congress, and in 1951 a group under Acharya Kripalani departed. By the 
time of the first General Elections most ideologically based groups, aside 
from Swatantra were gone. 
The internal politics of the Congress party in U.P. revolved around 
a struggle to gain or control the office of Chief Minister by dominating the 
party organization. Pandit Pant, first Chief Minister of U.P. left for the 
centre after 1955 and Dr.Sampurnand became Chief Minister of U.P. from 
1955 to 1960. Then C.B. Gupta succeeded him and became the third chief 
of U.P. from 1960 to 1963, when under Kamraj plan he was removed and 
Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani became the Chief Minister''^ after 1967 again C.B. 
Gupta formed the govt, in U.P., a coalition govt, with the support of 
Independence which could not survive more than days. Defection of big 
46. Craig Baxter; op.cit. No. 37. 
47. Paul R. Brass; National power and Local politics in India; A twenty year 
perspective in Partha Chatterjee (ed) State and Politics in India; Oxford University 
press, Delhi, 1997, p. 305. 
48; Craig Baxter; op.cit. No. 37, p. 113. 
49. Paul R. Brass; op.cit. No. 15, p. 241. 
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leaders like Charan Singh contributed to its decline. After the death of 
Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India. Death of 
Rajiv Gandhi exposed the inadequacy of congress to win power in U.P. and 
it is witnessing frequent decline in its vote share and seats. 
Congress 'vote bank' : The Congress has been represented by a fusion of 
the professional and business classes in the cities and towns with the 
middle class of petty and middle zamindars and the more prosperous 
tenants in the countryside.^^ It was basically supported by dominant castes 
such as Brahmin and Thakur, later after 1990 when BJP captured power in 
several states it was also benefited by getting good share of Muslim votes. 
Sudha Pai says that because of its secular image it could gain support of 
the lower castes/classes and the Muslims apart from the prosperous peasant 
classes.^' The Congress generally does not rely only upon its influence 
with the 'dominant castes' to win election but seeks to form coalitions of 
caste and community groups.^^ When Charan Singh with peasants appealed 
backward castes, was not liked by Samumanand and C.B. Gupta because 
of their pro-upper castes altitude.^^ After 1990s when BJP started gaining 
ground in U.P. and other states Congress opted for a 'non-sectarian' 
approach and appealed to the masses from all the section of Indian society. 
The Socialist Parties : The history of the socialist parties in U.P. is a 
history of mergers and splits. The socialists with the emergence of 
Congress socialist parties (CSP) entered into Indian politics which was 
50. Ibid., p. 236. 
51. Sudha Pai, op.cit., No. 19, p. 39. 
52. Paul R. Brass, op.cit., No. 15,. 242. 
53. Zoya Hasan, op.cit. No. 20, p. 258. 
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formed in 1934 with the Congress. After independence in 1947 the 
Congress adopted a rule that no organized groups should exist within itself. 
Some CSP members, including Acharya Narendra Dev, Jaya Prakash 
Narayan, Ashok Mehta, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, S.M. Joshi, and Achut 
Patawardhan, then decided to withdraw and form the socialist party. It is 
estimated that less than 20 per cent of the membership of the CSP in U.P. 
left the Congress in 1948.^ ^ In 1951 a group of radical Congressmen under 
J.B. Kripalani left to form a new party in U.P. The Kisan Mazdoor Praja 
Party (KMPP).^^ In Dec. 1949, twenty one Congress men, led by Triloki 
Singh, crossed the floor of the house. These twenty one MLAs formed a 
Jan Congress, which merged with Acharya Kripalani's Kisan Mazdoor 
en 
Praja party in June 1951. The outcome of the first General election was a 
shattering blow to the hopes of the socialist leadership. It could gain only 
19 Assembly seats while KMPP could get only 1. On September 12, 1952 
the two socialist parties (PSP). By the merger the party apparatus went into 
the hands of the socialist, which provided all the secretaries in the party 
unit, whereas the honourable positions went in the hands of the former 
KMPP member Kriplani became the party President and Ashoka Mehta 
became the General Secretary.^* In Feb. 1993, Nehru invited JP to 
cooperate with Congress to keep away communist opposition problems. 
Both SP and Kripalani had expressed their readiness to cooperate which 
was not liked by Lohia.^^ Acharya Narendra Deva also backed him while 
54. Angela S. Burger, op.cit., No. 12, p. 36. 
55. Paul R. Brass, op.cit. No. 15, p. 248. 
56. Sudha Pal, op.cit. No. 19, p. 39. 
57. Paul, R. Brass, op.cit. No. 15, p. 248. 
58. For details see, Hartmann, op.cit. No., 36, p. 71. 
59. Madhu Limaye; Birth ofNon-Congressism; Opposition Politics, 1947-1975; B.R. 
Publishing Cooperation, Delhi, 1988, p. 47. 
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Ashoka Mehta welcomed this move. Lohia and Narendra Dev were of the 
opinion that the socialist should keep an 'equal distance' with Congress as 
well as from the communists. Lohia constantly championed the theory of 
'equi distance'. Again on 28 December 1955, Lohia split occurred, creating 
two socialist parties in the state, the PSP and the socialist. The socialist 
parties, like the Congress, have been afflicted with factionalism and with 
the struggle of individual leaders for personal prestige. Again in 1962 an 
attempt at the reunification of the two socialist parties were made. This 
time both the parties were ready to cooperate even on some critical issues. 
New party which came out of the merger of PSP and Socialist Party was 
known as SSP (Samyukta Socialist Party) and was even ready to accept the 
manifesto of SP as their code of guiding principal.^^ It gave way to what 
Lohia called to merge unconditionally with PSP at the all India level in 
1964 but soon on Jan. 1965 PSP established its separate existence. One of 
the main reasons which harmed the unification was the expulsion of Ashok 
Mehta from the party for accepting a post in the Congress government and 
defection of his supporters. In U.P., the PSP was seriously weakened by 
these events, for those who opposed unity with the Lohia's socialist joined 
the Congress in June 1964 and those favoured unity remained in the new 
SSP.*^ ' Lohia again started talks of unity to fight fourth General elections. 
By March 1966, he envisaged four ascending steps.^^ (i) Electoral 
adjustments, (ii) Limited one issue fronts, (iii) Broad joint fronts, (iv) 
Merger of parties. After the fourth General elections, the Jan Sangh 
emerged as the largest opposition party in U.P. Congress loss became its 
60. H. Hartmann, op.cit., No. 36, p. 72-73. 
61. Paul R. Brass, op.cit. No. 15, p. 249. 
62. Madhu Limaye; op.cit. No. 59, p. 102. 
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gain while PSP which was earlier the largest opposition party in U.P. could 
gain only 11 seats. It got 44 seats in 1957 and 38 seats in 1962. SSP could 
gain 44 seats." All the opposition parties joined hand to form non 
Congress coalition government but with the passage of time, the PSP 
became more and more disillusioned with the functioning of SVD 
Government. In 1969 midterm election both SSP and PSP witnessed loss in 
their seats. SSP could get 33 while PSP could get only 3 seats and finished 
as an independent party in U.P. By 1970 the PSP had all but given UP on 
the usefulness of pre-election alliances and coalition politics. In 1971 Lok 
Sabha elections, the PSP and SSP followed different strategies. In U.P. the 
PSP supported a Congress (R) Govt, while the SSP sought to bring it down 
in alliance with Congress (0) and the BKD.^ ^ After 1971 Lok Sabha 
elections, a movement starts among some groups within both the parties to 
join forces once again. In the PSP, sentiment for merger was more general 
and less divisive than in SSP. While in SSP, Madhu Limaye and Fernandes 
favoured dropping the policy of non-Congressism and merging with the 
PSP, Raj Narain and U.P. unit of the party favoured continuation of the 
anti-ruling Congress alliance strategy and resisted merger with the PSP. 
Talks about merger started in April 1971 which resulted in the formation of 
the new socialist party in June 1971. Karpuri Thakur of the new SSP was 
the new Chairman of the party and Madhu Dundvate of the PSP was 
elected General Secretary. But soon in Oct. 1971 disputes arose over the 
63. Link, Jan. 26, 1967, Vol. 9, No. 25, p. 34. 
64. Bruce Bueno De Mesquita; Strategy, Risk and Personality in coalition politics; The 
Case Study of India, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p. 55. 
65. Paul R. Brass, Leadership, conflict and the Disintegration of the Indian socialist 
movement in Dr. Sundar Ram (ed) Readings in the Indian Parliamentary 
Opposition, New Delhi, Kanishka Publications, 1996, vol. 2, p. 51. 
66. Paul R. Brass, Ibid No. 65. 
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selection of an adhoc committee for the state. In March 1972 news began 
to appear that the SP was on the brink of a split, that Raj Narain had filled 
his nomination papers for a Rajya Sabha seat from U.P. after being denied 
the nomination by the Central parliamentary Board of the Party, that he 
was seeking a merger of his faction with Congress (O) and that would soon 
take his group out of the party. Karpuri Thakur had resigned the 
chairmanship of the party because of its refusal of the Rajya Sabha 
nomination of Raj Narain. The National Committee of the SP responded to 
Raj Narain's defiance of the Central Parliamentary Board by suspending 
him from the party for six months. On 14 May, the Raj Narain group split 
from the SP and formed a parallel party at Allahabad called the Socialist 
party (Lohiavadi).^ ^ Karpuri Thakur also formed a third separate unit called 
the socialist party (Samata vadi Ektavadi) whose aim was to restore unity 
in the socialist movement. In December 1972 these two groups merged 
again in the SSP, the new SSP comprised most of the UP wing of the SP 
and approximately half of the Bihar legislative party, the other half having 
chosen to remain with the SP. PSP lost its individual identities in U.P. after 
1969 elections while socialist party could get only 5 seats in 1974 with its 
strength greatly depleted was unable to evolve a viable political line. The 
weakening of socialist movement made it subject to counter pressure of the 
Congress as well as opposition politics.^ ^ SSP became a part of BLD and 
supported Charan Singh, leaders like Karpuri Thakur and Mulayam Singh 
67. 18 India Recorder & Digest, Nos. 4 & 5 (April-May 1972), 23-24 cited in Paul R. 
Brass; Ibid, No. 65. 
68. Ibid. No. 6 (June 1972) 16,21 in Paul & Brass; op.cit. No. 65. 
69. Madhu Limaye; op.cit. No. 59, pp. 519. 
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Yadav did not allow the Congress element to capture party organization.'^ 
In 1977 all the opposition parties except communist came under one 
Umbrella to defeat Congress and won 352 seats in 1997 Assembly 
elections of U.P. 
Support Base of PSP 
In the process of mobilization of the people the socialist parties in 
India, depended on the support of trade unions, Kisan Sabhas, women 
associations and Youth organizations. But their role was very limited as the 
SSP for instance, complains that its Youth Wing, Samajwadi Yuvajana 
71 
Sabha (SYS) has no influence over any group except the students. 
Nevertheless, the SSP, because of its aggressive and nationalist policies 
finds a better response among the younger generation from the PSP and 
aims at furthering its cooperation with SYS. In the field of trade union the 
PSP is supported by the Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS).''^ Paul Brass says 
that socialist party in 1962 elections sought the support of the middle 
agricultural castes, such as the Ahirs. These middle castes were generally 
tenants of Brahmin or Rajput zamindars in their villages, but became land 
owners after zamindars abolition. 
Jana Sangh/Bhartiya Janata Party 
The Jana Sangh is one of the three Hindu communal parties which 
have fought the post-independence general elections. Hindu Maha Sabha 
70. Ashok S. Chousulkar, The Role of the former Congressmen in Opposition; 1980-93; 
in D. Sundar Ram (ed) Readings in the Indian Parliamentary Opposition, vol. 2, 
Kanishka Publishers, 1996, p. 311. 
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72. For details see N. Pattabhi Raman; Political Involvement of India's Trade Unions; 
London, 1967,177, cited in Horst Hartmann; op.cit. No. 36. 
73. Paul R. Brass, op.cit. No. 15, p. 257. 
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and Ram Rajya Parishad have faded and left the Jana Sangh alone as the 
only important Hindu political party in India.''* Craig Baxter says that the 
party resulted from a combination of a partyless leaders, Shyama Prasad 
Mukherjee, and a leaderless party the RSS7^ The Jana Sangh differs all 
other opposition parties in U.P. in that it is not developed out of Congress. 
The Jana Sangh as a party was committed to 'Bhartiya Sanskrit!' which for 
its many supporter meant 'Hindu Nationalism'.'^ Much of its 
organizational impetus came from the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh 
(RSS) a paramilitary organisation''' which was founded by Dr. Hedgewar 
78 
with five association on Vijayadashmi Day, 1925 in Nagpur. Dr. 
Hedgewar was born in 1889, He was a Brahmin of Telugu ancestry and 
7Q 
was highly influenced by Tilak in 1915, he earned a medical degree. On 
his death bed, in the presence of the leadership of the RSS, Hedgewar 
designated Golwalkar as his successor, as M.Sc. in Biology. Though 
Golwalkar was very much a political^° but his ways were mended by D. 
Upadhyaya who was to remain the party's general secretary till 1967 with 
the full support of Golwalkar. From 1954 onwards, leaders of the Jana 
Sangh with an RSS background reshaped the political programme and 
74. Paul R. Brass, op.cit. No. 15, p. 258. 
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organization.^' The main architect of this transformation was D. Upadhyay. 
The RSS has been banned after a Hindu assassinated Gandhi in Jan. 
1948. The RSS and Jana Sangh have been charged for being fascist, 
obscarantist, chauvinistic, supporters of dictatorship, secret organization 
(this with regard to the RSS), enemies of socialism opposed to minorities, 
believers in violence and that they collect arms and give training in the 
use. ' Nehru strongly opposed the RSS. He doubted the intentions of RSS 
and declared 'we shall keep a very vigil watch on it'.*'* Mukherjee who 
founded the Jana Sangh was a man of intellect and well learned, he 
endorsed the programme for the RSS, drafted by Malkani.*^ He was having 
both art and law degree and got elected to the Bengal Legislative Council 
in 1929 as a Congress candidate and again in 1931 as an independent. 
Although he was vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University between 1934 and 
1938, he was inclined towards a career in politics and was elected to the 
Bengal Legislative Assembly in 1937 and joined the Hindu Mahasabha in 
1938. In Dec. 1941 he accepted the post of finance minister in the 
provincial government formed in Bengal by Fazl-Ul Huq, but resigned on 
21 November 1942. He later became working President of the All India 
Hindu Mahasabha at the end of 1944.*^ In the election in 1946, Mukherjee 
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August 15, 1947, Nehru included Mukherjee in his Cabinet as Minister of 
Industries and Supplies. Mukherjee sharply disagree with Nehru on the 
question of Kashmir and on the handling of the East Bengal situation. The 
day Liaquat Nehru pact was signed (on April 8, 1950). Mukherjee and 
Neogy (a Bengali, Minister of Commerce) resigned.*^ After long 
discussions and meetings, finally on May 27, 1951 the BJS was formed in 
Jullandur. Batraj Bhalla was elected President, Sharma- Vice-President and 
Balraj Madhok - Secretary.^^ 
The Jana Sangh stated its fundamentals as 'one country, one 
nation, one culture and the rule of law'.^^ Soon after its formation Jana 
Sangh participated in the first General Elections. It could gain only 2 seats 
in 1957 Assembly Elections in U.P. with 6.5 per cent vote share. In 1957 it 
captured 17 seats with 9.8% vote share. If emerged as a single largest 
opposition party in 1962 with 119 seats and 16.5% vote share. In 1967 Jana 
Sangh secured 98 seats with an increase in the voting percentage from 16.5 
to 21.7.^^ This time Jana Sangh played a decisive role in the formation of 
non-Congress government in the state coalition could not work for long 
and in 1969 mid-term Assembly Elections BJS witnessed a decrease from 
98 to 49 in seats and 21.7 to 17.9% in vote share though it secured 61 seats 
in 1974 Assembly Election. It had a decrease in its vote share from 17.9 to 
17.1%. The Jana Sangh played an important role in forming the Janata 
Party in 1977.^' The Jana Sangh remained within the Janata after the party 
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split in 1979, but after the 1980 Election the Jana Sangh Members 
withdrew to form their own party once again. 
On April 5, 1980 the ex-Jana Sanghis inaugurated a new party, the 
Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), which saw itself as the Janata party's heir. 
Vajpayee, the BJP president, explained that the ex-Jana sanghis could 
claim his special relationship because of the exemplary way they had 
conducted themselves while a part of the Janata party, where their 
attachment to the values of the 'JP Movement' took pride of place.^^ In 
1980 UP Assembly Election party received only 11 seats and in 1985, 16 
seats. ' After the setback they had suffered through participating in the 
Janata party, the founders of the BJP decided that they would never 
amalgamate with another party. In 1989 Assembly Elections BJP secured 
57 seats with 11.6 per cent vote share. It extended full support to Janata 
Dal but soon afterwards BJP took back its support from Mulayam Singh 
government when he made a tactical mistake by arresting Dwarkapeeth 
Shankracharya Swaroopanand to put off his proposed Shilanayas at 
Ayodhya. Though Congress supported the government. It could not last for 
long. The 1991 election will be remembered as a landmark in the history of 
the BJP. In this Election, the party completed the leap it began in 1989. 
The success of 1989 could still be attributed to the effects of opposition 
unity. It's performance in 1991 following as it did the Mandal controversy 
the Rath Yatra, a number of communal violences is credited only to its 
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own. The major gains for the BJP came from the districts ranged by 
frequent riots. The UP Assembly has 425 seats, BJP gained 221 seats. Two 
issues helped BJP to gain ground in UP one anti-Mandal politics second 
Ram Janam Bhoomi-Babri Masjid issue. In 1993, and 1996 BJP played a 
key role in UP politics which will be dealt in detail in coming chapter. The 
leadership and the main sources of support of the Jana Sangh in U.P. came 
largely from the merchants, shop keepers, and businessmen in the towns 
and from the big landlords in the countryside. '^* Ex-Zamindars and 
Talukdars also occupied important position in Jana Sangh.^ ^ Studies in the 
1960s show that most of the Jana Sangh MLAs come from the upper elite 
castes and were largely urban based though many came from a zamindari 
background.^^ BJP is still relying mostly upon the masses of Upper castes 
Hindus which was support base of Jana Sangh. Though appealing lower 
castes to extend its vote box. 
BKD/BLD/LD 
Whenever elections took place, the group rivalries and dissensions 
within the Congress party came to the surface. In 1967 Elections the 
Congress failed to win a majority in the UP Legislative Assembly, 
capturing only 199 of 425 seats." Again C.B. Gupta became the Chief 
Minister of U.P. As a factional leader he was disliked by both Kamlaputi 
Tripathi and Chaudhry Charan Singh. Charan Singh refused to join the 
government allegedly because Gupta did not agree to seek two ministers 
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who did not enjoy a good reputation. According to another interpretation it 
was became Gupta refused to appoint thirteen of Charan Singh's followers 
as Cabinet Minister and Ministers of state.^ ^ On April 1, 1967, Charan 
Singh announced that he was ending his 45 years career in the Congress. 
He founded Jana Sangh which included 13 members who had been elected 
as Congressmen and two who had come in as independents.^^ Charan Singh 
immediately assumed the leadership of SVD (Samyukta Vidhayak Dal) and 
assumed office as Chief Minister on April 6, 1967.^ *'^  But this coalition 
could not work for long and on Feb. 17, 1968. Charan Singh submitted his 
resignation. This happened because CPI and SSP withdrew its support 
from the govt."" In September 1968, Charan Singh formed Bhartiya Kranti 
Dai. It was a party which tried to project an alternative to both 
capitalism and socialism. In the 1969 UP State Assembly Elections, 
Chaudhry Charan Singh had succeeded in getting about 98 seats. It 
emerged as the single largest opposition party. In 1969, Congress party 
splitted at the national level. Gupta remained with the Organisation 
Congress led by Nija Lingappa while Tripathi went to the ruling Congress 
headed by Mrs. Gandhi.'"'* Again in February 1970 Charan Singh formed 
ministry in the state which fell in September. Between 1970 to 1973 UP 
witnessed formation and fall of new government. In the 1974 Assembly 
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Election BKD, SSP and Muslim Majlis alliance could capture 106 seats, 
Congress (O) could get only 10 seats while Jan Sangh got 62.'"^ The 
Congress, led by Indra Gandhi, succeeded in getting a majority. H.N. 
Bahuguna, who was made the Chief Minister before the election, played an 
important role in the success. During the months of April to August 1974, 
attempts to form a democratic opposition to the ruling party were 
continued Talks were held with the leaders of the Congress (O), Jan Sangh, 
DMK and others. These attempts met with a partial success and resulted in 
the formation of Bhartiya Lok Dal. The BLD was inaugurated on 29"" 
August 1974. The BKD, SSP, Swatentra party, Utkal Congress, RLD of 
Balraj Madhak, Kisan Mazdoor party of Chand Ram and Punjab Khetibari 
Zamindaran Union merged into BLD.'^^ Before 1977 General Election 
BLD, the Jana Sangh, the socialist party, the Congress (0) and the 
Congress for Democracy led by Jagjivan Ram merged into the Janata 
party.'°^ On the 23'^ '' of Jan, the Janata party was launched with Morarji 
Desai as Chairman and Ch. Charan Singh as Deputy Chairman. A 27 
Member National Committee was also announced. **^^ The tension between 
the BLD and the socialist on the one hand and the Congress (O) and the 
Jana Sangh on the other led to the Schism of June 1979 when Charan Singh 
founded the Janata Party (S) receiving Indira Gandhi's support to became 
Prime Minister.'°^ Before the 1980 elections, Charan Singh founded a new 
political party, the Lok Dal, one of whose aim and object was to establish a 
105. V.B. Singh and Shankar Bose, op.cit. No. 93, p. 33. 
106. Brahm Dutt; op.cit. No. 102, p. 6. 
107. Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit. No. 98, p. 309. 
108. Brahm Dutt; op.cit. No. 102, p. 112. 
109. Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit. No. 98, p. 319. 
25 
socialist society, consistent with maintenance of individual freedom.''° 
Charan Singh was its president, Raj Narain its Vice-President and Madhu 
Limaye was general Secretary. It was an attempt to combine socialist 
legacy and Kisan politics. After the death of Charan Singh his son Ajit 
Singh could not dominate U.P. politics as his father did though he has 
strong support of jat peasants but is facing opposition from the rising lower 
castes who are numerically dominant in U.P. This is seen in the rise of 
Bahujan Samaj party in U.P. politics.'" 
Support Base : Paul Brass claims that one persistent underlying trend of 
twenty years 1957-1977 has been the politicization of an increased 
cohesion of some of the middle castes of peasants. He maintains the great 
peasant castes, the Jats and the Yadavs has shown a persistent aversion for 
the Congress and tendency to vote solidly for the party of Charan Singh in 
election after election."^ Charan Singh's own reputation rested on the fact 
that he was the Chief architect of zamindari abolition and a consistent 
champion of peasant proprietors, strongly opposed to Congress proposals 
for cooperative farming."^ Brass described him as a spokesman for three 
interests ""^  rural interests over urban; western region peasants over eastern 
region peasant and peasant who took up full proprietary rights under the 
Zamindari Abolition Act (Bhumidars) against those who did not (Sirdars) 
Sudha pai says two factors were responsible for the success ofBKD."'(i) 
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the mobilization of certain castes groups which far had not been politically 
active, (ii) class based changes in the rural agrarian economy which were 
to affect politics. The BLD was formed in 1974. The emergence of the 
BLD helped to consolidate the supremacy of rich and middle peasants a 
development which had far reaching consequences for political and 
economic process in U.P."^ BLD also justified its demands for cheaper 
inputs and lower taxes as beneficial to the whole peasantry. From the mid 
1970s and as part of Janata combine it adopted a multi-class agrarian 
strategy together with caste appeals. As a result of this it was able to gain 
the support of the middle and small peasant proprietors as a whole. Present 
Lok Dal is again heavily depending upon middle class peasants. History 
of Lok Dal is also marked by internal competition and fragmentation; 
Mulayam Singh joined BLD in 1974. When a socialist faction led by Raj 
Narain merged with BKD to form BLD. Mulayam Singh Yadav lost the 
1980s, election but was made president of the UP Lok Dal and then of the 
state Dalit Mazdoor Kisan party that Charan Singh launched in 1984. In 
1987 Ajit Singh dislodged Mulayam from the post of leader of the 
opposition in UP Assembly. The lok Dal splitted into two : the Lok Dal (A) 
After Ajit and Lok Dal (B) 'B' for Bahuguna; a party whose real leader in 
UP was Mulayam Singh. While Bahuguna refused to join Janata Dal 
Mulayam Singh Yadav committed his political party to it and joined its 
central parliamentary Board as Ajit Singh did. The victory of SP in Uttar 
Pradesh led both leaders to contest the post of Chief Minister which was in 
favour of OBCs reservation but anti of OBC-Jat alliances. He was hostile 
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to the inclusion of Jats in the OBC list since it would dilute the Quota 
whose main beneficiaries were to be Yadavs and deprived them of their 
newly established leadership of the lower castes Mulayam Singh Yadav 
again returned to socialist tradition when he severed his links with the 
Janata Dal to form, a new socialist party; the Samajwadi Janata Dal, the 
socialist people's party while became the Samajwadi Party in November 
1992."^ 
The Janata Party : 
The creation of the Janata party resulted from the merger of BLD, 
the Jana Sangh, the socialist party the Congress O and the Congress for 
Democracy - the product of a break away faction of Congress led by 
Jagjivan Ram."^ Though there has been unity talks on various levels but 
immediate cause of unity was Mrs. Gandhis withdrawal in 1977 the 
Emergency she imposed in 1975 and holding of free elections in which she 
and the Congress were thrown out of power in a stunning opposition 
victory. Leaders like Madhu Limaye has been preaching "that unless there 
was a non-Congress at the centre, the non-Congress government in the 
state could not flourish or exist".'^'^ One of the major causes of the down 
fall of the Congress in 1977 was the resignation of Jagjivan Ram on 2 Feb. 
1977 both from the Union cabinet and from the Congress party. Whereas it 
acted as a morale booster to newly formed Janata party, it demoralized the 
Prime Minister and her party, says Hartmann. The reason for his 
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resignation was assigned to the Prime Minister's reluctance over revoking 
the emergency proclamation. Criticising the extraordinary powers; Ja^yivan 
Ram observed in his resignation letter that life and liberty of the citizens 
are not safe. Any citizen can be deprived of his property by the 
Government without any remedy legal or administrative - being available 
to him."^^ 
Babu Jagjivan Ram and his five associates H.N. Buhuguna, 
Shrimati Nandini Satpathy, K.R. Ganesh Raj Mangal Pandey and D.N. 
Tiwari did not join any opposition party, but formed a new party. The 
Congress for Democracy. The CED consisted mainly of defector from the 
Congress.'^'' On the 23'^ '' of January, the Janata party was launched with 
Morarji Desai as Chairman and Ch. Charan Singh as Deputy Chairman. A 
27 member National Committee was also announced.'^'' Congress criticized 
Janata party as 'hotch potch' and its unity as facade". Jay Prakash Narayan 
explained that 'It is not born out of expediency but out of realization of a 
political necessity. The opposition parties have realized that if the country 
has to be saved for democracy they must came together not merely as an 
alliance but as one single party".'^^ Among the major political parties, BLD 
and Jana Sangh both parties had long played and important role in UP 
politics. In 1977 Janata Party came to power both at the centre and in U.P. 
In U.P. in 1977 Assembly Election the Janata party gained majority. It 
receives 352 out of 425 seats. Congress could get only 47 seats but 
122. Ibid., pp. 270-271. 
123. Ibid., p. 271. 
124. Brahm Dutt, op.cit. No. 102, p. 112. 
125. The Sunday Standard, 13 March 1977. 
29 
31.9% of the popular votes which shows that it still remained a force in 
UP. The BLD represented the interest of the rich peasant while Jana Sangh 
represented business community and big land owners, the CFD represented 
the interest of the Harijans and constantly complained of lack of support to 
the lower castes in the rural areas and of being suppressed by the BLD. 
Due to this diversity of support from various sectors of society Janata party 
could get 47.8%'^^ vote share only Congress party could get this much 
votes earlier in first General Election because it was then also getting 
support from all sides. In 1977 Congress just qualify to become the official 
opposition. The election results clearly indicated that the BLD and the Jana 
Sangh were the most dominant section of the party. Among the Janata 
constituents the relative strength of the various erstwhile parties was that 
BLD-156; Jana Sangh-97, CFD-53 and others 46.'^* Both the Chief 
Ministers Ram Naresh Yadav and Banarsi Das were from the BLD. 
Finding a Chief Minister in a coalition Government was a huge 
difficulty, faced by Janata's party. Just after the election, names of 3 chief 
Minsiters were in the air. Charan Singh, M.K. Bahuguna and C.B. Gupta, 
while Charan Singh had big plans, Bahuguna also decided to influence UP 
politics from outside. C.B. Gupta who was too old to shoulder the 
responsibility was not too interested. Ram Naresh Yadav backed by the 
BLD-Jana Sangh combine came out triumphant. Ram Naresh Yadav was 
criticized by the former SSP group of BLD, by the Congress, CFD, 
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socialists and the Ciiandra Shekhar group who supported Ram Dhan; the 
formation of ministry was the second difficulty faced by Janata. Many 
other coalition partners feared that Jana Sangh BLD combine will 
dominate. Hardly five months had passed after Yadav took over the change 
of Chief Ministry when a concerted move to dislodge gathered momentum 
in November 1977. Ultimately it was decided that Ram Naresh Yadav 
would seek a vote of confidence. Yadav won the vote of confidence by 
securing 273 votes against 103 votes polled by dissidents.'^^ Jana Sangh 
helped Mr. Yadav to survive this situafion. Again his position was 
challenged in June 1978. Third time on February 7, 1979 when he was 
again asked to seek a vote of confidence his supporter could not bail him 
out from this impasse. Ram N. Yadav lost the vote of confidence by 9 
votes. He secured 190 votes and the dissidents 199. Charan Singh proposed 
name of Banarsi Das while a section of BLD was not in favour of Banarsi 
Das's candidture. Charan Singh asked his group to support Banarsi Das 
and persuaded Raj Mangal Pande to withdraw but Pande refused to 
withdraw'^ *^ and therefore, CFD was divided, one section supported Banrsi 
Das, the other supported Raj M. Pande. Banarsi Das won by a comfortable 
majority of 35. He secured 212 votes against 177 by his rival. Banarsi Das 
could hardly complete one year as Chief Minister when Janata party was 
splitted between Janata and the Janata(s) (secular). Charan Singh with the 
support of Cong. (I) became the Prime Minister in July 1979. Charan Singh 
could not win the vote of confidence in parliament and give way to fresh 
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elections. The Janata party, BLD (old Janata (S) were routed from power. 
Mrs. Gandhi came back to power. 131 
Mrs. Gandhi used Narainpur incident to dissolve state assemblies 
ruled by Janata party. The Narainpur incident took place on 14 Januarj^  
1980, just after the parliamentary elections which brought Congress (I) 
back in power'"^ at the centre. The Narainpur incident was a major 
symbolic issue used by Mrs. Gandhi and the Cong. (I) to demonstrate the 
incompetence of the Janata government still ruling in UP and other states 
and its aligned mistreatment of Muslims and scheduled castes and the 
consequent need for mid-term legislative Assembly elections. On 18 Feb., 
the President of India, acting on the advice of the cabinet, dismissed the 
UP government and nine and other state government in India and ordered 
elections to be held in them in June 1980. Down fall of Janata party 
resulted in the disintegration of the party. Many parties looked back to gain 
their independent identities to fight 1980 elections. Jana Sangh became 
Bhartiya Janata party, BLD converted into Lok Dal later into LD (A) and 
LD (B). Janata party could gain only 4 seats in 1980 Assembly Election. 
Mr. V. P. Singh became the Chief Minister of U.P. in 1980.*" When 
Congress was in power. In 1980 Janata party could gain only 4 seats led by 
Chandra Shekhar with 2.9% vote share. It's presence was almost negligible 
in the state. 
Janata Dal : Twelve years after the first Janata experiment, a second one 
started with the rise of Janata Dal in power in 1989. The Janata Dal (JD) 
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was formed by V.P. Singh who left the Congress in 1988 to establish is 
own party, and included some other parties. While the Janata party had 
been a very heterogeneous coalition like party. It was primarily 
amalgamated only two currents of Indian politics, that of the socialist and 
LD of Charan singh. This state of affair was evident from the identify of 
the parties it incorporated, mainly the Lok Dal (A) of Ajit Singh and the 
Lok Dal (B) of Devi Lai, and form the long list of socialist leaders who 
became office bearer of the Janata Dal - Madhu Dandvate, George 
Fernandes, Surendra Mohan, Sharad Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan, such 
heterodox origins brought with them their own problems, as controversy 
over the name of the party showed till the last minute it was intended to be 
called the Samajwadi Janata Dal (socialist people party) but Devilal 
strongly objected to the epithet 'socialist' and it had to be removed.''''* 
V.P. Singh was the Chief Minister of U.P. in 1980-82 and was than 
appointed Finance Minister by Rajiv Gandhi, a post where he launched an 
unprecedented campaign against Business Tax Evasion. He manifested his 
socialist sedentials by claiming that he was 'to the Congress what JP was 
to the Janata'. "' Due to his anti-corruption policies he was shifted from 
finance to Defence department. Later he was forced to resign.'^^ After that 
V.P. Singh, Devilal and Hegde played an important role in the formation of 
Janata Dal. BJP did not merged into Janta Dal, after 1977 experience, its 
decided to remain as an independent party. But it had close alliances with 
JD, Mulayam Singh Yadav who became President of the Janata party in 
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U.P. in February 1989 largely due to the support of Devi Lai merged with 
LD (A) in Janata Party. Jana Morch and remaining groups of the erstwhile 
Janata party merged also into JD. He maintained his hold on UP even 
after the minority Janata Dal led National Front government collapsed at 
the centre, once the BJP withdrew its support in the wake of the Mandal 
Mandir controversy. 
The process of disintegration of the Janata Dal began soon after its 
victory in December 1989. During 1990 two issues within UP contributed 
tc this process. V.P. Singh's decision to implement the Mandal 
commission report on 8 August 1990, divided the party at the centre and in 
U.P. In U.P. Mulayam Singh opposed the Report and it divided party into 
pro and anti Mandal groups. His group consisted of the erstwhile LD (B) or 
the socialist group while the opposing group was led by Ajit Singh and 
V.P. Singh and was made up of the earlier LD (A) which had a strong base 
in western U.P. This divide became very important when the Janata Dal 
split at the centre on 6 Nov. 1990 and 70 MPs led by Chandra Shekhar left 
the party to form the Janata Dal (socialist) leading to the fall of V.P. 
Singh's government on Nov. 7, 1990.'^ ^ Mulayam Singh Yadav decided to 
join the Janata Dal (S) group which enabled him to gain Congress support 
in order to remain in power creating a situation very similar to the 
arrangement at the central level. He was able to give a vote of confidence 
on Nov. 20, 1990 when in spite of some reservations almost all congress 
members voted for him. This led to a formal split in the Janata Dal and 
Yadav and his group were expelled from the party for coUading with the 
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Congress. The Janata Dal also announced dissolution of the executive of 
the UP unit of the Janata Dal and all the district units. A new President, 
Kailash Nath Dixit was appointed who was to form a new executive. This 
led to the breakup of the district level units of the party in many areas. 
Hence the split was directly responsible for the poor electoral performance 
of the party as it affectively destroyed its base in many areas.'•'^  
The fall of the Chandra Shekhar government at the centre on 5 
April 1991 led to the resignation of Mulayam Singh Yadav and dissolution 
of the U.P. Assembly. He severed his links with the Janata Dal to form the 
Samajwadi Janata Dal, which became the Samajwadi party in Nov. 1992. 
Since 1991 Janata Dal position is declining in the state it could gain only 
92 seats in 1991 with 18.81% vote share and secured 27 seats in 1993 with 
12.3% vote share.'^" 
Bahujan Samaj Party : 
In the 1980s one of the most significant development in U.P. 
electoral politics has been the rise of Bahujan Samad Party (BSP), a party 
which seeks to gain the support primarily of the scheduled castes and also 
the backward caste and minorities in North India. Earlier the scheduled 
castes voted for either the Congress or the Republican party of India which 
could not make a remarkable stand in U.P. It could gain 8 seats in 1962 
Assembly Elections, 10 n 1967 with 4.1% vote share, and on in 1969 later 
in 1974, 1977 and 1980 it could not gain even a single seat. Kanshi Ram, a 
chamar converted to Sikhism, founded the Bahujan Samaj pparty on 14 
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April 1984. He started his organizational activities by founding the All 
India Backward (SCs/STs/OBCs) and converted Minorities communities 
Employee Federation (BAMCEF) in 1973. He adopted Ambedkar's motto 
'Educate, organize and Agitate for his BAMCEF. Kanshi Ram created the 
Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti (DS4) (Committee of the Oppressed 
for struggle) in 1981. BAMCEF and DS4 helped building the network of 
Phooley Ambedkarite movement for founding the BSP in 1984.''*' Kanshi 
Ram in his writings has outlined two stages by which the position of the 
dalit/bahujans would undergo a transformation. The first is capturing 
power through mobilization and electoral victory from the Upper caste who 
comprise only a small percentage of the population. 
In the second phase, under the leadership of the BSP, the 
revolution would penetrate deeper into society transforming it through 
appropriate policies for the details using the power of the state "from 
above". "•-
BSP vice President Ms. Mayawati who became UP Chief Minister 
from June 3, 1995 to October 27, 1995"'^ an LLB, a school-teacher turned 
politicians helped the party to emerge stronger year after year. The BSP 
contested elections for the first time in UP in the 1985 Assembly Elections, 
but lost all the seats in 1989 it contested 372 seats and could win only 13 
seats with 9.84% vote share. In 1991 when it contested 385 seats it could 
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win only 12 seats. In 1993 it entered into an alliance with the SP and 
contested 167 seats and won 69 with 11% of vote share. BSP-SP alliances 
helped BSP in emerging as a strong party but could not work for long and 
BSP entered into an alliance with BJP for four and a half months (June to 
October 1995). When BSP was in power it started extending its support 
base by giving reservation to SCs/ST, launching Ambedkar village 
programme (AVP), installed 15,000 Ambedkar statues all over UP."*'* 
Electoral Politics in U.P. upto 1967 
The Congress was the dominant force in U.P. nearly for three 
decades. Under the rule of the Congress party in the post independence 
period. UP enjoyed a political stability upto the late 1980s except for a 
brief period in the mid 1960 and 1970s.'''^ Paul R. Brass argues that from 
1951 to 1967, is the period of Congress domination of Indian politics. It 
stradelled the middle ground of Indian politics and was the central factor in 
what come to be termed the Congress 'system' of one party dominance. 
From 1967 the Congress system of one party dominance was marked by a 
loosening of the party's grip on politics.'''^ 
The first four general elections to the Lok Sabha 1952, 1957, 1961 
and 1967, coincided with elections to all the state assemblies. In the first 
three of these, the Congress party won an over two third majority of seats 
in the Lok Sabha on the basis of mostly a plurality of votes against a 
144. Sethi Suni! (1997) "When Dalit women find their voice", The Times of India, New 
Delhi, July 28 in Sudha Pai, Deprivation and Development, VXXV, No. \,Man and 
Development, March 2003, p. 41. 
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fragmented opposition. Only in 1967 for the first time Congress received a 
set back due to fragmentation in its own party which strengthened the 
opposition. The Congress party polled nearly 48 per cent of all valid votes 
cast in the 1952 elections. It had won 390 out of 430 elective seats in 
VindhanSabha.'^^ 
Pant had been the dominating personality in the UP Congress since 
1937, when he became the state's first chief Minister, he was an 
authoritative leader with great personal prestige, which enabled him to 
mediate and arbitrate internal conflict in the UP Congress. After he left, the 
whole tenor of U.P. politics changed. Authoritative political change was 
replaced by group and faction leadership.''*^ Congress emerged victorious 
again in 1957 Assembly Election when it received 286 seats with 42.4 per 
cent vote share. PSP emerged as single largest opposition party and Jana 
Sangh started gaining ground with 17 seats. Dr. Sampurnanand continued 
as the Chief Minister of U.P. First time he became Chief Minister of U.P. 
in 1955 when Pant left to join central cabinet after him internal struggle to 
gain control the office of Chief Minister dominated the party organization 
and C.B. Gupta became the Chief Minister of U.P. in 1960. Factionalism 
and Dissensions among Congressmen that even they were ready to bring 
down their own ministry.'''^ The failure of the Congress to retain the 
number of seats. It had secured in 1957 (286 out of 430), the emergence of 
the Jana Sangh as the main opposition, the decline of the PSP and 
improvement in the position of the communists were the main features of 
1962 Assembly elections in U.P. 
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Congress could secure 249 seats out of 430 and its vote share 
reduced from 42.4 in 1957 to 36.3% while Jana Sangh got 49 seats and its 
vote share almost got doubled, 16.5% PSP decline with 38 seats and 
socialist could get 24 seats.'^° Apart from factionalism, communalism was 
claimed to be the main reason for this downfall of Congress.'^' Keshav 
Dev Malvia said, "The Jana Sangh had adopted a strategy of campaigning 
which, to me, appears based completely on fascist methods of approach to 
the people. Repeat a lie a million times and it becomes a truth. When the 
slogans regarding cow slaughter and inter-caste marriages were repeatedly 
dinned into the ears of the people' they started believing it.'^^ C.B. Gupta 
became the Chief Minister of U.P. but his leadership was not unchallenged. 
This group in the Congress Assembly party was slightly stronger than the 
dissidents with a "floating" vote of about 40 but groupism and hostility had 
not died down even after the unanimous election of C.B. Gupta as the 
leader.'^^ Under Kamraj plan Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani succeeded C.B. 
Gupta in 1963. Under Kamraj plan, Nehru decided to accept the 
resignation of six minister of his cabinet and six chief ministers. According 
to the Kamraj plan these people should devote their full time for the party 
work.'^ "^ In U.P. Nehru wanted Tripathi to succeed Gupta but Mrs. 
Kripalani's succeed was possible only because the followers of the former 
chief minister were not happy with Nehru. So they decided to vote for her. 
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With this, the old group rivalries in Uttar Pradesh once again became 
acute.'^^ According to Dr. S. Gopal, Pandit Nehru, "used the opportunity to 
send out many of these either reputed to be inefficient or rumoured to be 
corrupt or known to disagree with him on basic policies the Finance 
Minister, Morarji Desai in particular, Nehru wished to see out of office".'^^ 
In 1963 a major development was the defeat of Congress in many 
parliamentary by elections in which defeat in Jaunpur^", Amroha, 
Farrukhabad and Rajkot'^ ^ shocked the ruling govt. The result of three by 
elections, Amroha, Farrukhabad and Rajkot in which the Congress was 
defeated by a sweeping majority created a sensation in the country. While 
the extent of the defeat surprised every one, it nearly stupefied the congress 
and raised great, jubiliation in the ranks of the opposition. The later lost no 
time in declaring the result as a clear 'verdict' of the people against the 
govt, and infact, called for a general election in the country.'^^ No doubt 
war with China had been the measure cause of this defeat and it also was 
responsible for 1967 down fall. 
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Chapter - II 
COALITION GOVERNMENT IN UTTAR PRADESH 
Decline of Congress resulted in the emergence of multi-party 
system in Uttar Pradesh. Congress dominated U.P. politics from 
independence to 1967. 1967 General Elections changed centralized power 
making politics of Congress into a more complex mechanism of alliance 
and coalition by the opposition parties. After the General Elections of 1980 
Congress again came to power. But it could not retain this power for a long 
period because of the heterogenous nature of U.P. society and resurgence 
of lower castes. Their turning into a political community changed the 
electoral equations in U.P. Now no single party was able to gain majority 
seats in the state and coalition politics became a compulsion. 
In 1990, U.P. politics witnessed the rise of a competitive party 
system. In three successive state Assembly Elections 1989, 1991 and 1993, 
no single party was able to secure a majority, resuhing in the formation of 
coalition government. First time non-Congress government was formed in 
the state from 1967-1977 and the decade was important in bringing a 
change in the mood of the people. 1989 elections heralded the end of one 
party or Congress domination. Now in U.P. there were so many centers of 
power. Instead of Congress, B.S.P., S.P. and B.J.P. were more powerful in 
the state. Though these parties formed coalitions in the state by uniting 
themselves, but these could be characterized as a coalition of group 
interests representing a segment of the social community. 
41 
BSP represents 'Dalits', Congress and BJP represent upper castes, 
though they are fast converting into multi ethnic parties, SP is supported by 
OBC and Muslims while RLD by the peasants. The big size of the state, 
the existence of various castes and communities and other related problems 
such as communalism tends to divide society and has turned sections of the 
masses towards a party which can represent their interest. But main 
problem of coalition government is instability. Where population is already 
diversified and no single party can fiilfil the aspiration of the people, 
coalition government is a liability, but no two parties can agree upon a 
common programme because these take advantages of diverse sections to 
win elections. Making only sectarian appeal they can win a large number 
of votes from their own targeted group. This leaves them short of a 
majority. The only viable solution remains a coalition government. 
The term coalition is derived from the latin word 'coalition' which 
is the verbal substantive of coalescere, 'co' means together and 'alescere' 
means to grow up which means to grow together.' Oxford Advanced 
Learner Dictionary gives the meaning of coalition as "a government 
formed by two or more political parties working together, a group formed 
by people from several different groups, especially political ones, agreeing 
to work together for a particular purpose and the act of two or more groups 
joining together. According to Ogg, "the term coalition as employed in 
political parties, or at all events where members of such parties unite to 
form a government or ministry".^ William Riker says that "regardless of 
1 . The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, (ed) Edwin R.A. Seligman, V. Ill, New 
York, 1962, p. 600. 
2 . F.A. Ogg; Coalition in Encyclopedia of Social Sciences; (ed) Edwin R.A. 
Seligman, V. Ill, New York, 1962, p. 600. 
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the numbers of persons conventionally believed to be decisive, the process 
of reaching a decision in a group is a process of forming a sub group, 
which by the rules accepted by all members can decide for the whole. This 
group is coalition".^ In short a coalition government may be defined as a 
government formed by more than one political party sharing portfolios in 
the coalition cabinet and sharing political power on the basis of a minimum 
programme. In a narrow sense, coalition is a temporary alliance of distinct 
political parties for a limited purpose. Political parties enter into alliance 
when they are short of majority. Of course coalition governments are 
formed out of compulsion rather than out of choice. 
In every coalition government one party is dominant and one is a 
weak partner. Dominant party or major player in the coalition tries to 
dominate the weaker one in order to serve its own purpose. In U.P., 
whether it was coalition between SP-BSP or BJP and BSP, it could not 
survive for a long period. Coalition government in the state therefore needs 
to tackle the problem of stability. The word coalition has acquired a 
technical significance in social theories with the elaboration of the theory 
of n-person games."* Schelling classified two person games of strategy into; 
(i) pure coordination games, (ii) pure conflict (or zero sum') games and 
(iii) mixed motive games. Coalition can take place only within the context 
of mixed motive, n-person games, in which both conflict and common 
interest are simultaneously present, and must govern the course of action 
3. William Riker; The theory of political coalitions Calcutta, 1962, p. 12 cited 
in John John, Coalition Government in Kerala, Chitra Press, Kerala, p.l 3. 
4. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences; (ed) David L. Sills, 
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chosen. Nature of political parties in U.P. can be better understood in the 
context of mixed motive, n-person games, while political parties being 
antagonistic to each other entered into alliance with other party with totally 
different ideology and programmes. SP and BSP alliance of 1993 and BJP 
and BSP alliance shows this strategy well. 
There are three different categories of coalition politics in India. 
Cohesive, cooperative and combative.^ Apart from the quality, stability and 
dependability, the style of functioning differs between the three categories. 
S.K. Jain says that cohesive coalition is prevalent in Kerala where both the 
coalition led by Congress and left parties realized its limited strength and 
therefore not only agreed to share power but also support each other in the 
interest of the state. The cooperative coalition, he says, rules on 
'compulsions of survival'. Here parties avoid ditching and play down 
controversies and coalition between BJP and Akalis is reflection of this 
trend. Third he says that 'combative' types are based on the 'short term 
opportunistic objective of obstructing the chances of a common adversary'. 
The purpose of parties here is not to strengthen the coalition but the 
partners constantly seek to gain partisan advantage and settle scores with 
each other. The example of combative coalition was between the BJP and 
BSP in U.P. 
In U.P. political parties fight each other even in a coalition to gain 
advantages. In SP-BSP coalition, Mulayam Singh gave more and more 
5. For details see, ibid., p. 530. 
6. See for detail, S.K. Jain, Coalition politics and party system in India, in 
Kalim Bahadur, M.C. Paul (ed) Contemporary India, Authors Press, Delhi, 
2000, pp. 39-40. 
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reservation and government job to OBCs to expand its vote base while 
same was done by Mayawati government in the alliance of BJP. Both the 
parties tried hard to gain over dalit votes. BJP allianced itself with BSP so 
it could make a base among dalits while the only motive for BSP was to 
come to power. Kanchan Chandra argues that all parties in patronage 
democracies succeed on an ethnic head count. She says the difference 
between them lies only in the nature of the coalition whose support they 
seek. Ethnic parties seek uniform coalition of support while muhi-ethnic 
and non-ethnic parties seek the support of differentiated ethnic coalition. 
By doing this parties get support of one group while they alienate another. 
IR U.P., SP and BSP seek uniform coalition of support from OBCs and 
dalits while muhi-ethnic parties like BJP and Congress rely upon 
differentiated ethnic coalition groups to gain broad support from all 
sections of society. 
Lok Sabha speaker G.M.C. Balayogi said that reason for coalition 
politics in India may be fragmentation of main line political parties and the 
emergence of regional parties. He admitted that coalitions are products of 
the political realities as they emerge in a parliamentary democracy. This 
resulted due to complexities of a multi-party system where a number of 
mmority parties join hands for the purpose of running the government. 
In U.P. coalitions are always formed for the sake of reward, there 
is tough competition between various parties. In U.P. coalition politics is 
7. Kanchan Chandra; Why Ethnic Parties Succeed; Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, pp. 96-97. 
8. G.M.C. Balayogi's address at the inauguration of the symposium on 
coalition Government and Political Stability in the Journal of Parliamentary 
Information, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, Sept. 2000, p. 392. 
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more dynamic affair than other states, old coalitions are easily dissolved 
and new are formed for the sake of increase in reward. Working on a 
minimum programme even seems impossible by the opportunistic parties 
in the state. Coalition partners don't work on a clear cut ideology but they 
adjust with each other for the sake of power. This can be rightly 
understood by the implications given by Bruce Bueno De Mesquita about 
the coalition process in India. Where he made a precise study of U.P. 
politics.' 
One major drawback with the coalition government is the 
instability. Whenever in Uttar Pradesh, Congress was not in power, the 
period was marked by frequent election, down fall of government and 
instability There are various causes of this instability in the state. First, 
there is a multiparty system and no single party can dominate the scene. 
This multiparty system makes the coalition formation and maintenance 
more difficult. Secondly there is the presence of extreme right parties like 
the BJP and Congress. If these parties are not in power, they try to weaken 
the existing coalition system either to come themselves to power or to stop 
some other party from assuming power. Thirdly, different parties have 
different ideologies and different caste appeals, and working with an 
entirely different ideological party makes coalition prone to collapse. 
Coalition experiment from 1967 to 1977 and since 1990s has been 
very bad. Stability of the government is always doubted. The irreconsilable 
9. For details see Bruce Bueno De Mesquita; Strategy Risk and Personality in 
Coalition Politics; The Case of India; Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1975, p. 151. 
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differences and tussle between the partners of the coalition increase the 
danger of breaking up of the coalition. Ministers work more for survival of 
the government than welfare of the people. Welfare comes in the face of 
Yadavisation or Dalitisation of U.P. politics, where marginal sections of 
the society are benefited. How the coalitions in the state were formed? 
What were the causes behind the alliances and break up of the coalitions? 
Who were the major partners in the coalition? Who benifitted and who was 
cheated? All these questions ask for a detailed study of coalition 
government. 
The Beginning of the First Coalition Era in the State 
From 1967 to 1977 
1967 election marked the beginning of coalition era in U.P. state. 
This era extended from 1967 to the defeat of the congress party at the 
general elections of 1977, which occurred in the immediate aftermath of 
the emergency. In the 1967 election the congress failed to win an absolute 
majority in the UP (eg. legislative assembly, capturing only 199 seats of 
425 Assembly seats). The anti-congress storm which swept across the UP 
had liquidated the congress party's absolute majority and reduced it to the 
status of the single largest group in the state Assembly. It was 16 short of 
absolute majority in forming the Government." E.P.W. da Costa claimed 
that poll results Heralded second Indian Revolution.'^ Jana Sangh emerged 
10. Source : Statistical Supplement; Prepared by CSDS Data Unit, Vol. 15, Nos. 
I & 2, Jan-June 2003, p. 377. 
11. Congress defeated in its strong hold; Link, Feb. 26, 1967, Vol. 9, No. 29, 
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as the second largest group in the state bagging 98 seats with 21% of valid 
votes cast PSP could gain only 11 seats. It's share of total votes polled fell 
from 11.5 in 1962 to 4.1 in 1967, SSP grew stronger by gaining 44 seats 
with 10% vote share communist could capture only 13 seats. The left 
parties put up a poor show because of their internal division and lack of 
resources. The 1967 election left politics in UP in a state of flux. Neither 
the congress nor the opposition parties were able to claim majority support 
in the legislature. The balance of power in the 425 member state legislative 
assembly lay with a few uncommitted independents and after much 
negotiations and some coercion, the Congress party under the leadership of 
C.B. Gupta succeeded in working sufficient support to the government. 
The formation of a Joint Legislative Party of 215 was achieved on March 
5, 1967 Though it seemed difficult to choose a leader in congress party.'"* 
On March 7, 1967 C.B. Gupta was elected as a leader.'^ Governor 
Biswanath took the advice of Advocate General'^ and invited C.B. Gupta 
to form the Government." On March 13, C.B. Gupta was sworn in '^  and a 
list of 18 ministers and Deputy Ministers proposed by Mr. C.B. Gupta was 
hastily cut down to 13 on Charan Singh's refusal to join the new UP 
government shortly before he was sworn in.'^ Charan Singh told reporters 
13. Joint Legislative formed in U.P. The Statesman; Delhi, March 6,1967, p. 1. 
14. Party leadership contest Inevitable in U.P. - The Statesman, Delhi, March 7, 
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that "Mr. Gupta was kind enough to invite me to join the government but 
7ft 
for certain reason. I could not see my way to accept it". Though 
bargaining with independents would have worked it did not work within 
the congress party itself. On April 1, when Gupta presented his cabinet to 
the assembly for a vote of confidence, Charan Singh startled the meeting 
by crossing the aisle and announcing that he was ending his 45 years career 
in the congress. Charan Singh then started a new party, the Jana Congress, 
which included 13 members who had been elected as congressmen and two 
who had come in as independents.'^' With the fall of the Congress ministry 
the Governor of the state called upon the SVD to form the government 
though Jana Sangh was the biggest party, Charan Singh could assume the 
leadership because it could topple the congress government; SSP - 45, 
CPL-14, PSP-11, Swantantra - 10, the Republican party - 7, Independent 
Group - 18 (Nirdaliya Dal) was combined with Charan Singh to form the 
government.^^ 
Despite some initial success, the stresses among the parties and 
continued pressure brought by the congress led the coalition to eventual 
collapse. The SSP was dissatisfied with the pace at which the government 
was implementing important programmes. On June 26, 1967, it gave the 
government an ultimation to leave the govt. After long debate back and 
forth, the SSP resigned in Nov. 1967 on the same day the CPI Ministers 
20. Ibid. 
21. Craig Baxter; The Rise and Fall of Bhartiya Kranti Dal in Uttar Pradesh in 
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and Deputy Minister, both resigned from tiie cabinet in support of the SSP 
position, but assured the Government of their party's continued support. 
The SSP gave no such assurance.^^ The most important dispute concerned 
Charan Singh's opposition to the demand of the communists and the 
socialists concerning the abolition of land revenue on farms of less than 6 
acres Recognising the necessity of SSP support, the Jana Sangh and the 
swantra party agreed to compromise their position on the land revenue 
issue. SSP and CPI ministers, satisfied with the compromise, withdraw 
their resignations. The CPI resigned again in Nov. 1967, this time over the 
government use of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) against Trade 
Unions. This time Jana Sangh also supported the CPI. 
On the matter of reshuffling in the cabinet both PSP and Jana 
Sangh grew angry." The demand for new leader intensified both interparty 
and intra-party differences. The Swatantra, the Republicans, the BKD, and 
the independents continued to support Charan Singh, While the Jana 
Sangh insisted upon his replacement. The SSP, the PSP and the CPI were 
divided on this issue.^^ Charan Singh resigned and advised the governor on 
Feb. 17, 1968 to dissolve the Assembly and order a mid term election. SVD 
thought it was still capable of forming the Government and decided to elect 
another leader.^' The Uttar Pradesh legislative Assembly was suspended 
23. Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, op.cit No. 9, p. 96. 
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from Feb. 25 to April 14, 1968 after Charan Singh submitted his personal 
resignation to the Governor B. Gupta Reddi. Since the Congress under 
C.B. Gupta could not manufacture a majority in the Legislative 
Assembly^^ the Governor, setting aside the claim of Charan Singh's 
successor in the SVD to form the government, advised the President to 
dissolve the Assembly. President Rule, dissolving the Assembly was 
proclaimed on April 15, 1968 and continued till Feb. 16, 1969.^ ^ Dr. Zakir 
Hussain signed the proclamation dissolving the Vidhan Sabha to pave the 
way for the holding of mid term elections in the state.^ *^  
Before mid term elections Charan Singh joined in April 1967 the 
BKD which emerged as a strong force in mid term poll in U.P. Assembly 
elections and got support of the Jats, Ahirs, Kurmis and the Kulaks.''' BKD 
emerged as a new factor in the state politics. It eroded the backward 
community base of the Republican Party and the SSP commanded the 
Kulaks support, especially in the three western divisions of Meerut, 
Ruhilkhand and Agra. The BKD annexed 98 seats, 58 from the Congress, 
10 from the Jan Sangh, nine from the SSP, five from Republicans and 16 
from independents and other parties. It also won 24 of the 89 seats reserved 
for the SCs sixty one of the 98 seats being in the three western divisions of 
the state.^^ The Jana Sangh lost 50 seats with its strength reduced firom 98 
28. The Statesman; Delhi, Feb. 26,1968. 
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in 1967 to 48 in 1969. It lost 64 seats to the Congress and gained 20 from 
it, the net balance is a deficit by 44. SSP could get 33 seats. In this election 
Congress increased its number seats from 199 to 211, two seats short of a 
majority."^ This time Gupta could easily acquire the necessary support to 
gain a majority and form a Congress ministry. In 1969 began the series of 
events which ended in the split in the organization party at the national 
level Gupta remained with the Organisation Congress led by Nijalingappa, 
while Tripathi went to the Ruling Congress headed by Mrs. Gandhi. The 
BKD decided to regain its separate identity and not to merge with either 
the Congress (I) or Congress (R).^'' Gupta tried to save its ministry and 
added 29 new members on November 23, 1969^^  but on February 10, 1970 
Gupta, resigned and requested the Governor to invite the BKD leader, 
Charan Singh, to form an alternative government. 
This was perhaps, the last master stroke of Gupta to keep 
Kamlapati Tripathi out of seat of power. Charan Singh was assured the 
support of Congress (0), SSP, Jan Sangh and the Swatantra party. On 
February 17, Charan Singh formed the Ministry but in coalition with the 
Congress (R). In return, the 10 BKD members of the parliament assured 
Mrs. Gandhi of their support for her government.''^ After 8 months his 
government fell on Sept. 5, 1970 BKD members in the Rajya Sabha voted 
against the Government Bill on privy purses. Charan Singh asked 26 
33. CSDS Data Unit, Op.cit. No. 35, p. 377. 
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36. B.D. Dua, op.cit. No. 29; pp. 295-296. 
52 
Congress (R) ministers, 26 out of a total of 46 in the cabinet to resign. 
When these Ministers refused to resign, Charan Singh requested the 
Governor to dismiss them forthwith. The Governor, B. Gopala Reddi 
seemed confused but Mrs. Gandhi showed him the way since the Cong (R) 
was a major partner in the coalition, BKD was a minor partner, i.e. it was 
BKD which should resign in the event of a break up. Governor took the 
opinion of Attorney General, which was that either all the ministers should 
resign or else the president should take over the administration. On Sept. 
30, Mrs. Gandhi send a messenger in the Soviet Union to take the signature 
of the touring president of India for a presidential proclamation dismissing 
Charan Singh Ministry and suspending the Uttar Pradesh legislative 
Assembly on Oct. 1, 1970. Charan Singh's second government was 
followed by an other short lived government led by T.N. Singh in which 
the BKD was the main coalition partner in alliance with the Cong (0), 
Swatantra the Jana Sangh and the SSP.^ ^ 
On October 18, T.N. Singh formed the United front to form the 
government which was soon in trouble. He was a member of Rajya Sabha 
and needed to find a seat in the assembly but he failed to do so. Though 
T.N. Singh was supported and campaigned by C.B. Gupta; Charan Singh 
and Karpuri Thakur still he was defeated in Mani Ram bye election. Now 
he was forced to resign. Different sections started to talk about the 
submission of his resignation. T.N. Singh's government was defeated in 
37. Ibid., pp. 296-297. 
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the U.P. Legislative Assembly on March 30, 1971 and followed by a 
succession of Congress governments/° Tripathi became the new Chief 
Minister of U.P. on April 5, 1971. Tripathi melded members of both 
Charan Singh ministries and the 1969 Gupta ministry, along with some 
new members in what appeared to be a fairly stable government. Stability 
however, was not a long range matter in the U.P. politics and the Tripathi 
cabinet fell in the June 1973 following a rebellion within a segment of the 
police force."* Finally on June 12, Tripathi resigned for what he claimed to 
maintain public standard and as impelled by the urges of political morality. 
Mr. Tripathi said he had come to the conclusion after examining various 
alternatives, that "my resignation should be accepted and president's rule 
imposed, if necessary".""^ U.P. came under President's rule. Assembly was 
suspended and President Giri took over the administration of the state on 
the basis of Governor's report."*^  One aspect of U.P. politics was no doubt 
the struggle for the post of Chief Minister whether it was a coalition 
government or the ruling parties like Congress which had a majority. 
Dissidents could ever change the equations in favour of leaders of their 
own choice. After that, hardly any CM. could complete full term of five 
year in the office. 
On November 8, 1973, A 35-member congress ministry headed by 
Mr. H.N. Bahugana was sworn in by the governor, Mr. Akbar Ali Khan 
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with the revocution of 148 day old President rule imposed in U.P.'*'* 
Tripathi joined the centre as Transport Minister/^ 
The state went to the polls to elect members of the VI Assembly 
which completed its term of five years in February 1974. Congress got an 
absolute majority by winning 215 seats out of 425 seats, opposition was 
fragmented this time and could not make much change. Initiative to form 
an anti-Congress front to defeat the Congress in 1974 Assembly election 
and to explore possibilities to form an all India party as an alternative to 
the Congress was taken by the leaders of the Cong (0), the Bhartiya Kranti 
Dal (BKD), the Samyukta Socialist party (SSP) the Muslim Majlis and the 
Pragati party when they met at Lucknow on Aug. 6, 1973. But idea was 
dropped because of the differences amongst the participant leaders."*^ 
Congress (0) leader wanted that the opposition parties should join it. The 
BKD and the Swatantra leaders felt that a new party should be formed after 
dissolving the existing parties. The Jana Sangh was not in favour of merger 
at this stage."*^  
The Ruling Congress won an absolute majority with 215 seats in 
the Febuary 1974 elections to the U.P. Vidhan Sabha but its percentage of 
the vote was 1.60 less than that of the undivided Congress in the 1969 mid 
term poll. The party had then won 211 seats. Congress polled 32.6 per cent 
44. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Nov. 9,1973. 
45. Ibid. 
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of the total votes cast as against 33.68 per cent in the 1969 mid-term poll. 
Congress secured majority in 1974 with 32.3 per cent vote share but it 
failed to do so when it got 33.7% in 1969.''^  An outstanding feature of this 
election was that though many political parties suffered a decline in their 
share of votes they registered a substantial increase in their share of seats 
in the assembly. The one to benefit most from this electoral phenomenon 
was, of course, the ruling party.''^ The voting trend showed that by and 
large the majority of SCs/STs votes had gone to the Congress. They 
supported Congress party's program of 'Gharibi Hatao'. The victory of the 
Congress came as a surprise even to the Congress leaders of the state who 
had forecast a massive majority for the party. The Bhartiya Kranti Dal -
SSP Muslim Majlis Alliance has come out as the second large group with 
106. The BKD's individual scores was 82, the SSP's 21 and Muslim 
Majlis' three. The BKD got 98 seats in 1969, SSP secured 33 in 1969 and 
Muslim Majlis only one.^ *' Jana Sangh got 98 seats in 1967. In the 1969 
mid term poll, its tally was reduced to half at 49 while in this election it 
improved its position and secured 61 seats with 12.1% vote share though it 
had 17.9% vote share in 1969; it could get only 49 seats. The Congress (0) 
and the Swatantra were the worst sufferer in this elections. Congress (0) 
could get only 10 seats with 8.44 '^ per cent of votes polled. The number of 
48. CSDS Data unit, op.cit. No. 10. 
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seats (and percentage of votes polled) by the swatantra party in 1967 and 
1969 were 12 (4.73) and 5 (1.25) respectively. The declining popularity of 
independents continued in this election also.^ ^ 
H.N. Bahuguna again become the Chief Minister of U.P. and 
headed the government until 1977 when Assembly was suspended under 
the Janata and fourth elections were held. Mrs. Gandhi imposed emergency 
on June 26, 1975 which extended over 19 months when she withdrew in 
1977 the Emergency she imposed in 1975 and held free elections in which 
she and the Congress were thrown out of power in a stunning opposition 
victory. The history of 28 month Janata party in India is a history of 
merger and split, a history replete with sickening intra party wranglings, 
internecine factional fighting, insatiable ambition of the old men in the top 
echelons and implacable personal hostilities, and a history of those leaders 
in whom the people reposed confidence in the March 1977." Janata party 
took its birth as an 'election arrangement' a patched up compromise to win 
the elections and to avoid the opposition votes. These parties ever had 
strong support base in U.P. In March 1977 elections, the Janata party 
captured power in the centre. One major factor which facilitated the down 
fall of Congress was split in the party on 2 Feb. when Mr. Jagjivan Ram 
and his group CFD (the Congress for Democracy) left the Congress. This 
came as a shock for Indira Gandhi.^'' The formation of the Janata party in 
52. K.B. Shrivastava; Election politics in India; A study of the U.P. Assembly 
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1977 had an important bearing on U.P. politics. Apart from Cong (O) and 
PSP led by George Fernandes, BLD, Jana Sangh and CFD has strong 
support base in U.P. Charan Singhs, BKD, Raj Narain's SSP, H.N. 
Bahugana and Jagjivan Ram had followers mainly in U.P.^ ^ 
The overwhelming victory of Janata party created a new 
confidence in the party. They wanted to utilize the anti-Congress wave at 
its best and immediately after coming to power in the centre, the Janata 
government sacked the Congress Ministry in the states and declared 
election. It was on April 30, 1977 when, B.R. Jatti, the Acting President 
dissolved the legislative Assmblies of the nine states where the Congress 
was totally routed out in March 1977 Lok Sabha elections.^ ^ Each unit was 
interested in getting the lion's share. Chandra Shekhar who was annoyed 
with Charan Singh hit him by secretly aligning himself with Jana Sangh 
and Congress (0) group. When the names of Janata party, candidates for 
the U.P. legislative Assembly were being finalized, Chandra shekhar made 
arbitrary changes in the list prepared by Charan Singh. Charan Singh felt 
that in U.P., Chandra Shekhar intentionally wanted to enhance power of his 
traditional enemies C.B. Gupta and H.N. Bahuguna. On May 14, 1977 
Charan Singh resigned from the post of observer for the selection of 
candidates for the U.P. Assembly seats, later the resignation was 
withdrawn, on May 27, 1977 Raj Narain publicly criticized the party 
president Chandra Shekhar for insulting Charan Singh by changing 88 
names in the list for the U.P. poll prepared by the state's Observer Charan 
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Singh. Distribution of ticket hardly left the Janata party as the United 
party. The Janata party inspite of fierce infighting secured a three fourth 
majority in the seventh Vidhan Sabha elections, held in June 1973, won 
352^ of the 425 seats and Congress was reduced to only 47 seats^^ just 
qualifying to become the official opposition. Here again BLD was a 
dominant party in U.P. which alone could get 156 seats while Jana Sangh 
97, CFD-53 and 46 seats by others.^" 
Now the most difficult task was to search the Chief Minister. BLD 
and Jana Sangh were the dominant party and could play their card well. 
Ram Naresh Yadav backed by the BLD - Jana Sangh combine came out 
triumphant. He defeated his rival Ram Dhan supported by the CFD, 
socialist and the Chandra Shekhar group by a big margin.^' Ram Naresh 
Yadav secured 277 votes while Ram Dhan 103. Ram Naresh Yadav was a 
very weak chairman. Two times he won the vote of confidence with 
thumping majority because BLD and Jana Sangh together backed him. The 
Jana Sangh had long term interests. It wanted stability in the party. They 
saved Naresh Yadav's government in June 1978 but were annoyed his 
ebullience and foolery which was making the Janata party a laughing 
stock. The Chief Minister was again in the dock just after six months he 
had saved his position. This time Jana Sangh did not come to his rescue 
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and on 7 February 1979 he could not seek a vote of confidence. He lost 
only by 9 votes.^^ Only about one and half year of the Janata Rule had 
passed, once again the party was plunged in the search of a leader for 
which the date of election was fixed for 28^ *^  Feb. 1979 Charan singh 
proposed the name of Banarsi Das while Raj Mangal Pande became the 
candidate of Pro-changers. This time BLD was weak because Jana Sangh 
was in opposite camp. But situation changed because Bahuguna charged 
the scale in favour of Banarsi Das who won by a comfortable majority of 
35. ' He secured 212 votes against 177 by his rival. The Banarsi Das 
ministry faced its first and an unprecedented crisis as the entire Jana Sangh 
faction of the Janata voted with the opposition against the minister on the 
Appropriation Bill on 9 March 1979. The fall of the minority was saved by 
the Congress (I) support. 
On the other hand a different realignment of the forces in U.P. was 
taking shape with the efforts of Madhu Limaye and Raj Narain. Madhu 
Limaye brought Bahuguna and Charan Singh close to combat the 
communal forces in U.P.^ ^ Things were also critical in the centre. Charan 
Singh baded by Limaye and R. Narain was struggling to become the Prime 
Minister of India, while Raj Narain was criticizing the government openly 
Madhu Limaye made the systematic attempts to isolate the Jana Sanghis 
inside the Janata party and then drive them out of the party. In June 1977, 
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Raj Narain quit the party and started criticizing government openly. Soon 
Janata party splitted into Janata and Janata (S) (Secular) on July 15, 1979, 
the Desai era came to an abrupt end, when 27 month 22 day ministry 
headed by Morarji Desai submitted its resignation of its being reduced to 
minority owing to a large scale of defection to the Janata (S) under the 
leadership of Raj Narain. On July 9, 1979, Y.B. Charan moved a vote of no 
confidence, which proved a death knell of the Government.^' The three 
developments that played the most crucial role in the ultimate fall of 
Mbrarjis government about from the tabling of the no confidence motion 
and the defection of the BLD members during the whole week, were the 
Bahuguna's resignation from the government, the CPI (M)"s decision to 
vote for the no confidence motion and last but not the least, George 
Fernandes announcement of resignation on the 15* morning. 
Other major factor was the intense power struggle among the top 
three leaders, Morarji Desai, Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram whose lust of 
power proved a death knell to the Janata Government N. Sanjiva Reddy 
later invited Charan Singh to form the government and also to seek vote of 
confidence by the third week of August 1979 and rejected Morarji's claim 
to form the government. His supporter of Charan Singh government was 
Cong (I) at the centre but he had to resign from the post of Prime Minister 
of his coalition government when Indira Gandhi withdrew its support to his 
government before he could sought the vote of confidence from the Lok 
Sabha. In such a juncture the then President, Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, felt 
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that it would be best to hold mid-term elections to the Lok Sabha. He 
dissolved the sixth Lok Sabha on August 22, 1979 and ordered fresh 
Parliamentary elections. In the 1980 mid term elections. Indira Gandhi 
staged a comebade with tremendous majority. Soon the Janata ruled 
assemblies were dissolved, hence Banarsi Das could complete only one 
year as a Chief Minister. The fierce infighting on fractional lines coupled 
with personal ambitions and personality clashes caused the downfall of 
Janata government in U.P. and facilitated dominance of Congress party 
again in the state almost for a decade. 
1980-1985 Assembly Election 
Congress came to power after the fall of Janata party in the centre. 
She dissolved all the state assemblies under Janata ruled and held free 
elections in May 28 and 31.^ ^ It gained an overwhelming victory with 309 
seats and 37.7% of vote share in comparison to 31.9% votes and 47 seats in 
1977. Janata party fell into pieces once again LD group of Charan Singh 
could not dwell even in its strong hold and could gain only 59 seats 
through with an increase in its vote share by 3% (21.5% vote share) vote 
support. BJP lost heavily in Uttar Pradesh. It could win only eleven seats 
as against sixty one the Jana Sangh had won in the 1974 elections. Cong (I) 
faced severe reverses. The Janata party (J) and JS fared even more badly. 
Over 90% of their candidates lost their opposites. Small parties such as the 
Muslim League, Forward Bloc, and Republican party of India etc. were 
swept off the board and communist parties lost many seats. The congress 
68. Back to the Polls, Link, June 1,1980, p. 9. 
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hence cut into the vote and seat share of all parties.^' One major 
development in 1981 was returning of a large number of Congress (S) 
leaders back to the Congress, prominent among them were Y.B. Chavan, 
K.C. Pant, A.K. Antony and J. Vergal Rao. From the Congress side Mr. 
H.N. Bahuguna resigned from the party along his 10 MPs and formed his 
own Democratic Socialist party. For remaining part of his life, Mr. 
Bahuguna remained in the opposition.'" Later Lok Dal also divided in 1987 
into Lok Dal (A) and Lok Dal (B) following the death of Charan Singh. In 
1985 Assembly elections again Congress received a majority, it captured 
269 seats. While it got 269 seats against 309 in 1980 its vote share 
increased from 37.7 to 39.3. BJP captured 16 seats against 11 in 1980 but 
its vote share declined from 10.8 to 9.8. Janata party could get 84 seats 
with 21.4%. Charan Singh's Lok Dal received a major set back, it secured 
20 seats with 5.6% vote share which was least since it birth in 1969 as 
BKD Emergence of V.P. Singh in U.P. and National politics opened a new 
era of coalition politics. V.P. Singh, became Chief Minister of U.P. in 1980 
then he became Finance Minister in Rajiv Gandhi's government. Soon he 
started having disputes with Mr. Gandhi over his policies of anti-
corruption. He was then made a defence minister. Mr. Gandhi forced him 
resign later he resigned from the Congress along with A.M. Khan, 
Ramdhan and Arun Nehru and floated his own political movement the Jan 
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Morcha or the People Front V.P. Singh was known for his personal 
integrity, honesty and competence, so he got over whelming support from 
the masses. In 1988, Mr. Singh contested parliamentary by election from 
Allahabad. He won the election and the victory signaled opposition party's 
return to power.'' 
The Beginning of the Second Coalition Era 
From 1989-1993 
1989 elections brought second era of coalition in state as well as in 
the centre. With the emergence of Janata Dal in the centre and state 
emerged various other parties and issues (The Janata Dal had formed a 
National Front with the DMK, the AASU/AGP, the TDP and the Cong (S) 
in 1989 elections (They had the support of the BJP).'^ After 1989 U.P. 
politics was dominated by SP, BSP, BJP and LD with these parties, 
dominated issues were like OBC's assertions Dalit assertion, Hindutva, 
Mandal Vs. Kamandal and Jat politics or Agrarian politics. The most 
dominating issue has been Ram Janam Bhoomi Babri Masjid issue or 
Hindutva politics of BJP which gave rise to polarization of secular forces 
against non-secular force like BJP. After 1990s BJP also replace Congress 
as a major party in U.P. Congress is receiving frequent downfall in his 
support base year after year. Dalit assertion also has became one of the 
major factor in U.P. Politics which was given impetus by the Bahujan 
Samaj party gave rise to the low caste revolution in the state politics. In 
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1989 the BSP emerged as a force to reckon with when it polled 9.4% in 
Assembly election. 
Janata Dal was formed by the BLD, the remaining socialist groups 
and the Jan Morcha of the Janata party in U.P. Combining both the faction 
of Lok Dal was a big challenge. Mulayam Singh Yadav became president 
of the Janata party in U.P. in Feb. 1989 largely due to the support of 
extended by Devilal. Ajit Singh seemed to have the support of V.P. Singh 
but his effort to make R.N. Yadav President of the U.P. unit of the Janata 
party failed.^ '' 
In 1989 elections JD got 208 seats with 29.7% vote share while 
United Janata party got 352 seats with 47.8% vote share in 1977. Congress 
was totally routed with 94 seats and 27.9% vote share which was lowest, it 
received since first general election. 
In the 1989 election, the BJP had a tally of 57 seats in U.P. 
Assembly, gathering 11.6% of the total vote. Year 1989 also witnessed 
emergence of BSP in U.P. political arena. It secured 13 seats with 9.4% 
vote share. Mulayam Singh succeeded to become Chief Minister of U.P. 
winning over Ajit Singh faction and was having support of BJP. It was 
clear form the very beginning that Mulayam Singh is going to find holding 
power very difficult.^ '' In August 1990 his government came under a big 
crisis when Dwarkapeeth Shankracharya Swaroopanand was arrested for 
his proposed shilaniyas at Ayodhya and mass arrests of farmers from 
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western U.P. and their leader Mahendra Singh Tikait after which 70 
legislators from U.P. revolted Mulayam Singh turned to the centre and 
solicited the help of V.P. Singh, Devilal, Ajit Singh and Chandra Shekhar 
to bail him out. After 2-3 months his government was again in danger, 
BJP withdrew its support at the wake of Mandir-Masjid controversy. Ajit 
Singh was also waiting for the right time. When Janata Dal split at the 
centre and Chandra Shekhar become Prime Minister on 10 Nov. 1990 with 
outside support from the Congress.^^ Now with over 90 legislators with 
Ajit Singh disowned Mulayam as their leader and with the BJP support of 
54 members gone, Mulayam Singh appeared to be in a soup as he was 
reduced to having the support of about 150 MLAs (120 of the Janata Dal 
and 30 independents and others) in a House with an effective strength of 
421. Ajit Singh began to demand his dismissal claiming that he was 
reduced to ministry. He was also given the nick name of 'Dyer' for the 
undeclared emergency he imposed in the state in the wake of Advani's rath 
yatra. Mulayam's government, was saved by the outside support given by 
Cong (I). In Dec. 1990, riots broke in Agra, Meerut, Khurja, Bulandshahr 
and Aligarh. Congress started putting pressure on Mulayam to make 
judicial inquiry into the Ayodhya killings.'^ In June 1991, P.V. Narasimha 
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Rao headed a minority government in the centre, fresh elections were held 
in the state. The fall of the Chandra Shekhar govt, at the centre on 5 April 
1991 led to the resignation of Mulayam Singh Yadav and dissolution of the 
U.P. Assembly.^^ 
The outcome of the 1991 Assembly elections was the result of two 
movements; one was fast drift towards the communalization of U.P. 
politics and another trend expressing rejection at the Congress's and the 
Janata Dai's record in ruling the state. BJP's Ayodhya camp reached in 
UP's villages and towns during the rath yatra of party's President, L.K. 
Advani in Sept. and Oct. 1990. He led to communalization of U.P. politics 
where even non upper caste Hindu supported the party. Though SC/STs 
voted for BSP and OBCs to Janata Dal (S). But the decisions to implement 
the Mandal report further polarized upper caste votes in favour of BJP who 
made its stand clear against Mandal policies by withdrawal its support to 
the V.P. Singh government. Voters were highly confused with the stand 
taken by Congress. While it was Congress in November. 1989, that 
allowed the foundation laying ceremony of the Ram Mandir to take place 
on the disputed site. Although it later prohibited the construction of the 
mandir. The foundation laying ceremony emboldened militant Hindus 
associated with the BJP. This helped the VHP-RSS to start a popular 
movement which significantly changed India's political agenda. Designed 
to reverse the dwindling appeal of the Congress by buttressing the 'Hindu' 
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vote, the leadership permissiveness in allowing the foundation laying 
ceremony, while holding the time against building the temple, alarmed 
Muslims and disappointed Hindus, ironically contributing to party's 
downfall.^' 
The growth of the BJP which had not won even a quarter of the 
votes or seats in the U.P. Assembly before 1991 proved to be an extra 
ordinary development. It received 31.5% vote share and captured 221 seats 
which was highest of its political history. Even Jana Sangh could not make 
such kind of progress. Rai Singh said that BJP heralded a new era in U.P.^ ^ 
Janata Dal bagged 92 seats with 18.8% vote share while Congress finished 
poor third only by getting 46 seats with 17.4% vote share. It's ambiguous 
stand on both reservation and Mandir controversy alienated both Hindu and 
Muslims. Samajvadi Janata Dal of Mulayam was defeated badly and could 
capture only 34 seats with 12.5% vote share. He could not provide stability 
in the state when he was chief minister of U.P. He joined hand with V.P. 
Singh, then Chandra Shekhar and fought election with Rajiv Gandhi's 
support. This political acrobatic of Mulayam Singh Yadav dismayed the 
electorate Mulayam Singh already had a bad reputation among Hindu's for 
using force against Kar Vekas joining hand with Congress also added fuel 
to fire. The major gain for the BJP came from the districts savaged by 
frequent riots. The BJP won from Kanpur Nagar, three successive riots in 
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Kanpur had polarized the electorate on communal lines.*"^  While BJP riding 
the 'Ram wave' secured Hindu votes, the Janata Dal with the help of Shahi 
Imam's 'fatwa' cornered support of minorities, Muslims and OBCs were 
divided between JD and SJP while Yadavs voted for Mulayam, non Yadav 
voted for JP. BSP received 12 seats. The 18 man BJP Ministry, headed by 
Kalyan Singh was established in Lucknow June 24, 1991. BJP's communal 
politics did not step only at winning in the U.P. It was dying to increase its 
vote bank which led to the demolition of Babri Mosque on December 6, 
1992. The Congress party accused the BJP government of U.P. not 
complying with its commitments to the judiciary in regard to the protection 
of Babri Masjid at Ayodhya and destruction of Mosque on December 6, 
1992, led to the dismissal of the Kalyan Singh government of U.P. The 
central govt, in white paper on Ayodhya has clearly justified the dismissal 
of the Kalyan Singh government on the basis of its failure to stand by its 
commitments given to the Supreme Court. The centre in its White paper 
of February 24, 1993 on Ayodhya has catalogued a series of steps to prove 
that dismissal of the Kalyan Singh government was an action of last resort 
by the centre.^^ With the resignation of Kalyan Singh government 
President's rule was imposed in the state which gave way to the fresh 
elections in 1993. Ayodhya issue gave rise to the BJP in 1991. 
In 1993 election the major parties were Samajwadi party of 
Mulayam Singh, BSP of Kanshi Ram, BJP, Janata Dal and Congress. 
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Samajwadi party as the splinter group of Janata Dal combined with the 
BSP and made a winning combination of vote Banks. He was now Banking 
upon Muslims OBCs and Harijan votes. The steady and sustained growth 
of BSP caused concern to the Congress as it was taking away its Dalit vote 
bank. In the 1993 election Janata Dal was seen as the party associated with 
V.P. Singh and Ajit Singh having strong base support of Jats the political 
legacy of his father.^ ^ The BSP/SP combined refused to have any 
alignment with the JD. BJP so sure of its success, did not align with any 
party even Kalyan Singh stated that anything less than 220 seats would be 
considered a defeat of the party in the state.^' Janata Dal 'B ' , Janata Dal 
'A' and Chandra Shekhar function of Samajwadi Janata party merged to 
form the Janata Dal just before the 1993 election Congress party also failed 
to arrive at any such understanding. Elections for U.P. Assembly were held 
to 229 seats on 18 November, the second and final phase of election was 
completed on 21 November, state to 198 seats. BJP emerged as the single 
largest party by capturing 178 seats with 33.3% vote share. It's seats 
reduces from 221 to 178 its vote share increased from 31.5 to 33.3%, SP 
emerged as the second largest party with 109 seats and 17.8% vote share. 
SP-BSP alliance proved to be a winning alliance for both SP-BSP. BSP got 
69 seats with 11.3% vote share. BSP got 24 seats from reserved 
constituencies of SC with 17.3% vote share. It got 45 seats from general 
86. N.K. Chaudhry, Assembly Election 1993; Shipra Publications, Delhi, 1994, 
p. 127-127. 
87. Yogendra K. Malik and V.B. Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India, the Rise of 
the Bhartia Janata Party, Vistaar Publications (New Delhi, 1999), p. 209. 
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with 9.9% vote share. SP on the other hand got 23 reserved seats while 86 
general, while BJP could get 35 reserved seats being an upper caste party it 
could get ever dalit vote when mobilized against masses. Congress and 
Janata both received a major setback getting 28 and 27 seats 
simultaneously. 
The dominant, the depressed and the dalits were the three different 
backward castes which were won over by SP-BSP alliance to win power in 
U.P. After election all the parties specially Congress and Janata Dal 
decided to support SP-BSP alliance.^^ The Governor had little option left 
and Mulayam Singh became the CM of Uttar Pradesh. Though Muslim 
votes were divided between SP and JD still Muslims and scheduled castes 
played a decisive role in the elections. They whole heartedly supported 
Mulayam and Kanshi Ram. November 1993 elections were implemented as 
"secular victory" or as a defeat of "communalism".^ The alliance of SP 
and BSP was brought about by the desire of the deprived castes for a share 
in the power structure and of the Muslims to see the BJP defeated at all 
costs. These groups turned out in large numbers to vote leading to an 
increase in the poll percentage. Caste also played an important role in U.P. 
Lodhas supported Kalyan Singh as Yadav supported Mulayam and harijans 
supported Kanshi Ram. Analyst claims that victory of SP-BSP alliance was 
the emergence of new social forces in U.P. 
88. CSDS, Data Unit, op.cit. No 10, p. 603. 
89. N.K. Chaudhry, op.cit. No. 86. 
90. Yogendra K. Malik and V.B. Singh, op.cit No. 87. 
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It was perceived as victory of secular forces and these social forces 
were not from upper strata of the society but from below and the Hindutva 
forces which had not completely failed still had possibility of re-
emergence^' coalition government has its own lacunas, soon conflict arose 
among Muslims and solid base of dalits. Dalit-backward alliance received 
a set back after Fatehpur and Dauna incident. Land disputes became so 
acute that even Congress threatened Mulayam Singh government to with 
draw support from it. Kanshi Ram called an "anti defection rally on July 
10, 1994 which further became bone of contention between the two. 
Amaresh Misra said that if BSP failed to cultivate a second constituency 
beyond the dalits, it will be leave the BSP devoid of a mainstream position 
of supremacy. But since its existence depends on maintaining this slot, 
withdrawl from the Mulayam government at this juncture could have 
proved suicidal.^'' As soon as the alliances was dagged by differences over 
the distribution of benefits. SP-BSP alliance was by no means a natural 
alliance, since the two communities were engaged in sometimes violent 
conflict over land and wages in the villages. The BSP was worried by 
advances made by the Yadav's under Chief Minister Mulayam S. Yadav's 
dispensation, while backward castes used every opportunity to tease and 
torment dalits and also check the laters efforts towards social mobility. The 
91. Sudha Pai; Emergence of new social forces in U.P. Mainstream, vol. XXXII, 
No. 5,Dec.l8,1993,pp.3-5. 
92. Amaresh Misra, Challenge to SP-BSP Government; Economic and Political 
Weekly. Vol. XXIX, No. 8, Feb. 19, 1994, p. 409. 
93. Amaresh Misra, Cracks in the alliances; Economic and Political Weekly; July 
23, 1994, p. 1907. 
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alliance fell through amidst considerable bickering and bitterness over 
atrocities towards dalits in May 1995.^ ^ Disputes were also related to 
installation of Ambedkar statues over a period of four months, about sixty 
incidents linked with the installation of statues led to 21 casualties among 
the Dalits. Kanshi Ram declared that atrocities was the main reason for 
the divorce between the BSP and the SP. 
The immediate context was the elections to the three-tier 
panchayat system which saw the SP letting loose a reign of terror through 
both the police and its own good machinery against rival candidates and 
parties which included in a big way its own ally, the BSP. The total but 
planned anarchy which started with the panchayat elections reached its 
apagree during the election of the presidents of the new district boards, 
zilla panchayats or zilla parishad. Mulayam Singh was about to capture 
the base of the power pyramid out of 50 districts where elections to the 
presidents of the districts took place, thirty were won by the samajwadi 
party, nine by the BJP, five by Congress and only one by the BSP. These 
results came as a shock to the SP's coalition partner. Mulayam Singh also 
did not lagged behind to welcome dissidents. His strategy to ensure the 
emergence of the SP as a powerful political force not dependent on any 
allies. Before the final act of withdrawing support, the party had began 
attacking Mulayam as 'corrupt' and as a 'thief and Kanshi Ram also 
criticized Mulayam bitterly before journalists. After that a planned meeting 
95. Zoya Hassan, op.cit. No. 80, p. 383. 
96. India Today, 10 April 1994, p. 56. 
97. Amaresh Mishra; Limits of OBC-Dalit politics; Economic and Political 
Wekely, June 10,1995, p. 1356. 
73 
between the two leaders at the same verse in Lucknow could not take place 
with Mulayam Singh staying a walk out. The BSP leader was indeed 
caught in a blind. During a visit to the state capital only 20-22 of his 67 
MLAs turned upto meet him. The rest were reportedly in a conclave with 
Mulayam Singh who it appeared had reached a stage when he could break 
the BSP. 
After the collapse of BSP-SP alliance Mayawati became Chief 
Minister of U.P. (first dalit and second women Chief Minister in U.P.) in 
June 1995 with an alliance with BJP. Major aim of this alliance was to 
control Mulayam Singh Yadav, whose increasing political influence both 
partner wished to curb. One major question arose with this alliance was 
why BSP entered into an alliance with a Manuwadi party who was against 
'Bahujan wad' why BSP broke its alliance with SP and joined hand with 
BJP while basing itself solely on the dalits who for centuries have suffered 
at the hands of forces symbolized by the BJP. BSP ever declaring its 
opposition to ail form of Brahmanism and its political representatives such 
as the BJP. Dr. Sita Ram Sharma says that in 1993, Mayawati and 
Mulayam Singh Yadav formed the most unbeatable combination yet in 
India politics barely had the pundits finished signing hosannas to social 
revolution, when she joined up with a party (the BJP), to oppose whose 
'manuwadi' ideology the BSP was formed in the first place.^ ^ The new 
strategy evolved by Kanshi Ram was bound to give some strength to the 
communal forces like the BJP and, at the same time the BSP's committed 
98. Sita Ram Sharma; After Vajpayee who ? Mohit Publications, New Delhi, 
2004, p. 86. 
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to social justice was diluted BJP leaders declared that the party's support to 
the Mayavati's ministry in U.P. was solely motivated by the desire to oust 
Mulayam Singh's ministry. This on its own admission, the BJPs support to 
the BSP government in U.P. was purely negative in character.^ ^ 
Coalition between two partners is not an easy affair but coalition 
with a partner who has a completely different ideology is entirely 
impossible. Mayawati, after coming in the power started increasing its vote 
bank, she not only distributed benefits but also gave a cultural pride to 
dalits by renaming the universities after B.R. Ambedkar, Periyar Mela that 
the Mayawati government organized on 18 and 19 September 1995 in 
Lucknow was highly criticized by upper castes. She promoted her 
supporters in bureaucracy. BJP may have thought to control this 
government but the reverse happened, Mayawati proved herself to be a 
shrewd politician. She was also determined to give reservations to the 
Muslims. BJP which was "anti dalit and anti-Muslim party could not bear 
this attitude of BSP and the BJP withdrew its support on 18 October 1995. 
The fall of the Mayawati government led New Delhi to declare President's 
rule in Uttar Pradesh. BJP could successfully use the Congress formula to 
overthrow a minority government. Political rivalries and ambitions often 
make politicians discard their old policy based alliances in search of power 
for themselves. This is exactly what happened with Kanshi Ram who 
withdrew support of BSP to the Mulayam Singh government of U.P. and 
joined BJP under the leadership of Mayawati. After sometime BJP pulled 
99. Madhu Dandavate; Quest of Conscience; (BSP-BJP Estrangent), Shipra 
Publication, 1998; p. 305. 
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the rug from under the feet of Mayawati. The same thing Indira Gandhi did 
when she extended support to Charan Singh and withdrew its support even 
before he could seek a vote of confidence. Again Rajiv Gandhi supported 
Chandra Shekhar who defected from the Janata Dal and then Congress 
repeated its tactics which led to the resignation of the Chandra Shekhar and 
downfall of the government with fresh elections ordered. The same 
happened with BSP in U.P. Again the state was under President's rule and 
stage was set for 1996 Assembly elections in U.P. 
Since 1967 elections coalition government has become an 
important feature of state politics in India. Though mainly these coalition 
governments were formed by the faction of Congress parties itself, these 
parties could not reconcile their interest with the dominance of Congress. 
Opposition was fragmented and no single party was able to secure 
majority. To stop Congress the coalition government was the only 
alternative, these parties were not united around a similar ideology rather 
stopping the congress was their only objective. It is believed that before 
1996 elections, UP had entered into the era of coalition government and no 
single party had overwhelmly support of the masses to win a majority. In 
U.P. the essence of coalition politics is opportunism and self interest. The 
main problem of coalitions is that the interest of these actors in the 
coalition are not identical. Here coalition arrangements survive on negative 
agendas like BJP aligned with BSP to stop SP from coming to power. Or in 
1993, SP-BSP combined to stop BJP from coming to power. Sandeep 
Shastri believes that coalition has become a norm and parties extend 
unconditional support to the ruling party. Though the supporting party 
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exercises enormous influence but can in no way be held accountable for 
the governmental decision, many of which may have been taken because of 
the pressure exerted by the former. He further suggests that coalition 
should be formed on the basis of pre-election alliance and acceptance of a 
common programme to provide greater stability. If coalition forms after 
election, a strict adherence to a common minimum programme should be 
must.'°^ There should be clear institutionalization of bargaining structure in 
the coalition and a clear identification of the coalition nuclei or centre of 
power. Coalition politics is not at all a negative concept. It has some 
advantages like accommodation of diverse interest, consensual decision 
making etc. says N. Chandra Babu Naidu. He further says there is no room 
for complaceny and there is a pressure to perform. It is more sensitive and 
responsible to regional concerns.'*" Political parties in U.P. should also 
realize that the state has entered into a situation where coalitions are the 
only option and if they have to live with that, it will be better to make 
sincere coalitions than opportunistic coalitions. 
100. Sandeep Shastri, Making Coalition Governments more Effective, 
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Chapter - III 
CASTE POLITICS IN UTTAR P R ^ E s f c ^ S S s 
Since independence the factor of caste has influenced U.P. politics, 
especially the voting behaviour of the electorates. Though Congress 
dominated U.P. politics with the strong support of upper castes, it also 
received substantial vote share of lower castes. Since 1989 caste factor 
acquired a greater salience when for the first time in the Vidhan Sabha 
elections, the Congress received 27.9% votes. Downfall of the Congress 
gave rise to other parties like BJP, SP and BSP. These parties appealed to 
different castes and used it overtly to increase their vote share. Hence 
politics of U.P. is often based on caste and thus caste acts as a political 
faction. Either it is visible in the exploitation of caste or it is used as an 
issue for elections. 
Rajni Kothari holds that casteism in politics is no more and no less 
than politicization of caste.' The key process was and is politicization. He 
further argues that caste is 'the great seculariser'.^ In response of Mandal 
Commission report he suggested that forces like OBCs cut across religious 
barriers. They unite people of the same caste either they belong to one 
religion or other. While M.N. Srinivas responded to him by saying that it is 
Kothari's illusion of secular upsurge."^  He claims that every caster itself is 
1. Rajni Kothari, Caste and Politics; The Great Secular Upsurge; The Times of India, 
New Delhi, September 28, 1990, p. 8; also Rajni Kothari (ed.) Caste in Indian 
Politics, New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1970. 
2. Ibid. 
3. M.N. Srinivas; A.M. Shah and B.S. Baviskar; Kothari's illusion of secular upsurge; 
The Times of India, New Delhi, October 17,1990, p. 8. 
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internally differentiated and which according to Kothari is cutting across 
religious division is at best a partial truth and at worst an illusion. Hence, 
what castes do to the politics is still to be debated. Whether it is a binding 
or a dividing force, whether caste based politics plays a negative role or a 
positive role by giving great importance to lower classes, should also be 
examined carefully. 
In U.P. caste is a factor of instability, violence and fractured 
verdict. It gave rise to multiparty system, impetus to regionalism, 
Mandalisation with anti-Mandal agitation and rise of lower castes on the 
political front. Earlier Congress has been a dominant party with a very 
weak factional opposition. Now Congress is loosing its ground in U.P. and 
with this three other parties BJP, SP and BSP are building their base 
rapidly. In the fierce struggle for power of four parties, no single party is 
able to gain majority and multiparty system is an established trend and is 
forcing parties to make unbelievable alliances. Caste politics is also 
making regionalism more prominent. Caste based parties can realize their 
potential largely at different regional levels than national level. So, parties 
like SP and BSP can be seen as dominant parties only in U.P. than other 
states. 
Parties also use caste against other caste. Post Mandal politics in 
U.P. witnessed clashes between upper castes and OBCs on the one hand 
and lower castes opposition to OBCs on the other. Caste may be a 
secularizing force cutting across religious barriers but it gave rise to a 
different kind of struggle and violence in the state. Though dalits feel 
proud and have a sense of dignity but their upsurge is not a welcome move 
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and they are subject to fierce opposition in the state. Parties like BSP used 
caste politics as their 'natural right' opposing other castes openly and 
parties like BJP are heading for 'indirect dalitization'^ , realizing its weak 
support base in the state by making alliances with BSP. Kanchan Chandra 
claims that post Congress politics is characterized by two transformation^ 
first, the second democratic upsurge and second, ethnification. The second 
democratic upsurge is characterize by the participation of subordinate 
social groups in the political process and ethnification refers to the 
emergence of party system in which all major parties make open appeal to 
ethnic identity central to their political campaign. 
1989 General election is very crucial in the history of UP as it 
liquidified the support base of Congress and only in this election caste 
based parties like BSP could emerge as a force. Results of 1989 elections 
gave a jolt to the Congress when first time in U.P. it received only 27.9% 
vote share and received 94 seats. BJP playing its Hindutva card rightly 
gained 57 seats with 11.6% vote share. Janata Dal got overwhelming 
majority 208 seats with 29.7 per cent vote share while BSP got 13 seats 
and with 9.4% vote share. 
In 1989 elections Congress banked on its traditional Brahmin-
Harijan-Muslim votes.^  BJP relied on its Hindutva politics with an eye on 
4. Christophe Jaffreiot; The Sangh Parivar Between Sanskritisation and Social 
Engineering in Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffreiot (ed) The BJP and the 
Compulsions of Politics in India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1998, p. 70. 
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Party System and its Consequences in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (ed) Indian 
Politics and the 1998 Elections, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1999, p. 55. 
6. Subhash Kirpekar; The Caste Factor; The Times of India {Sunday Review) November 
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upper castes. Janata Dal appealed to OBCs, Muslims, Jats and Rajputs 
while BSP emerged solely as 'Dalit' party and raised its old slogan, 
Brahmin, Thakur, Bania chor, Baki sab hain DS4' (Brahmin, Thakur and 
Banias are thieves and others belong to Dalit Shoshit Sangharsh Samiti). 
Major developments after 1989 elections were, appointment of 
V.P. Singh as Prime Minister, Mulayam Singh as Chief Minister of U.P., 
the growth of BSP and BJP. All these were set to change the political 
history of U.P. Keeping in view the importance of caste politics, in U.P., 
the present chapter aims to analyse these issues; 
(1) Post Mandal politics, OBCs assertion and role of SP in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
(2) Dalit Upsurge and Role of BSP 
(3) BJP and hunt for vote bank after Hindutva 
(4) Congress still striving as a catch all party; A 'secular approach' is 
the only solution. 
(5) Caste Vs caste competition. 
Post Mandal Politics; OBCs assertion and SP's role in Uttar Pradesh 
In U.P. Brahmans are 10 per cent, thakurs 6.5 per cent, backward 
castes 50% and SCs 20%.^  It is evident that being 50 per cent, i.e. half of 
the UP population OBCs can play a decisive role in the formation of 
7. Chandan Mitra; Sowing the Wind to reap the whirlwind in UP, The Times of India, 
Nov. 22,1989, New Delhi, p. 6. 
8. Sudhir Hindwan, Pioneer, July 22, 1995 cited in Ravindra K. Jain; Hierarchy, 
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government in U.P. After 1989 elections, V.P. Singh became the Prime 
Minister with the victory of the Janata Dal whose main support base were 
OBCs. In August 1990, V.P. Singh's announcement to implement Mandal 
Commission report invited strong opposition from various sections of the 
society. Mandal Commission Report recommended 27 per cent reservation 
for OBCs in the government jobs. V.P. Singh declared it a more intended 
effort to make social reform which was long delayed. Before election also 
V.P. Singh promised to reserve 60 per cent of posts within the party to 
OBCs. He realized that positive discrimination can be a right technique to 
provide long term upliftment of OBCs. His affirmative action programme 
was based on his inspiration and appreciation of R.H. Lohia.^ Many 
scholar, argues that V.P. Singh used Mandal politics to increase Janata 
Dai's vote share, keeping its long term implications in view. C.P. 
Bhambhri claims that, 
"Mr. V.P. Singh, the "messiah" of the worst kind of 
casteist politics in India, proclaimed the acceptance of 
Mandal Commission Report on reservations in public 
services in the name of social justice for the backward 
castes. It is ironical that the worst kind of casteist 
politicians of UP conceal their activity of vulgur 
manipulative politics by taking recourse to the 
ideology of social justice".''' 
While Mandal Commission report states that "what caste has lost 
on the ritual front, it has gained on the political front. (The) caste system 
9. See for detail, V.P. Singh, Towards a Just Society; Abridged Version of his first 
Address to the Nation; 3 Dec. 1989. Cited in Christophe Jaffrelot & Jasmine Zerinini 
Brotei - Post Mandal Politics in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh in Rob Jenkins 
(ed) Regional Reflections, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2004, p. 141. 
10. C.P. Bhambhri; Hindutva; A challenge to multi-cultural Democracy; Shipra 
Publications, Delhi, 2003, p. 
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has provided the political leadership with readymade channels of 
communication and mobilization" (from the Report of Mandal 
Commission, 1980)." 
Implementation of Mandal Commission Report sparked off a sharp 
polarization along caste lines in U.P. Yogendra Yadav claims that rise of 
OBCs as a political community are examples of how marginalized groups 
used competitive politics to make a place for themselves. He also believes 
that this type of politics though strengthening regionalism would also 
strengthen the process of democratization, though locus has been shifted 
from nation to states.''^  
V.P. Singh called this phenomenon, a silent revolution, a long term 
transformation under which more and more people from the politically 
marginalized section of the society were given access to power. This view 
was further polularised by Christophe Jafferelot who claims that this silent 
revolution is an attempt to establish their dignity.'^  Though this revolution 
became a victim of severe opposition from upper castes. This opposition 
helped the OBCs to transform themselves into an interest group. They 
began to vote for candidates from their own caste instead of supporting 
Congress which led to eventual downfall of the party. Zoya Hasan argues 
that OBCs politics in the 1980s was not routine politics of 'vertical clients 
11. Cited in Pradyot Lai and Tara Nair, Caste Vs Caste, Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1998, 
p. 30. 
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variety but rather a much more assertive politics of horizontal 
aggregation'.'" Rajni Kothari declares that move to implement Mandal 
Commission will make castes a great seculariser.'^  
The decision to implement Mandal Commission Report was 
enough to change the history of politics in the state. All upper castes were 
up in arms against OBCs. Their demonstration of anti-Mandal agitation, 
ignited the tension between the two, parties like Congress and BJP were 
against this policy especially BJP was angry because upsurge of lower 
caste was considered against Hindu Nationalism' theory of BJP. OBCs 
realized their potential and asserted themselves as an interest group.'^ 
Students in UP founded the Arakshan Virodhi Sangharsh Samiti and the 
Mandal Ayog Virodhi Sangharsh Samiti.'' Those students who dominated 
the samiti fanned out in the state to mobilize support among lawyers, 
teachers and bureaucrats. They wanted to abolish all reservations, 
including the reservation for the SCs. These groups were against 
reservation in the jobs, where merit should be the only criteria. One of the 
argument put forward was that the heterogenous nature of the OBC 
grouping means that a job reservation policy is likely to create elite among 
the OBC group without necessarily accomplishing the basic purpose of a 
positive discrimination policy. It can not also remove the inequality of 
14. Zoya Hasan; Quest for Power; Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1998, p. 148. 
15. Rajni Kothari, op.cit. No. 1. 
16. Christophe Jaffrelot & Jasmine Zerinini Brotel, Post Mandal politics in Uttar Pradesh 
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access to opportunities arising out of educational or social backwardness. 
Anti-Mandal lobby was guilty of manufacturing a remarkable hysteria over 
the problem rather than trying to solve the problem peacefully and 
analyzing the real nature of the problem. They believe that those who are 
coming in the government job through reservation are inferior to those who 
did not. It was precisely this kind of presumption that led the youths like 
Rajiv Goswami to self immolate to show his anti-Mandal stand.'^  He was 
the first of 152 people, mostly students who tried to immolate themselves, 
of whom 63 succeeded.'^ '^  
Much of the agitation was based upon the fact that developments 
through reservation are cornered by elite group among the OBCs and 
depressed will remain deprived. Indra Sawhney challenged the 
constitutionality of V.P. Singh's decision to implement MCR in the 
Supreme Court in September 1990.^ ' Supreme Court decision came on 16 
November 1992 in which Supreme Court held that government of India 
should specify within four months "the relevant and requisite socio-
economic criteria to exclude socially advanced persons/sections (the 
creamy layer) from "other Backward classes".'^ ^ 
Janata Dal won the loyalty of OBCs but it could not eat the fruit of 
its labour for long. Mandalisation of U.P. politics made Mulayam Singh 
18. Pradyot Lai and Tara Nair, op.cit., No. 11, p. 104. 
19. Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
20. Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit.No. 13, p. 347. 
21. Indra Sawhney and Others Vs. Union of India, Ibid., p. 318. 
22. Ibid., p. 366. 
85 
Yadav, the real beneficiary. His Samajwadi party was formed out of a 
series of splits from the Janata Dal. In Mulayam Singh's government of 
1990, OBCs ministers were above 14 percent, while Upper castes 
continued to cling to half of the Ministerships. Analysts says that "clearly 
the Janata Dal was not an OBC party in the way the Samajwadi party was 
to become one. This is confirmed by the 1993 watershed".'^ ^ Mulayam 
Singh Yadav united OBCs under Yadav leadership with strong support 
from Muslims. He could exploit both Mandal politics of V.P. Singh and 
Hindutva politics of BJP, well in his favour. Being a socialist he has been 
urging the government to implement the recommendation of Mandal 
Commission report since 1980s. V.P. Singh's decision of reservation only 
in the central administration while leaving aside educational institution 
annoyed him badly. However he supported V.P. Singh's decision to shift 
towards Quota politics in the context of Mandal affair.^ '' He could become 
a real beneficiary of Mandal politics by gaining strong support from 
Yadav's and could win 109 seats with 17.8% vote share in 1993. It could 
also gain smartly from BJP's Hindutva politics, which is also dubbed as 
Mandal Vs kmandal on the one hand and on the other hand, a pro-Hindu, 
upper caste communal party which is anti-Muslim, Even putting forward 
Kalyan Singh (a Lodha) could not bring much OBCs votes to the BJP and 
it's communal strategy with the appeasement policy of Congress provided 
Samajwadi party with strong Muslim support. Mulayam Singh's tough 
dealings of the Hindu agitators, during rath yatra to Ayodhya in 1990 led 
23. Christophe Jaffrelot & Jasmine Zerinini Brotel, op.cit. No. 16, p. 156. 
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him to be dubbed as 'mullah Mulayam' by the BJP.'^ ^ He also liquidified 
the Congress support base which was a 'catch all party' and received 
support from all sections of the society. Now Congress declined badly in 
U.P. in 1993 by capturing only 28 seats which was the lowest since 
independence and it could receive only 15% per cent votes. BSP and SP 
alliance reduced it to this minority. Realising this threat the BJP tried to 
influence OBCs, through projecting Kalyan Singh as the party's Chief 
Minsiterial candidate. This helped BJP to win a sizeable section of non-
Yadav OBC votes, in particular those of the Lodha and Kurmis.^ ^ BJP 
could emerge as the single largest party in 1993 Assembly election, it 
gained 178 seats with 33.3 per cent vote share but it could not form the 
government as it was short of about 37 seats to gain majority. It's Mandal 
Vs. Kamandal politics could not bring majority votes and victory of SP and 
BSP alliances was seen as victory of secular forces against Congress and 
BJP. 
Victory of SP-BSP alliances was a landmark in the upsurge of 
lower castes, still this coalition could not work for long. Opportunistic 
strategy of both the parties on the one hand and assertion of Dalits on the 
other hand made both the castes hostile to each other. Soon differences 
were so great that in 1995 the coalition broke. After the break up of the 
alliances, BSP openly revealed that it can enter into an alliance with any 
party to come in power. Capturing power was its main motto and so despite 
25. Paranjoy Guha Thakurta and Shankar Raghuraman; A Time of Coalitions; Divided we 
stand, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2004, p. 179. 
26. Ibid., p. 181. 
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being an anti-Manuwadi party it came in power first time, truly, when 
Mayawati became Chief Minister, with an alliance with B JP which was an 
upper caste party. By aligning itself with an upper caste dominated party, 
BSP gave a jolt to the so called silent revolution of lower castes. 
Congress finding no other option but to stick to its non-sectarian 
approach lost its vote bank to SP and BSP. Being a catch all party it was 
representing multi-ethnic groups. Now these groups, identifying their own 
potentials, under new leadership started leaving Congress. Hindutva 
politics saved BJP for the moment but caste politics emergence played an 
important role in the decline of congress. Assertion of Dalits under the 
leadership of Kanshi Ram and Mayawati also needed a close examination 
to understand the character of caste politics in U.P. and its implications 
hereafter. 
Dalit Upsurge and Role of BSP 
Rise of Janata Dal not only benefited OBCs but also dalits. Dalit 
assertion accelerated after Mandalisation of UP politics. Through 
'Mandalisation' OBCs realized their potential and it also led dalits to 
recognize their numerical strength in the state. Political mobilization of the 
lower castes mainly dalits started with the emergence of Bahujan samaj 
party in the state politics. However, Dalit politics is not a recent 
phenomenon. Before the rise of BSP, RPI in 1952 (Republic Party in India) 
Dalit Panthers in the early 1970s, BAMCEF in 1978 (Backward and 
Minority Communities Employees Federation and DS4 (Dalit Shoshit 
Samaj Sangharsh Samiti) in December 1981 under the leadership of Kanshi 
Ram worked for the emancipation of Dalits. Kanshi Ram worked hard to 
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convert dalits from a social community to a political community. He 
preached the masses that only way of emancipation is to capture political 
power first and after that by constitutional means rest can be changed 
peacefully and legally. His main motto was 'jati todo samaj jodo' aimed to 
unite bahujans to capture power. From the very beginning Kanshi Ram 
knew that only dalit assertion can not bring success for the Bahujan Samaj 
party and potentials of other backward castes and minorities can be 
utilized. As OBCs were represented by Janata Dal in General and 
Samajwadi party in particular, BSP became a party of Dalits. Sudha Pai 
argues that BSPs emergence and establishment as an important political 
force was a result of the steady decay and in fact a collapse of the 
"Congress system" in U.P. Congress dominated by upper caste leaders 
failed to throw up BC or SC leaders and therefore became increasingly 
marginalized, where lower castes were becoming important. So, it can be 
assumed that BSP emerged in the response of upper caste domination in 
the state. BSP projected itself as a party which was very much against any 
kind of 'manuwad'. It's slogan Tilak, Tarazu aur Talwar, Marc inko jute 
char shows its outlook though under its 'bahujan or Manavwad' it tried to 
enclose all the groups which have majority in number but are economically 
and socially depressed. BSP's main support came from rural areas as Vivek 
Kumar says nearly 80% of India's population still lives in the rural areas 
and also around 90 per cent of the Scheduled caste population in the 
country is rural.^ ^ Ravindra K. Jain explains that 'bahujan' refers to 
'majoritarianism'. It was conceived originally as a consortium of 
27. Sudha Pai; From Harijans to Dalits in Ghanshyam Shah (ed) Dalit Identity and 
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Backward castes and dalits and this trend of 'majoritarianism' helped it to 
make popular alliance with Mulayam Singh Yadav's Samajwadi party. 
Secondly he explains that connotation of the term Samaj saying that it 
refers to the community, and in that sense it has a number of meanings 
which embrace the notions of 'self and the 'others' as well as socio-
cultural pluralism. The last term 'party' is to be understood in Weberian 
terms. Parties, he said according to Weber, reside in the sphere of power. 
The action of parties is oriented toward the acquisition of social power, 
i.e., toward influencing social action, no matter what its content may be. 
He also finds it interesting that Weber does not include 'ideology' as a 
defining characteristic of 'party'.^^ From his assessment of BSP it can be 
assumed that BSP though being a party of Dalits doesnot have a specific 
ideology. And this trend is visible from BSP's alliances with the BJP. 
Although it was an anti-manuwadi party but it has no ideology to retain its 
stand. It could change its policy whenever circumstances were not in its 
favour. Ravindra K. Jain analyzing Weber's theory of ethnicity in case of 
Uttar Pradesh says. 
"Weber's theory of ethnicity and Gramsci's concept 
of hegemony can illuminate recent trends in UP 
politics - particularly the rise of the BSP. The former 
hierarchical caste system characterized by 'integral 
hegemony' has been transformed into one of 
ethnicised status groups and minimal hegemony, a 
process that has been primarily political. Under this 
scenario a counter hegemonic regime becomes a 
theoretical possibility, but this depends upon the 
advent of a revolutionary ideology and leadership".^ *^ 
29. Ravindra K. Jain; Hierarchy, Hegemony and Dominance; Politics of Ethnicity in Uttar 
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30. Ibid., p. 215. 
90 
While BSP has the charismatic leadership of Kanshi Ram and 
Mayawati. It has been short of as revolutionary ideology or an ideology as 
such. BSP's lack of commitment resulted in the decline of dalits assertion 
and led to Hindutvising the dalits in future elections after 1993. Kanchan 
Chandra says BSP draws a cross-cutting line between different kind of 
minority 'alpjan, and majority 'bahujan'.^' Thus minority constitutes three 
Hindu upper castes, Brahmin, Bania and Thakur and majority constitutes 
backward castes, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes Muslims, Christians 
and Sikhs. For BSP present politics is dominated by Hindu upper castes 
parties vs the rest or majority exploited sections of the society. BSP later 
classified backward castes into two groups, Backward castes and most 
backward castes. Where backward constitutes Yadav, Kurmi and Lodha 
while most backward castes consists of Saini, prajapati and Pal. Yadavs 
were cornered by Mulayam singh Yadav and Kurmi and Lodh had been 
supporting BJP, so BSP tried to influence most backward castes (sainit, 
prajapti and pal). BSP divided scheduled castes also in two groups chamar 
and others, while chamar has jatav and chamar, others consist of pasi, kori 
and dhobi. BSP's categorization of the political community can be rightly 
understood with the help of the following figure, based on the figure given 
by Kanchan Chandra.^ ^ 
31. For detail see, Kanchan Chandra, op.cit. No. 5, pp. 68-69. 
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BSP leadership tried to mobilize BCs, OBCs, SCs, STs and religious 
minorities on a common platform of 'Bahujan' as it knows clearly that 20 
per cent scheduled castes in Uttar Pradesh can not provide stable political 
base, enough to capture power on its own. Out of this compulsion it united 
different oppressed sections in the society to create a stable life long base 
for itself. Sudha Pai claims that U.P. has 66 SC and 58 BC groups, out of 
which 21 are Mulsim groups whom BSP hoped to mobilise. He further 
claims that the main aim of BSP was to establish a new social order and 
this BSP needed to capture political power. By this new social and political 
order a different kind of redistribution was to be made so historical wrongs 
could be rectified. 'The new social order could be achieved by using state 
33. Op.cit.No.27,p.27l. 
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power for 'social engineering' from above, i.e., introducing developmental 
programmes for dalit upliftment and mobilization rather than a revolution 
based upon destruction of the social order 'from below'.^ "^  
BSP especially speaks about castes and not about different 
economic classes or occupational groups. It treats poverty as an attribute 
associated with certain ethnic categories but not as an organizing category 
in itself. BSP used caste as an ideology instead of having any political 
ideology to capture power. It's alliance with SP also helped to consolidate 
Muslim votes though Muslims were a part of bahujanwad but soon in 1995 
Muslims become suspicious of BSP as it became impatient to come in 
power and allied with a hindutva party. 
Vivek Kumar says that BSP leaders believe in the parliamentary 
Democracy.^ ^ It can be proved by their slogans "vote se lenge PM, CM; 
Arakshan se lenge SP, DM and vote hamara raj turn hara! Nahi chalega, 
nahi chalega (from vote we will have Prime Minister and Chief Minister, 
and from reservation the Superintendents of police and District Magistrates 
and our votes and your rule, No more. No more). 
In 1991 Assembly Election BJP emerged as a force riding high on 
its Hindutva politics, but in 1993 Assembly Election it could gain only 178 
seats. In December 1992, Babri Mosque was demolished, Muslims were 
alienated, Dalits being anti-upper castes could not become part of 
mainstream Hindutva, they were also a big force to reckon with, BJP's 
34. Ibid. 
35. Vivek Kumar, op.cit. No. 28, p. 198. 
93 
policy of Mandal Vs. Kamandal also alienated OBCs. These three groups 
found their emancipation in SP-BSP alliance. SP captured 109 seats and 
BSP 69 seats with the help of the Congress support, under Mulayam Singh 
Yadav, a new government was formed in the state. This victory received 
appreciation from almost every corner of the state. It was declared that 
1993 Assembly Elections brought new social forces (not from top but from 
below) in power. It was a victory of secular forces in the state though B JP 
being the single largest party failed to form the government. K. Srinivasulu 
said the outcome of the recent UP elections signaled the formation of a 
new subaltern subjectivity forged on caste identity, which has potential to 
break through the confines of traditional, political discourse in 
contemporary India".^ ^ 
Once they were in power real game of politics started. Fierce hunt 
for issues and areas through which expansion of vote support could take 
place, resulted in various tussles between the two. Mulayam Singh became 
the Chief Minister and BSP obtained II ministerial portfolios in the 
ministry of 27. In the beginning it was felt that SP-BSP will make a new 
history in UP but soon relations between the two deteriorated. Among 
many reasons of the tussle was the 'Yadavisation''^ ^ of the state under 
Mulayam Singh. 
Backward castes while improving their own social status, kept the 
SCs in their places and reacted violently to the latters moves for 
36. K. Srinivasulu; Centrality of Caste : Understanding UP elections, Economic and 
Political Weekly, January 22, 1994, p. 159. 
37. Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit. No. 13, p. 411. 
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development. Amaresh Misra analysed the danger posed by assertiveness 
on the part of Dalits and the aggressive response from the backward castes. 
He said that it will led to the breakup of fragile backward Dalit alliance. He 
also blamed backward castes for committing atrocities on Dalits. In 
Fatehpur dispute over the land allotted to the kanjars by the government, 
but in the possession of the kurmis, led to the brutal massacre of Dalits. 
Mulayam Singh Yadav was also blamed for indulging in this process of 
Yadavisation of the state while neglecting Dalits. There were about 60 
clashes involving the backward and lower castes in U.P. in the first five 
months of the government's tenure in which 21 SCs and 3 BCs were killed, 
one important among them was the clash at Meerut in March 1994. The 
commission of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes enumerated 1,067 
cases of atrocities in U.P. in its 1989-90 report and 14,960 in its report of 
1995. These atrocities were caused mainly by upper castes but Yadavs also 
were a major force behind it.''° 
Though atrocities and advance move of Yadavs were the main 
reasons, one of the most important causes of disputes between the two was 
the result of bye election in November 1993 and Panchayat elections in 
April 1994. SP was fast gaining ground in OBC-Dalit constituencies, 
dilating the support base of BSP. Though SP-BSP combine won four out of 
the six assembly seats against BJP, the elections in fact were seen as a 
38. Amaresh Misra; Challenge to SP-BSP Government, Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol. XXIX, No. 8, Feb. 19, 1994, p. 409. 
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triumph for Mulayam Singh. In the Panchayat elections, the SP gained 
control over 45 per cent of the 52,111 gram panchayats the BJP and 
Congress won just over 20 percent and 10 per cent respectively, BSP was 
shocked to get only 10 per cent of the seats. BSP condemned Mulayam 
Singh for the large scale irregularities in the 'rapid census' ordered by 
Mulayam Singh to estimate the OBC population, following the amendment 
of Panchayat Act 1994, granting electoral reservations to the OBCs and 
SCs subsequently repolls were ordered.'*' Both Kanshi Ram and Mulayam 
Singh started issuing statements against each other. Kanshi Ram held an 
anti-defection rally on July 10, 1994 and it appeared that BSP would 
withdraw support on the same day. Kanshi Ram accused Mulayam Singh 
for engineering the biggest defection of all times in the state. 
BSP terminated its coalition with the SP in June 1995. Amaresh 
Misra argues that Congress also played an important role in the downfall of 
the alliances. The anti-Mulayam Singh lobby in the Congress, led by Ajit 
Singh, prevailed and Narasimha Rao was also not in favour of a 
strengthened Mulayam Singh who was no longer an asset to him. So, it was 
better for the SP not to undermine its partner and save the alliance."^ ^ BSP's 
first flirtation with the BJP started in June 1993. Sudha Pai claims that fall 
of SP-BSP coalition government inaugurated a new post Bahujan phase of 
Dalit movement'*'' in which two contradictory mobilization trends are 
41. Sudha Pai, op.cit. No. 27, p. 278. 
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visible, coalition building with upper castes parties and a deepening of the 
movement at the grass root level. BSP leadership became too hostile to the 
SP that it could not keep patience to continue the coalition and it became 
so impatient to capture the power that breaking the alliance was the only 
solution. For capturing power it moved closer to the upper caste parties 
like Congress and BJP. BJP used BSP to gain support of lower castes and 
this led to Dalitisation of UP politics. This decision marked BSP's 
conversion from a movement to a party led by an opportunistic leadership. 
In June 1995, Congress supported the break up of the alliance but 
did not support the BSP to form the government. It could not allow any 
small regional party to rule India's largest state. BJP which was looking for 
an opportunity to appeal to lower castes extended support to BSP. BJP 
leaders publicly declared that the party's support to the Mayavati's 
ministry in Uttar Pradesh was solely motivated by its desire to oust 
Mulayam Singh.'*^  These parties declared that they were against Mulayam 
Singh's Gunda politics and mal-administration, so they were joining hands. 
Chamar and pasis were unhappy with this development as the party was in 
the hands of OBCs, mainly the Karmis, who were the main supporters of 
the BJP in the state.''^  They were proud of Mayavati, a 'dalit ki beti' to 
bring dignity to them. But by aligning itself with a manuwadi party, BSP 
was in danger of losing its distinct identity as a movement for the 
oppressed achieved after a period of struggle. Yet by forming a 
government, the BSP leadership hoped to strengthen its position in the 
45. BSP-BJP Estrangement, Janata, Vol. 50, No. 26, Sept. 17,1996, p. 1. 
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state. Once in power, BSP started Dalitisation of UP politics like 
Yadavisation of Mulayam Singh. She appointed her supporters in key 
administrative jobs; more than 1,500 transfers took place in Uttar Pradesh 
during the 136 days of Mayawati's government.'*^ She started Ambedkar 
Rozgar Yojna for Dalit women, construction of roads, electricity, water 
supply were the main part of development of Dalit areas. She started 
Ambedkar village scheme and to give dignity to the dalits, installation of 
Ambedkar statues was a main part of BSP's scheme. She also changed 
names of the universities and places after the name of Ambedkar. She 
continued reservation for OBCs and extended reservation for Muslims also. 
B JP which superficially accepted the policy of social justice due to 
compulsion of the political situations, in reality, it considered this policy as 
a contest aberration. BJP refused to grasp the significance of the concept of 
preferential opportunity to socially oppressed. Being an upper caste party it 
was against any kind of affirmative action. BJP started opposing 
Mayawati's government soon. It was against of installation of a statue of 
Periyar (a social reformer from Tamil Nadu) and against BSP's policy of 
reservation to the Muslims. BSP's main support base is among dalits, 
MBCs and minorities. Alliance with BJP led to apprehensions among 
Muslims and to appease them BSP extended reservation to the Muslims. 
This move was very difficult to swallow for BJP which was against its 
communal politics. Though BJP extended unconditional support to BSP, it 
tried to impose its conditions from the backdoor. Casteism was considered 
47. Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit. No. 13, p. 416. 
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inimical to both the country as well as the BJP. It, according to Prafull 
Goradia prevents the bulk of the nation from coming together and distracts 
Hindus from electing a nationalist party to govern India. He argued to 
nullify casteism, through Hindutva."* Obviously both the alliances could 
not work for long and the coalition fell in October 1995. 
BJP and hunt for vote bank after 'Hindutva' 
First time, the BJP came to power in U.P. in 1991. Its rise to power 
resulted through Hindutva politics. Riding Rama wave it marketed itself 
openly as a pro-Hindutva party. BJP has been an upper caste dominated 
party since its formation and it remained an upper caste party until 1990s 
when after the upsurge of OBCs and Dalits in the political arena, it realized 
its weakness and insufficiency of upper caste Hindu votes to win power. 
Since then it started moderating its position, winning over a large section 
of OBCs especially kurmi and lodha votes but it failed to gain a big share 
of Dalit votes. 
In 1993, though BJP was the single largest party. SP-BSP combine 
could form the government. Congress and Janata Dal supported the 
alliance to form the government and check communal forces from coming 
to power. It's loss and incapacity to win majority seats compelled BJP to 
have new outlook towards the society. Upper caste character of the party 
became a liability for the BJP. It opposed Mandalisation of UP politics but 
was in the grave danger to loose OBC votes. BJP claimed that any kind of 
48. Prafull Goradia; Nullifying casteism through Hindutva, Organiser, March 26, 1991, 
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caste politics will demoralize U.P. politics and Hindutva should be guiding 
principle to choose a party for power. BJP assumed that its upper caste 
support and Hindutva wave will bring majority seats for it but soon BJP 
realized that it was short of majority after the elections. So, it changed its 
stand towards dalits and OBCs. BJP used Kalyan Singh to capture OBC 
votes mainly Lodha and Kurmis against Yadav votes to Mulayam Singh. 
BJP tried hard to consolidate OBCs votes but it could not provide Kalyan 
Singh his due place in the party. Upper castes leaders could not allow and 
accept this resurgence of lower castes in the politics. Kalyan Singh used 
every opportunity to provide representation to the OBCs in the state 
Assembly and reservation in the jobs which was opposed by leaders of 
upper castes. 
When BJP failed on OBCs front it turned towards Dalits. BJP 
which is also known as Congress 'clone' used Congress age old politics, 
'alliances of extremes' to come to power. It aligned itself with a Dalit 
party, BSP. But BSP emerged as the real gainer and BJP's attempt of 
indirect 'dalitisation' of U.P. politics failed. After the proved incapacity 
and failure of Hindutva politics in the state, BJP's hunt for votes and 
appeasement policy of lower castes needs close examination. 
After demolition of Babri Mosque, BJP alienated Muslims, who 
were angry with the Congress and were looking for a party which could 
foster their cause. Muslims found refuge in Janata Dal and Samajwadi 
party. To counter Muslims enbloc voting for SP, BJP targeted Dalits. Now 
BJP was locked in fierce competition for the support of backward castes 
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with the SP and BSP, both of which were pursuing backward castes by 
promising them a share in power in proportion to their population.""^ BJP 
benefited greatly from the hostile politics of SP and BSP combine. These 
parties could rule the states for years but their antagonistic interest for 
power, invited parties like BJP to erode their support base. Two factors led 
tc the growth of BJP in the state, one its communal politics, second 
downfall of the Congress. Though decline of Congress gave resurgence to 
SP-BSP but both could do well only in the state. On the other hand BJP 
could realize its dream on national level also. 
Mulayam Singh Yadav became the Chief Minister of UP in 1993, 
cashing on Mandal card. But Mulayam Singh's Yadav oriented politics 
resulted in the division of OBC votes. Yadavs supported him and Kurmis 
and lodhas formed another powerful camp against Yadavs in the state. 
Mulayam Singh's Yadavisation of UP politics was also not accepted by 
dalits who were being victim of atrocities and were deprived from ages. 
BJP used this opportunity to make caste based mobilization which it has 
been criticizing. BJP made an effort through its policy of social 
engineering to bring to its fold 'other' OBCs particularly those that 
resented the position of the Yadavs.^" K. Srinivasulu also acknowledge this 
strategy of BJP. He said that the SCs are structurally homogeneous but the 
OBCs are internally differentiated and heterogeneous. The BJP's 
mobilization strategy aimed at cashing on this, as was apparent in the 
49. Kanchan Chandra, op.cit. No. 5, p. 67. 
50. Christophe Jaffrelot and Jasmine Zerinini - Brotel, op.cit. No. 16, p. 159. 
101 
projection of Kalyan Singh, belonging to lodha community, as the visible 
leader of the BJP.^' Kaiyan Singh became the Chief architect of the BJP's 
Mandalisation strategy in UP.^ ^ BJP could become successful in 
engineering some of most backward castes votes. MBCs were convinced 
that only creamy layer will be benifitted. They were more fascinated by 
Mandir issue than Mandal plank. Though projection of an intermediate 
caste leader helped BJP to win over a sizeable section of non-Yadav votes, 
but it could not provide a stable power base to the BJP. In reality these 
MBCs were behind OBC leaders in the upper caste party rather than 
accepting BJP as their own party. 
Break up of coalition of SP-BSP provided BJP a chance to play a 
very crucial role. Now, it shifted its attention from OBCs to Dalits, which 
could be easily appealed to by a few concessions and promise of dignity. 
BJP used this illusion of welfare' and other cultural factors to mobilize 
dalits. BJP wanted dalits to be a part of Hindu society. BJP did not 
recognize dalits as a separate force but called for integration of different 
castes under one big umbrella. To remove differences BJP calls for 
adoption of sanskritisation. BJP or Sangh parivar has been adverse to any 
casteist politics and it considered that sanskritisation is the right process 
for upward social mobility. Its policy of reunifying the Hindu vote beyond 
caste barriers by using the Ayodhya issue was attacked by BSP, As 
Ambedkarisation and reservation were not acceptable to the sangh parivar. 
51. K. Srinivasulu, op.cit. No. 36. 
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Sanskritisation was not acceptable to dalits. Instead of abolition of their 
identity, they preferred to stick with a party which could provide them a 
place and dignity in the society. 
Analysts believes that the modus operandi of the BJP is more or 
less the same in the case of OBCs and the SCs. The party tends to select 
candidates from the lower OBCs (MBCs) and the non chamar scheduled 
castes, small castes, not so politically aware or economically affluent. 
Sangh parivar evolved a strategy of focusing on the small castes of 
untouchables such as the Bhangis (sweepers) and the Mangs (basket 
weavers).^ ^ It attempted to incorporate the SCs in the religious, social and 
political way. The result were mixed and in most of the parts were 
unsuccessful.^ '' 
BJP extended unconditional support to BSP after its break up with 
SP. On June 2, 1995, the day after the BSP withdrew its support to Yadav's 
government, supporter of Mulayam Singh Yadav's attacked the guest 
house in Lucknow, where Mayawati was staying and virtually kept her 
under house arrest. Sensing an opportunity to build ties with the BSP, the 
BJP helped Mayawati to come out of the guest house. BJP had started 
working on dalits vote before 1993 elections. In 1993 BJP organized 
Samoohik bhojan in Dalit bastis and to capture their votes, it made a dalit 
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to lay the foundation stone of Ram Mandir in Ayodhya.^ ^ Now, BJP could 
not afford to loose its chance to appease dalits by uniting itself with BSP, 
and to stop BSP from uniting with the samajwadi party. This created 
confusion among the dalits masses who supported BSP's anti-Manuvadi 
politics and recognized BJP as a status quoits force. BSP was in the danger 
of loosing its bahujan identity. Some scholars already declared this move 
as a post bahujan phase of the BSP party. Mayawati and Kanshi Ram said 
that they prefer a majboor sarkar (a dependent government) to a Mazboot 
sarkar (a strong and stable government). They considered that a 
government dependent on them for survival will be forced to listen to the 
voice of the dalits; one that is stable would ignore them as most 
governments have done. The BSP is the only party to publicly favour 
unstable governments.^ ^ 
Once in power, Mayawati pursued dalit oriented politics. She 
made policies and programmes suitable for the development of the dalits, 
Ambedkarisation of universities and places were main schemes of 
Mayawati government with the reservation to uplift the dalits. BJP aiming 
to benefited from indirect dalitisation saw BSP becoming sole beneficiary 
of the alliance projecting itself as advocate of dalits. Instead of loosing its 
vote bank (which was a strong assumption after the alliance with BJP) BSP 
emerged more powerful. BJP extended unconditional support but tried to 
force BSP government from the backdoor. When Mayawati proved herself 
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a very shrewd politician, BJP took back its support on June 1995 and 
pulled down the government. This move further alienated Dalits who were 
opposed to BJP for being an upper caste party. Dalits believe that 
Brahmanism is based on hierarchy which exploits SCs. Dalits voters 
became hostile to BJP for pulling down the government. 
Now BJP is in a difficult situation. Its policy to appeal to both 
OBCs and SCs failed. Dalits were anti-BJP from the very beginning for 
sanskritisation and Brahmanism. They were anti-BJP before 1996 elections 
because BJP pulled down the government. They were also against OBC 
lobby in the BJP camp under the leadership of Kalyan Singh. On the other 
hand OBCs became suspicious of BJP's alliance with BSP. Though BJP 
could capture a few seats from OBCs and SCs constituency but it became 
the real looser by making alliance with BSP. Dalits could recognize 
themselves better with BSP and MBCs also started looking for other 
options. 
If dalits have to find another option other than BSP, they will not 
turn towards BJP. Congress party seems to be a much more likely choice to 
them because it does not bear the weight of sanskritization and 
Brahmanism. Only valmikis, pasis, koris and khatiks constitute, the BJP's 
main SC supporters. They are easy to mobilize because they are still 
widely under the influence of Hindu religion and social practices.^ ^ 
57. Christophe Jefferelot, Jasmine Zerinini-Brote! and Jyanti Chaturvedi, op.cit. No. 53, 
pp. 163-164. 
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Congress; still striving as a catch all party; A secular approach is the 
only solution : 
Congress has been the only party which ruled the state for decades 
with a big per cent of vote share. It was better described as a genuine 
'catch ail party' under which every section of society could find their 
representation. Congress could make broader appeal by mixing several 
ideologies and interest articulation of all sections. Rajni Kothari describes 
this system as 'Congress System' through which Congress could receive 
vote from different sections of the society.^ * 1989 Elections marked the 
emergence of post Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh. After this election, 
Congress vote share started declining very rapidly other parties could 
emerge at the expense of the Congress. Once the Congress declined 
different parties ran away with different sections of support base of its 
umbrella. Though Congress used to get a more or less equal share of votes 
from all the castes and communities. It received a little more from the 
upper castes, Muslims and Dalits, but a little less from intermediate castes. 
This dalit and upper caste combination of Congress is famously described 
as 'coalition of extremes'. 
With the decline of Congress, three parties emerged powerful in 
the states, the BJP, SP and BSP. The BJP took away upper castes votes, the 
SP Muslims and OBCs and the BSP targeted the dalits voters. These 
groups voting enbloc gave rise to a new caste based parties, Congress 
could receive only 94 seats in 1989, 46 seats with 17.4% vote share in 
58: For details see, Rajni Kothari; The Congress 'system' in India in Zoya Hasan (ed.) 
Parties and Party Politics in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002, p. 40. 
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1991 and 28 seats in 1993. These results were shocking for the Congress 
and opened a new political scenario for analysis. 
BJP which is one of the stronger parties in the state is alread)' 
dubbed a clone of Congress, using 'catch all' tactics and coalition of 
extremes. Three factors contributed for the decline of Congress in the state. 
Lack of cohesiveness and charismatic leadership in the party, emergence of 
caste based parties and emergence of BJP as the main container of upper 
caste votes. Muslims were confused and could no longer associate with 
Congress in the wake of Mandir-Masjid controversy on the other hand 
Congress was also confused because it could not appeal to majority and 
minority openly like BJP and SP. It could not come out with a clear cut 
policy on Muslim issue and on the other hand it was having tough 
competition with BSP over Dalit votes. Zoya Hassan claims that it was not 
only SP, BSP and BJP who harnessed and institutionalized caste and 
community identity but it started with the pragmatic communalism and 
casteism of the centrist Congress.^ ^ She further explains that the 'pragmatic 
communalism of the Congress was outmanouevred by the programmatic 
communalism of the BJP.^ ° 
After 1989, Congress adopted a secular approach to gain over 
different sections of the society. It opposed Mandal politics of SP , 
Mandir politics of BJP and Dalits opposed Congress as a upper caste 
'Manuvadi' party. Congress left with no option went for a secular approach 
59. Zoya Hasan, op.cit. No. 14, p. 235. 
60. Ibid., p. 238. 
61. Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit. No. 13, p. 428. 
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in the hope to capture other parties vote banks. Post Congress politics is 
marked by fragmented opposition and instability in the state. Building 
alliances is also very different in a state where politics is conducted by 
dividing different castes and no two parties have same ideology or same 
caste appeal in reality. Now Congress is no longer a centrist party under 
which different castes and groups could come together and a stable 
government could be formed in the state. Present scenario tells that in 
future there will be complete disappearance of Congress from the state. 
Zoya Hassan has already declared that BJP has emerged as the successor to 
the Congress in the UP.^ ^ However, it may be too early to declare a party to 
be the real successor of the Congress in the state. BSP and SP are equally 
important and are gaining more and more strength. This caste based 
politics will determine in future that which party is having larger caste 
appeal and is the stronger party in the state. 
Caste Vs Caste Competition in the State 
1989 elections brought Janata Dal in power. With the decline of 
Congress, a cut throat competition started between political parties to gain 
over different caste groups. Caste factor has acquired immense significance 
in the electoral politics of UP. Parties started gaining ground within the 
caste community they were relying and then playing them against other 
castes to win power. Logic is that who is numerically dominant should 
dominate U.P. politics. These caste based parties fight for the welfare of 
their own caste at the expense of other castes. Before 1996 elections caste 
based voting data is not available but different field works conducted by 
62: Zoya Hasan, op.cit. No. 14, p. 240. 
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analysts like Jasmine Zerinini-Brotel provides a clear picture of castes and 
community representation in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly in different 
years. With the help of these data one can analyse caste appeal of different 
political parties. 
Before 1989 Congress was in power in the state receiving more 
votes from Harijan (Dalits) and Muslims. Caste composition of Congress 
government in 1987 shows that upper castes were having 57.1 per cent 
while Intermediate castes were negligible. OBCs were also not finding 
adequate representation having only 8.6 per cent share. Scheduled caste 
and Muslims were having better representation 20 and 14.3 per cent 
respectively (Table 1). 
Upper castes ML As in Uttar Pradesh Assembly also stood at 39.7 
per cent in 1985. OBCs representation was almost half with 19.6 per cent 
when they constitute almost half of the UP population. Scheduled Caste 
and Muslims were 21.9 and 12.1 per cent respectively (Table 2). This 
uneven distribution of seats were resented by OBCs but they found their 
organized appeal in the Janata Dal which gave 27% reservation to the 
OBCs, Janata Dal decision to implement recommendation of OBCs 
resulted in the mobilization of OBCs in UP politics. 
In 1989, Mulayam Singh's government, OBCs found better 
representation than in the Congress. Though gap between Upper castes and 
lower caste was still very high. In Mulayam Singh's government upper 
castes were 42.85 per cent among them Brahmin were 28.57, while Rajput 











































































































































t 3 (U 
•1—1 













"^  Z 
00 ' - ' 
ON m 
o; « o\ ;z. 
o 3: 
2 I" 
O r r , 
2 II 




















































•*-• O) O 
tX, 
" u 




C ' - I 
S3 a . 
N ^ ^ 
o o 
C O 
6 ^ . 
tn •— 
a js 




• ^ ^ ?* -
,W tn 
en ""^ 
'^  « 
0 . 2 
• I - * 
5 oi 
He C3 u 
I - c8 
n, e 
































































































































































































































o • ^ 




• 5 "o 
^ « 
a « 

















> >^  <i) o 














vo 0 \ 
1 











00 Q OQ 







































o, ,^  
.- m l i t •"* 
O Q. 
CQ ^ f 
._ o 
c o 
• - r 4 
•S ._r 


















< S^  
• fti 
Ill 
from 8.6 to 14.3 per cent while percentage of Muslims also increased upto 
21.42 per cent. Though scheduled castes representation declined in 
Mulayam Singhs cabinet from 20 to 14.3 per cent (Table 3). These figures 
clearly show that Mulayam Singh's government gave steady rise to OBC 
candidates in the cabinet. In his cabinet upper castes were 42.85 per cent 
but in the Assembly these castes were 35.7 per cent, share of Muslims also 
declined from 12.1 to 9.6 in 1985-1989 (Table 2). 
*Table-3 



































































Source : C. Jaffrelot and J. Zerinini-Brotel, 'Accommodating the lower castes? U.P. and 
MP after Monital', in R. Jenkins (ed.) Comparing Politics Across Indian 
States (forthcoming) for the government of N.D. Tiwari and V.B. Singh, R. 
Singh and A. Yadav, Mulayam Singh, New Delhi: Konark, 1998, p. 93 for 
the 1989 government of Mulayam Singh Yadav. 










































































































































































































































































Source : J. Zerinini-Brotel's fieldwork, Numbers figure within brackets. 
*Adopted from Christophe Jaffrelot, Jasmine Zerinini-Brotel and Jayanti Chaturvedi; 
The BJP and the Rise of Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in Rogver Jeffery and Jens Lerche (eds) 
Social and political change in Uttar Pradesh (European perspective), Manohar 
Publication, Delhi, 2003, p. 156. 
In U.P., BJP remained basically an upper caste party. It is evident 
by the data in (Table 1, 2 and 4). In 1991, BJP came to power but 
percentage of MLAs from upper castes remained more or less same. 
Among upper castes, share of Brahmins have been relatively higher than 
Rajput and Banya. That is why BJP is known as a 'Brahmin party'. Among 
OBCs Yadavs are not a better choice for BJP. It relied upon Kurmis and 
lodhis. Kurmis always ranked first with more or less 5 per cent share. 
Among scheduled castes, BJP received much votes from Dhobi, Kori, Pasi 
and valmiki. Though chamar MLAs ranked first among SC but they are 
more earnestly with the BSP. Worst affected section was of course 
Muslims. Only 5.5 per cent MLAs were Muslims in 1991, Uttar Pradesh 
Assembly (Table 2). OBCs MLAs were 27.1 per cent while SC 22.1 per 
cent. 
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Caste composition of 1991 UP government shows 0 per cent 
representation of Muslims (Table 1). Their share came down from 21.4 to 0 
per cent and this figure remained same even in 1993 SP-BSP government. 
SP-BSP combine were dying to give more and more representation to the 
members of their own caste to increase their support base. So, in BJP 
government all the three groups found better place, of course at the 
expanse of Muslims. Still, the proportion of upper castes MLAs in the BJP 
remained above 45 per cent during 1990s. After Mandal polarization of 
upper caste Vs lower castes, BJP could not ignore the potential rise of 
OBCs. 
1993 election brought some major changes in the caste 
composition of U.P. Government under SP-BSP (Table 1). In Congress 
government the proportion of upper caste ministers stood clearly above 50 
per cent with a share 8 to 13 per cent to OBCs and 20 per cent going to 
scheduled castes. In Congress government upper castes, scheduled castes 
and Muslims received largest number of Ministerships. But still the 
prominence of upper castes was visible over lower castes. This trend was 
followed by the BJP in 1991 with few exceptions in case of minorities and 
OBCs. Realising the growing potential of OBCs, BJP increased its 
ministers in the government. When SP-BSP came in power, they turned 
earlier pattern of representation upside down. Upper castes ministers in SP-
BSP government were only 6.7 per cent. An all time low in the history of 
U.P. while Muslims and intermediate castes were 0 per cent. This fact is 
very surprising because SP could come into power, with the help of 
majority of Muslim's voting en bloc. Still Muslims ministers were only 0 
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per cent. Both SP-BSP, at the time of election were shouting to protect 
minorities interest but they only increased their own caste's representation 
in the government, knowing well, that Muslims having no other option will 
turn to SP as Muslims are against upper caste or Hindu dominated parties 
like BJP and Congress in the state. So, SP-BSP government did not feel the 
need to put them in the government. In 1993 under SP-BSP government 
there was a two fold rise in the OBCs and SCs representation from 19 per 
cent to 40 per cent in OBCs and 16 per cent to 33.3 per cent in SCs 
respectively (Table 1). Same trend was followed by SP-BSP government in 
1995. This phenomenon clearly described Yadavisation and Dalitisation of 
U.P. politics. Upper castes were surpassed by subordinate ethnic categories 
for the first time in the SP-BSP government and this trend was followed in 
1995 government also. 
Sudha Pai's study reveals that about 28 per cent of the backwards 
consisting mainly of the upwardly mobile Kurmis and lodhas voted for BJP 
in 1993 elections while 15 per cent supported Congress. This fact shows 
that this election did not make complete polarization of OBCs votes under 
SP-BSP alliance. The SP-BSP gained about 33 per cent of Backward votes 
while the share of the JD fell to 16 per cent. Muslim vote was also divided 
between SP-BSP, Congress and Janata Dal. Congress was able to poll 15-
20 per cent and the Janata Dal around 16 per cent of Muslims vote. 
In 1995 these figures remained more or less same (Table 1). This 
year was marked by 3 per cent increase in OBC ministers and 2 per cent 
63. Sudha Pal, Op.cit. No.2 7, p. 276. 
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decline in SC ministers while upper castes remained very low. Impact of 
caste on electoral politics is felt by the emergence of lower caste based 
parties. In U.P., competition between two national parties and two state 
parties like SP and BSP shows the growing resurgence of caste based 
parties. Now National parties like Congress and BJP are unable to 
dominate U.P. politics because of presence of state based parties like SP-
BSP who have strong support of their own caste. It will not be wrong to 
say that caste based mobilization is a key feature of U.P. politics and seems 
to be an established one. 
Chapter - IV 
COMMUNAL POLITICS IN UTTAR PRADESH. 
One of the major issues which has dominated U.P. politics since 
independence is communalism. Earlier Bhartiya Jana Sangh was active in 
U.P. as the main political party operating on communal lines. After 1990, 
communal politics that overwhelmed U.P. came with the emergence of BJP 
who was hitherto not a strong contender in U.P. It could secure only 11 
seats in state Assembly Elections of 1980 then 16 in 1985 and 57 in 1989. 
The party did not win a single Lok Sabha seat from U.P. in 1984. But the 
scene was changed after the mass mobilization on communal lines with its 
strong propaganda to build Ram temple in Ayodhya. This Ram 
Janamabhoomi campaign not only enabled BJP to gain bulk of seats in Lok 
Sabha Election but 221 seats with 31.5 per cent vote share in 1991 State 
Assembly Elections. This was its highest score since independence as BJS 
and after 1980s as BJP. 
Communal politics is not only against secular democracy but is 
ariti-humanism as well. BJP's communal politics basically targets muslims 
in U.P. as well as in India with an eye on Christians also. The ugliest 
manifestation of communalism is the violence which explodes in the shape 
of communal riots. 
"Communalism is the consciousness which is promoted by one's 
belonging to a distinctive religious community. Communal riots or similar 
events of communal conflicts are behavioural manifestations of that 
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consciousness.' Though Oxford Dictionary gives a very positive meaning 
of communal, that is 'shared by' especially by those who live together. But 
in India the term has negative connotation. A communal situation is 
characterized by tension or conflict between culturally distinct but 
geographically mixed communities. Communalism thus implies opposition 
of religious communities of each other where religious groups try to 
promote their own interest at the expanse of other. In India secularism 
promotes unity in diversity whereas communalism maintains religious 
distinction. Since independence this social pathology has been tacitly 
exploited by the leaders of various political parties. These parties use 
history to justify their action against minorities. These parties claim that 
earlier policies of Muslim rulers and partition of the country was ample 
reason to suspect muslims. 
In 1990s communalism was nurtured and promoted by the BJP in 
association with VHP, RSS and Bajrang Dal. BJP openly used communal 
politics to come in power. Shilaniyas at the disputed site and then 
demolition of Babri Masjid added fuel to the fire. Violence, riots and 
insecurity was everywhere and BJP could become a success overnight. One 
of the major causes of communalism is no doubt political opportunism. 
Pradeep Mandav argues that the behaviour of some politicians of the 
majority community show their prejudices against the minorities and these 
prejudices are so deep seated and ingrained in their system and have 
become part of their whole attitude towards the minorities. He further 
claims that when such an attitude takes possession of any individual or 
group, it is difficult for them to come out of it. He asks, what they may do 
1. Pradeep Mandav; Communalism in India, Authors Press, Delhi, 2000, p. 1. 
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once they occupy the seat of power and decision making can be imagined 
by anyone who has the necessary common sense. Zoya Hasan claims that 
in 1980s two new concepts were introduced into the political vocabulary, 
one was 'pseudo-secularism' and second was 'minorityism' which denoted 
placation of Muslims by the Indian state and is contradictory to 'positive 
secularism' which supposedly means 'being fair' to all communities. 
While giving too much importance to government policies, political 
strategies and tactics of mobilization employed by political parties to the 
growth of communal politics and communal movements, she claims 
communal politics in U.P. operates around three dimensions; the Hindi-
Urdu controversy, the Ayodhya movement and Hindu-Muslim violence. 
After 190s communal politics of "BJP changed the old pattern of 
mobilization though the Congress has been tacitly using communal 
identities for gaining power it however preferred to be represented as a 
secular party appealing to various religious communities and making 
alliances on religion basis. On the other hand, BJP, wholeheartedly 
declared itself a Hindu party, fighting for the Hindu cause, using ideologies 
such as Hindutva to win elections. The role of communal politics 
sponsored by a specific party to win elections needs to be analysed in 
depth. 
Hindu Nationalism and Hindutva 
In 1991 Assembly Elections of U.P., BJP captured 221 seats with 
31.5 per cent vote share and emerged as the largest party in the state. BJP 
2. Ibid., p. 28. 
3. Zoya Hasan; Quest for Power, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1998, p. 175. 
4. Ibid 
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was highly benefited by the Hindu nationalist movement led by RSS and 
its branches in U.P. and all over India. Hindu nationalist movement is not 
an overnight growth. Before independence, leaders like Tilak and Savarkar 
mobilized the masses on Hindu lines. "Tilak not only recognized Hindutva, 
but made an innovative attempt to mobilize the Hindus on the basis of 
common denominator".^  Savarkar publicized Hindutva with Hindu Rashtra 
which became a decisive step in Hindu communal politics. He gave three 
criteria for confirming a person as a Hindu. First was geographical that was 
Rashtra, second was racial that was Jati and the third was cultural that was 
Sanskrit.^  Systematic work of RSS with political strategies of Jana Sangh 
turned communal hatred into a movement which was declared a nationalist 
movement by the BJP and it openly mobilized the masses on communal 
lines. This Hindu nationalism could become successful because it could 
exploit the religious sentiments of the masses. 
Different analysts have different opinion about the resurgence of 
the Hindu nationalist movement which can be equated with Nazism in 
Germany promoting one culture one race. Some analysts believe that 
Hindu nationalism has taken shape in religious system and some believe in 
'political systems'. Core of RSS ideology of Hindu Rashtra is political, 
contesting the RSS contention, that it is cultural^ while Thomas Blom 
Hansen believes it emerged in public culture.^  He claims that Hindu 
5. Pralay Kanungo; RSS's Tryst with Politics; Manohar Publications, Delhi, 2002, p. 
108. 
6. Ibid., p. 109. 
7. Ibid., p. 28. 
8. Thomas Blom Hansen; The Saffron Wave, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1999, p. 4. 
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nationalist aims to transform Indian public culture into a sovereign, 
disciplined national culture rooted in superior Hindu past. He further 
argues that Hindu nationalist represent a "conservative revolution" reacting 
against a broader democratic transformation of both political field and 
public culture in post-colonial India".^  
Hindu nationalists target secular state and claim that 'pseudo-
secularism' or 'appeasing minorities' is anti-democratic. They don't 
believe in equality. They promote a party which exploits religion for 
getting votes and asks people to respond to the call for Hindutva at the 
polls. This Hindu Right also condemns those parties who declare 
themselves secular and accuse them of promoting minority rights at the 
cost of majority. Brenda Grossman and Ratna Kapur say that "By 'Hindu 
Right', we are referring to the main organization and political parties in the 
current phase of Hindu communalism in India - the B JP, the RSS, and the 
VHP, as well as the militantly anti-Muslim Shiv Sena - which are 
collectively seeking to establish a 'Hindu State' in India.'" This Hindu 
Right declares India a Hindu Nation where Hinduism should be a guiding 
principle of all aspects of life. It asks minorities to surrender their identities 
and become a part of Hinduism. These Hindu nationalists claim that a vast 
majority of Hindus which is nearly 80% is losing its 'right to rule,' 
establish 'Hindu rashtra' and preserve Hindu culture due to encroachment 
by the minorities in India. To re-formulate and re-claim Hindu identity 
they argue that all the minorities in India belong to the indigenous people 
9. For details see, ibid., p. 4. 
10. Brenda Grossman and Ratna Kapur, Secularism's Last Sigh. Oxford University Press, 
New Delhi, 1999, p. 6. 
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who converted due to oppression and some malpractices among Hindus 
and re-conversion is the only solution for them to live here peacefully. 
Hindu Right maintains that every Indian must acknowledge that he 
or she belongs to Hindutva. Hindus are the only inhabitants of India and 
others are foreigners and if these minorities are patriotic and loyal to the 
country these should realize that Hinduism is alone true nationalism. To 
make Hindutva possible or to make India a Hindu state, this wing proposed 
the idea of 'Hindu Constitution', 'Hindu ethos' and 'Hindu nation' or 
'Rashtra' which is against secular constitution of India. No doubt this 
Hindu Right wing could make Hindu sentiments a major political force and 
harnessing of Hindu sentiment upto this level could not be done without 
communalizing Hindu society. Thomas B. Hansen also agrees that 
"Muslims remain the decisive ideological bedrock of the Hindu nationalist 
movement, and the most persistent source of its popular and electoral 
success." 
Hindutva remains a central theme of this Hindu nationalist 
movement. The question arises as to what is Hindutva ? Is it really an 
ideology on which a political party can be formed. Does the constitution or 
the Representation of Peoples Act permit such ideology and party to exist ? 
Can this ideology bring success and prosperity for the country ? Is it 
political or opportunistic in strategy ? What is its true nature ? Who 
founded it ? From where, after 1990, it suddenly came into limelight? 
What was the purpose behind this ideology ? We will try to find out 
answers of these questions in the context of Hindutva and Hinduism. 
1. Thomas Blom Hansen, op.cit., No. 8, p. 12. 
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Though the BJP propogated that Hindutva is the bed rock on 
which Bharat or Hindu theocratic state can be founded, it did not take 
trouble to clearly explain what it meant by Hindutva. In 1991 and 1996, 
Ram Mandir dominated BJP's Election Manifesto. It was only in 1998 
when its manifesto gave importance to cultural nationalism to hide 
religious fundamentalist nature of Hindutva in order to expand its support 
base. In it's 1998 Election Manifesto, BJP proclaimed that "Our nationalist 
vision is not merely bound by the geographical or political identity of 
Bharat but it is referred by our timeless cultural heritage. This cultural 
heritage which is central to all regions, religions and languages, is a 
civilization identity and constitutes the cultural nationalism of India which 
is the core of Hindutva".'^  But, since 1989, Hindutva at operational 
political level tells another tale and BJP's malafide intentions are not 
difficult to understand. 
Different analysts while associating Hindutva with Hindu religion 
could not provide a comprehensive definition of Hindutva. Most probably 
this concept emerged with the concept of Hindu Rashtra. During Indian 
freedom struggle, many Hindu leaders of Renaissance supported the view 
of Hindu Rashtra, but the idea got impetus through the staunch propaganda 
of Tilak, Savarkar and Golwalkar. More or less, they all consider Hindutva, 
a mean through which a Hindu Rashtra could be achieved. Tilak attempted 
to unite all India Hindus of different regions and speaking different 
languages by preaching that "the common factor in Indian society is the 
12. For details see, A.G. Noorani (ed) The Babri Masjid Question, 1528-2003, Vol. II, 
Tulika books, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 162-163. 
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feeling of Hindutva (Hinduness)". He observed that there may be different 
doctrines in the Hindu dharma, but certain principle can be founded in 
common through this feeling of Hindutva or Hinduness.'"' For Tilak it was 
not ideology but only a feeling which could unite Hindus to fight for 
national independence. Even at that time his comments during 1893 
Bombay riots ignited tension between the two communities. 
Savarkar tried to find an ideological framework to achieve a 
culturally homogenous nation. His cultural nationalism claims T.B. Hansen 
was communal, masculine, and aggressively anti-Muslim.''' He also 
distinguished Hindutva from Hinduism. He said, "Hindutva is not a word 
but history. Not only the spiritual or religious history of our people, at 
times it is mistaken to be by being confounded with the other cognate term, 
Hinduism. Hinduism is only a derivative, a fraction, a part of Hindutva... 
Hindutva embraces all the departments of thought and activity of the whole 
being of our Hindu race".'^ Savarkar was clear that Hindus have to profess 
Hindutva rather than Hinduism and for this a common Rashtra and 
common jati was essential that is why his nationalism was cultural and 
social rather than religious. Like other renaissance leader's he recognized 
cultural malpractices among the Hindus which was not the part of Hindu 
religion and was a major case of disunity among them. 
It was Golwalkar who attached Hindutva primarily with religion. 
Though all the leaders related to Hindutva ideology were eyed communal 
13. Pralay Kanungo, op.cit. No. 5, pp. 107-8. 
14i Thomas B. Hansen, op.cit., No. 8, p. 79. 
15. Savarkar V.D, Hindutva, Ved Savarkar Prakashan, Bombay, 1969, cited in Ibid., 
p. 77. 
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by the Indian Nationalist leader but RSS under Golwalkar also witnessed 
severe criticism and imprisonment after Gandhi's assassination. RSS was 
also banned at that time. Golwalkar proclaimed that Hindutva was directly 
related to Hindu Rashtra. Only those who were Hindus could live in 
Hindustan. He asserted, "we repeat, in Hindustan, the land of the Hindus, 
lives and should live the Hindu nation - satisfying all the five essential 
requirements of the scientific nation concept of the modem world. 
Consequently only those movements are truly "National" as aim at re-
building, revitalizing and emancipating from its present stupor, the Hindu 
Nation".'^ He gave idea of five fold limits for every person to enjoy 
national life. According to him, "the idea contained in the word Nation is a 
compound of five distinct factors fused into one indissoluble whole the 
famous five unities; Geographical (country), Racial (race). Religious 
(religion), Cultural (culture) and Linguistic (language). For him, those 
who do not follow these five-fold limits are outside of national life, unless 
they abandon their differences and adopt these five components of national 
life and merge in the National life. Those who will retain their identity will 
be considered as foreigners, he said 
"The non-Hindu races in Hindustan must either adopt 
the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect 
and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain 
no idea but those of the glorification of the Hindu race 
and culture, i.e., of the Hindu nation and must lose 
their separate existence to merge in the Hindu race, or 
may stay in the countr}', wholly subordinated to the 
16. M.S. Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined; cited in Pralay Kanungo, op.cit. No. 
5, p. 112. 
17. M.S. Golwalkar, We or Our Nationalhood Defined cited in Brenda Grossman & Ratna 
Kapur, op.cit. No. 10, p. 38. 
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Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no 
privileges, far less any preferential treatment not even 
citizen's rights. There is, at least, should be, no other 
course for them to adopt. We are an old nation, let us 
deal, as old nations ought to and do deal, with foreign 
races, who have chosen to live in our country". 
Golwalkar's obsession to build a Hindu Rashtra and his staunch hatred for 
the minorities compelled various thinkers to compare him with Hitler. 
Hitlerism was compared with Golwalkarism where he did not only justify 
existence of caste system but also criticized minorities, by saying 
"Aggressiveness and scapegoatism; Muslims, Christians and communists 
etc. are undermining the country, ideas like 'internationalism', 'equality', 
'world unity', 'coexistence', 'neutrality', 'Hindu-Muslim Unity', 'peace', 
'non-violence' are damaging the Hindu nationand making as a nation of 
imbeciles and cowards". 'Mein Kampf of Hitler has been compared with 
Bunch of Thought of Golwalkar; Aryan and Aryan culture with Hindu and 
Hindu culture and jews with Muslims. 
Golwalkar's attitude towards minorities gave ample opportunity to 
analysts to claim that Hindutva is not only a religious ideology but a fascist 
ideology. Though supreme court in its verdict did not declare that Hindutva 
is a religious ideology, it realised that it is very difficult to explain an 
abstract concept like Hindutva. While explaining what Hindutva may 
mean, supreme court neglected to see implications of Hindutva at 
operational level and fascist intentions of Hindu Right. 
18. M.S. Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood defined cited in Sarto Esteves, Nationalism, 
Secularism and Communalism, South Asia Publications, Delhi, 1996, pp. 36-37. 
19. For details see; Excerpts from the Secular Democracy, August 1974, published in 
S.A.H. Haqqi (ed) Secularism under Siege; U.P.Rabita Committee, Aligarh, 1993, pp. 
7-12. 
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In Supreme Court, the main opinion on the interpretation of the 
Representation of the People Act, 1951 and whether an appeal to Hindutva 
constituted a violation of the Act, was rendered in the case of Prabhoo 
(Appelant) V. Shri Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte & Others (Respondents).^ ^ 
Section 123 (3A) prohibis, 'The promotion of, or attempt to promote, 
feelings of emity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India 
on grounds of religion, race, caste, community or language, by a candidate 
or his agent or any other person with the consent of a candidate ... for the 
furtherance of the prospects of the election of the candidate or for 
prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate". In this case 
Supreme Court stated that no precise meaning can be ascribed to the term 
'Hindu', Hindutva and Hinduism. The verdict reads; 
Para 38; "These constitution Bench decisions, after a 
detailed discussion, indicate that no precise meaning 
can be ascribed to the terms 'Hindu', 'Hindutva' and 
Hinduism; and meaning in the abstract can confine it 
to the narrow limits of religion alone, excluding the 
content of Indian culture and heritage. It is also 
indicated that the term 'Hindutva' is related to the way 
of life of the people in the subcontinent. It is difficult 
to appreciate how in the face of these decisions the 
term 'Hindutva' or 'Hinduism' per se, in the abstract, 
can be assumed to mean and be equated with narrow 
fundamentalist Hindu religion bigotry, or be construed 
to fall within the prohibition in sub-sections (3) and/or 
(3 A) of section of section 123 of the R.P. Act.^ ^ 
Thus Supreme court declared that the term 'Hindu, Hindutva and 
Hinduism should not confine to the narrow limit of religion. It did not take 
20. AIR 1996 SC 113; Also see, Brenda Cross Man and Ratna Kapur, op.cit No. 10 
(Appendix), pp. 142-186. 
21. Representation of People Act 1951, Section 123(3). 
22. AIR 1996 SC 1113, pp. 1129-30 para 38 taken from Appendix in Brenda Cross Man 
and Ratna Kapur, op.cit. No. 10, p. 173. 
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into account the views of the propounders of Hindutva. It was not only 
cultural but religious also. Even Savarkar equated Hinduism with religion. 
Supreme Court also neglected the process through which political parties 
like BJS or its successor BJP tried to realize Hindutva. BJP is using 
religion tacitly and aggressively to exploit Hindu sentiments against 
minorities and making Hindutva a religious ideology then cultural. When 
Supreme Court suggested that Hindutva is a way of life, it forget to 
mention that it is only a way of life of Hindus and under Art. 29 of the 
Constitution of India, minorities have right to have their own way of life. 
In every state people have their own way of life. Every caste has its own 
way of life. Hindus are themselves not a homogenous community. It is 
only upper caste hegemonic thinking which suggests Sanskritisation and 
Hindutvisation of Indian society and polity. 
Several BJP manifestoes^^ suggest that Hindutva is an ideology 
which aims to establish "one country, one culture and one nation in India. 
Thus Hindutva is claimed to be a danger to multi cultural democracy of 
India. Hindutva ideology is anti-democratic as it is anti-equality and right 
of the people of India. C.P. Bhambhri says that "Hindutva integrates Hindu 
religion-based culture with political power to create a polarized society 
based on the concept of the "other" and "social exclusivism. Hence 
Hindutva is a total negation of democracy and Indian constitution".^ '* 
Supporters of Hindutva claim that, they want to re-establish rich past 
heritage of Hindu culture. Means they want to revive great Aryan or vedic 
23. For details see; A.G. Noorani, op.cit. No. 12. 
24. C.P. Bhambhri, Hindutva, a Challenge to Multi-cultural Democracy, Shipra 
Publications, Delhi, 2003, p. 6. 
129 
culture. In this context Hindutva is revivalist in nature. But a close analysis 
suggests the so-called ideology proposed by Hindu right is not revivalist. 
They don't want to re-establish past values but their only aim is minority 
bashing. They may claim that "Hindus to India stand in same relation as 
the English to England, the French to France or the Germans to Germany" 
and further ask for Muslims, Christians and Sikhs where is the problem in 
not calling themselves as Hindus." Actually the author does not realize 
that English, French and Germans words are only related to a geographical 
location and not with any particular religion. All people living in India can 
be happily Indians and to some extent 'Bhartiya' but not Hindus because 
the word shows direct encroachment upon minority religions if imposed as 
'Muslim Hindu, Sikh Hindu and Christian Hindu etc'.^^ Hindutva can not 
also be taken as revivalist of Hindu religion or Vedas because the 
suggested methods to be employed to attain Hindu Rashtra are not tolerant. 
A few thinkers equate it with 'Militant Revivalism'.^' Violence is the main 
source to achieve the goal while Rigveda's lesson is, "Ma hinsyah sarva 
bhutani" (Do not harm anybody) and Geeta also teaches, "Ahimsa permo 
dharma". On the other hand Hindu militant organizations shouting for 
Hindu Rashtra preach violence and hatred. Their methods are violent and 
lead to breaking mosques and building temples in their place. Does Rig 
veda permits idol worship ? No it preaches Monotheism. It says 'Ekam Sat, 
bipra bahudha badhanti' R. V X.83.3 (He is one but he bears the name of 
25. P.K. Nijhawan; Hinduism and Hindu values alone can keep India intact, Organiser, 
Marcii 17, 1991, p. 9. 
26. Pradeep Mandav, op.cit. No. 1, p. 72. 
27. Inderjit Badhwar, Prabhe chawla and Fzand Ahmed, Militant Revivalism, in S.A.H. 
Haqqi, op.cit. No. 19, p. 71. 
28. A. Kumar Mazumdar, Early Hindu India, Cosmo, New Delhi, 1981, p. 265. 
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many)." No where vedic culture suggests worship of idols, instead of that 
fire was taken as the medium of reaching God. So, from where did the 
modern apologists of Hindutva learn to built mandirs by demolishing 
mosques. Is this Hindutva? Actualy this Hindu right in the name of 
Hindutva wants to revive Sarvakarism and Golwalkarism and both the tvi^ o 
concepts can better termed as communalism. One more question which 
arises is whether Hindutva ideology can bring modernization and 
development? In the age of Internationalisation and Globalisation. Can 
narrow Hindutva which according to Golwalkar should not give even 
citizenship right to the minorities, deal with Global Mobilisation ? Even 
when BJP was in power it had to extend citizenship right to those Indians 
who are economically well off but residing outside India. Did BJP enquire 
whether they are following Hindu culture or Hindu way of life ? Vajpaye 
celebrated pravasi Bhartiya Diwas without asking Hindu Right whether 
these foreigners can be true Bhartiya or not. 
It is clear that through Hindutva, Hindu Right does not preach to 
follow great Hindu culture of Vedas but to justify their organized hatred of 
the masses to gain political ends. It overtly mobilizes masses on communal 
lines to come in power. Nandy rightly concluded "that Hindu nationalism 
has always been an illegitimate child of modern India, not of Hindu 
tradition".^ *' 
C.H. Hanumantha Rao did not hesitate to call Hindu communal 
forces, "the forces of religious fundamentalism" '^ but Sunil Adam claims 
29. Ibid., p. 157. 
30 . For details see, Pralay Kanungo, op.cit. No. 5, p. 15. 
31. C.H. Hanumantha Rao; Religious fundamentalism in S.A.H. Haqqi, op.cit. No. 19, pp. 
332-333. 
131 
that conceptually, the term fundamentalism can not be applied to a religion 
like Hinduism which is not based on single text or a doctrine and which 
does not prescribe a rigrous spiritual servitude". No doubt Hindu 
consciousness was clearly a product of the growing political consciousness 
of Hindu Right. RSS is not committed to any religious scripture.. It only 
speak about past, Savarkar and Golwalkar. Which source provides 
legitimacy to the Hindutva ideology is also questionable. 
Many scholars boldly admitted that the Hindutva ideology is 
fascist and communal in nature. Golwalkar has been compared with Hitler, 
V.M. Tarakunde said that Hindu communalism, because of overwhelming 
majority of Hindus, can take the form of aggressive nationalism which will 
have all potentialities of fascist movement.^ ^ Sumit Sarkar compared the 
fascism of the sangh parivar through Hindutva with the traits of Nazism of 
Hitler. He analysed in Germany the Jews had been fairly prominent in 
intellectual, professional and business circle but in post-Independence 
India Muslims are grossly under represented at elite level. He also 
maintained that 
"Central to Hindutva as a mass phenomenon (or to 
Fascism) is the development of a powerful and 
extendable enemy image through appropriating stray 
elements from past prejudices, combining them with 
new ones skillfully dressed up as old varieties, and 
broadcasting the resultant compound through the most 
upto date media techniques"."'^  
32. Sunil Adam, The Method Behind Hindutva in Asghar AH Engineer (ed) Politics of 
Confrontation; Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1992, p. 180. 
33. V.M. Tarakunde, The fight against commuanlism, Radical Humanist, Vol. 56, No. 10, 
January 1993, p. 2. 
34. Sumit Sarkar, The Fascism of the Sangh Parivar, Economic and Political Weekly, 
Jan., 30, 1993, p. 165. 
35. Ibid. 
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Though BJP propogated that Hindutva is a majoritarian ideology 
which wants to establish culture of majority. Many scholars argued that it 
is an ideology developed by middle class Indians.^ ^ It has already been 
discussed that the ideology is more Brahmanic and wants to establish 
Brahmin-Bania rule in the country when lower caste are fighting for their 
identity and resurgence. In the present era this ideology is basically 
political through which the Hindu Right aim to gain its political ends. The 
political benefits that the BJP has received by such abuse of religion are 
known to every body. 
However after 1991, BJP gradually shifted from the ethno-religious 
mobilization of the Ram Janmabhoomi Movement towards a softer policy, 
only because party leaders feared that VHP would overshadow their 
organization and that they would lose control of the Hindu nationalist 
political agenda to these more extremist forces, and partly as a reaction to 
the BJP's defeat in several states of the Hindi belt in the 1993 State 
Election. 
BJP's role in Coininunalisation of U.P. Politics 
In April 1980, the BJP's was revived with the new name the 
Bhartiya Janata Party. Within a decade, BJP became a big force to reckon 
with. It gained overwhelming support from the upper caste Hindu. There 
were various organizations behind the party while helped it to get an India 
reach. Though BJP changed its name from Jana Sangh to Janata party, 
36. John Zavos, The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India, Oxford University Press, 
2000, p. 
37. Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (ed) The BJP and the compulsions of 
Politics in India, Oxford University Press, 1998, p.l. 
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Sangh being common to both Jana Sangh and RSS was probably 
considered a liability, but it was clearly mentioned in the BJP constitution 
that its members could retain their connections with the RSS. The Par1;y 
also emphasized the Gandhian concepts of development to enlarge its mass 
appeal.^ ^ No doubt BJP's nexus with Sangh Parivar or RSS helped it to 
reach the apex. The BJP has for long rightly been perceived as the political 
wing of the RSS.^ ^ 
Paul R. Brass explain that Hindu-Muslim opposition, tensions and 
violence which provided strength for the political existence of some local 
political organization in many cities and towns in north India linked to a 
family of militant Hindu organizations whose core is an orgaisation 
founded in 1925, known as the RSS'. This family according to him is the 
Sangh Parivar and the leading political organization in this family, 
originally called the Jana Sangh is now the BJP.'*^  
Sangh Parivar, says Sarto Esteves, includes RSS,VHP, Vansi 
Kalyan Ashram, Bhartiya Mazdur Sangh, Akhil Bhartiya Vidhyarti 
Parishad, Bajrang Dal, Patitpawan Sangathana, Rambhau Mhalji 
phatisthan, Shiv sena and the whole army of Bhats, Sants, Mahants, Prohits 
and godmen whom the BJP has roped into propagate its ideology and 
create the pro-Hindu Hysteria to achieve its political objectives.'*' 
38. Partha S. Ghosh, BJP and (he Evolution of Hindu Nationalism, Manohar Publications, 
New Delhi 2000, P. 86. 
39. Paranjay Guha Thakurta and Shankar Raghuraman; A Time of coalitions; Divided We 
. Stand; Sage Publications New Delhi, 2004, P. 63. 
40. Paul R. Brass, The production of Hindu-Muslim violence in contemporary India, 
Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2003, p. 6. 
41. Sarto Esteves; op. cit No. 18, P. 110. 
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This Hindu Right sought to spread communaiise discourse to a 
large segment of Hindu society, While aim of RSS and other organizations 
is to achieve cultural hegemony, BJP's is to gain political power. It is easy 
for the RSS or Sangh parivar to spread communal discourse to a large 
segment of Hindu society because. It has become a gigantic system, 
particularly with the emergence of a large number of 'affiliates' or off 
spring or 'off shoots' or 'branches' to organize different sections and 
groups of Hindu society.'*^ 
RSS helps the BJP in three respects; one, manpower; two, the RSS 
acts as a moral deterrent. Three, the ideological affinity being the same, the 
RSS sets the social agenda for the BJP. Sushma Swaraj said, 'The Sangh 
is to the party what a rishi was to a raja' but RSS counsel is not imposed 
upon BJP, it is upto BJP to make the advise politically feasible.'*^ Though 
BJP and RSS both deny interference of Sangh Parivar in the working and 
political strategies of BJP. It is evident from various sources that Sangh 
Parivar guided BJP in running political affairs. Though BJP itself 
reflecting the RSS mind tried for a synthesis of RSS ideology and real 
politic, still tensions surfaced between the two when ever BJP due to 
compulsion adopted a moderate line towards Muslims and lower castes. 
The compulsion of RSS can also be understood that the party had to 
appoint RSS men in key positions, only a few exceptions are there but in 
terms of the leadership structure and recruitment patterns the BJP 
continued with its Jana Sangh and RSS heritage.'*'^  BJP's connection with 
42. Pralay Kanungo, op. cit No. 5, p. 84. 
43. For details see Partha S. Ghosh; op. cit No. 38, P. 369. 
44. For details see, Pralay Kanungo; op. cit. No. P. 189. 
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RSS is also clear by the meetings held between the two; for e.g. whenever 
party is not doing well, RSS interferes "In April 1994. When 36 top 
ranking BJP leaders met at Sariska in Rajasthan to chalkout the Party's 
strategy their agenda was set by two RSS leaders H.V. Seshadri, General 
Secretary, and K. Sudershan, Joint General Secretary, both known for their 
hard line Hindutva stance''^  but it tries to avoid extremes in many cases. 
BJP and RSS both wont to scrap. Art 370, ban cow slaughter and to maike 
a uniform civil code for whole country. BJP being a political party tries 
now to work with consensus but RSS and Sangh Parivar wants to establish 
Hindutva in rigidity. This is now becoming a comulsion for BJP. Partha 
Ghosh says The Sankarsingh Waghela episode revealed how, due to 
unnecessary interference from organizations such as the RSS, the VHP and 
the Bajrang Dal the party failed to act democratically. It also revealed party 
president Advani's partisan approach in the politics. Waghela said 
Wherever the BJP comes to power, they (RSS, VHP and the Bajrang Dal) 
start treating it like their private company'. He also condemns Advani by 
saying that "he does not believe in fair play".'*^ 
BJP's huge success in U.P. Assembly Elections was an outcome of 
its closeness with VHP. VHP was founded in 1964 by Swami 
Chinnayananda under the auspices of the RSS to provide a bridge between 
the RSS and the religious establishment. VHP was active among the urban 
proletariat and unemployed youth, offering them connections and support 
of larger Hindu parties. Its strategy is to create a life long attachment of the 
45. Times of India, 14 April 1994, in Partha S.Ghosh, op. citNo. 38, PP. 376-377. 
46. For details see, Partha S. Ghosh; op. cit No. 38, P. 371. 
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students to the Sangh Parivar and to create network of local leader who 
owe their position and education to the Sangh Parivar.'*' BJP was highly 
benefited by the VHP in the wake of Ram Janambhoomi controversy 
because VHP is not a political party and its Hindutva rhetoric was more 
aggressive which the BJP took advantage of BJP also organized yatras like 
the Ekatmata Yatra to mobilize the masses. Though BJP took advantage of 
VHP's Hindutva but VHP's demand to plan Mathura and Kashi and its 
lower castes stand is a big liability on the party. Before 1996 elections BJP 
tried its best to find a moderate path but it could not also afford to lose its 
RSS-VHP sponsored Hindu vote bank. 
Electoral poUtics and BJP 
BJP was formed on 5 April 1980 after the split of Janata Party. 
Being a new party, the BJP was in search of an identity and popular 
support of the masses. Though it is easy to trace association of BJP with 
RSS and VHP a few writers also suggest that when BJP was formed, it 
wanted to follow certain tradition of the Janata Party. It retained the name 
of Janata and adopted lotus instead of lamp of the Jana Sangh as its 
election symbol. Its new flag was half Saffron and half green, the latter 
symbolizing secularism.'*^ Thomas Blom Hansen also suggests'*^ that in the 
early 1980s the idiomatic differentiation between the various branches of 
the Sangh Parivar turned from division of labour into two rather 
disjunctive strategies. While, BJP in the political field attempted to recover 
47. For details see. Thomas Blone Hansen, op.cit No. 8, PP. 101-104 and Zoya Hasan, 
op.cit. No.3, P. 196. 
48. Pralay Kanungo, op. cit no5, p. 189. 
49. Thomas Blom Hansen, op. citNo.8, pp. 157-158. 
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and save the moral and secular legacy of the Janata party, while RSS and 
VHP responded to the new majoritarian, pro-Hindutva signals and cultural 
assertiveness of various minority groups. He further suggest that BJP was 
playing a secular card in the beginning, inviting Muslim candidates and 
also encouraging candidates to participate in the Muslim festivals. It was 
not BJP but Congress who played the majoritarian and communal cards 
with greater force and in 1984, the RSS called upon its cadres to support 
congress than the BJP. Congress anti-Sikh politics, attitude towards Punjab 
and Kashmir and Indira Gandhi's pro-Hindu posture was very much 
appreciated by the RSS. 
Vajpayee, in his first presidential address at the first national 
convention of BJP, held in Bombay in December 1980, stressed upon 
Moral principals. He said authoritarianism and anarchism are the two 
dangers faced by the country. He called the party to follow a three pronged 
programme of Sangathan (organization), Sangharsh (struggle) and 
Sanrachna (constructive work).^ '^  Vajpayee also stressed the need to apply 
Gandhian principal of development so that the poorest of the poor can feel 
development. In 1980 UP. Assembly Elections BJP could capature only 11 
seats with 10.8 per cent vote share and in 1985 it could gain only 16 seats 
with 9.8 per cent vote share. This was a big shock for the party. In 1984 
Lok Sabha Election party could gain only four seats, Vajpayee admitted 
the failure of his contrast politics of loyal opposition to congress, his 
personal responsibility for this and the deep crisis of the party". He was 
50. Partha S. Ghosh, op.cit No. 38, P. 87. 
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also willing to shoulder any punishment for the failure. '^ Though in 1984, 
Congress could gain 403 seats out of 513 seats in Lok Sabha and 269 out 
of 425 seats in U.P. Assembly Election, its major cause was the wave of 
sympathy generated by the assassination of Indira Gandhi. At this time 
congress could get majority support of the Hindu Classes in some way due 
to anti-Sikh and anti-minority stance taken by majority. 
This period was also crucial in the history of India because there 
was a demand from the Sikh for Khalistan and Muslims in Kashmir for 
independence. Death of Indira Gandhi added fuel to the fire. Minorities 
could be dubbed easily as anti-Nationalist and anti-patriotic. RSS became 
more hostile towards minorities. Vajpayee's moderate policies alienated it 
from RSS and then L.K.Advani became president of BJP part^ ^ He 
criticized other parties for their policies like appeasement of minorities, 
pseudo secularism, minorityism, pampering of Muslims and foreign 
infiltration. Overnight L.K. Advani become a hero for RSS who could 
speak for a Hindu Nation so boldly. To become a political hero Advani did 
not care for his communal image if it could load him with vote bank. He 
claimed that for many other political parties secularims has become a 
mechanism for political appeasement of minorities which tend to vote en 
bloc. 
Advani condemned Congress for mishandling Shah Bano case and 
preached that there should be uniform civil code for all the Indians. All 
minorities should follow Hindu culture, cow slaughter should be bannned. 
51. For details see; Thomas B. Hansen, op.cit. No. 8, p. 158. 
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BJP also benefited due to revival of Babri Masjid controversy by the 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad. It organized a country wide campaign to liberate 
Ram Janambhoomi. On 21 Jan. 1986, an unknown Advocate (Umesh chand 
Pande) filed an application to unlock the gate of Babri Mosque in the 
Munsif court at Faizabad. 
On February. 1, 1986, by the orders of the District Judge of Faizabad the 
locks of gate were opened which had remained locked since Dec. 1949. 
Within 40 minutes of delivering the Judgment the gates of the Masjid 
opened and Puja was performed. Victory processions were taken out by the 
Hindus in different places in U.P." This gave VHP and BJP a chance to 
materialize their dream. Even the persons who installed the idols were not 
interested in making it into a temple. The only surviving sadhu of the two 
who did the job said it was not a communally-oriented design. He said, 
"one of our colleagues..., Once had a dream, that Lord Ram expressed a 
desire to be installed in his birthplace in the Babri Masjid .We were acting 
in deference to the Lord's instructions" '^' BJP also did not take into account 
archaeological findings and Historical facts present at that time. It was 
only interested to politicize the issue and rise at the national level. 
Congress also did not oppose communal politics in the state. It 
could play the Muslim card by setting passed the Muslim Women's Bill in 
1986 and later by allowing the opening of the gates of Babri Mosque, it 
52. Iqbal A. Ansari (ed) Communal Riots; The State and Law in India; Institute of 
objective studies, New Delhi - 1997, P. 170. 
53. Rasheeduddin Khan, Bewildered IndiaJdentity.Pluralism.Discord; Har Anand 
Publications 1994, p. 243. 
54. Partha S. Ghosh op.cit No. 38, p. 91. 
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could play the Hindu card. Zoya Hasn says that many leaders felt that the 
Ayodhya temple demand ought to be supported by the Congres. She also 
claimed that this Ayodhya strategy' was not designed for the UP but 
'Ayodhya strategy' changed the political agenda in this state, because the 
site is located in the state.^ ^ Congress also tacitly supported the Ram Shila 
programme by allowing the foundation stone to be laid adjacent to the 
Mosque. Even Rajiv Gandhi began his election compaign in Fiazabad, 
declaring that the congress would try to establish Ram Rajya. Though 
being in power Rajiv Gandhi could not take an open and clear stand on the 
Temple issue. It could not oppose it for fear of alienating Hindu masses 
and he could not support it being in power. It tacitly supported it but this 
annoyed both Hindus and Muslims. It was only Kamalapati Tripathi, 
working president of the congress who opposed Congress strategy. He 
warned the leadership that the Ramjanambhoomi - Babri Masjid 
controversy would destroy the unity and integrity of the country, and the 
only course open to the congress was mass mobilization to counter the 
VHP programmes.^ ^ 
1989 Election results shocked Congress. It was rooted out of 
power. BJP could gain 85 seats with 11.5 per cent of votes in 
Parliamentary Elections. In U.P. Assembly Elections BJP could gain 57 
seats with 11.6 per cent vote share. The real success was Janata Dal which 
got 208 seats with 29.7 per cent vote share. Muslims made up their mind 
well in favour of Janata Dal before the election. They were already sick of 
55. Zoga Hasan, op.cit. No. 3, p. 198. 
56. Ibid, P.201 
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the congress who could not help them during Moradabad riots in 1980, 
Meerut riots in 1987 and Bhagalpur riots. They were sure if congress 
allowed shilanyas to happen on November 9, 1989 it would be rooted out 
of power, as Mujahid Alam, a brass worker, in an interview to Askari. H. 
Zaidi said, in Moradabad " that day could seal the fate of the congress and 
Muslims would lose faith not only in the congress but also in the secular 
credentials of the Indian State.^ ^ 
Though many Muslims were angry with Janata Dal also for being 
an election partner of BJP. Halim Ali, a student of Deoband said "It is not 
necessary that the BJP as partner in an opposition coalition will spell doom 
for the Muslims. After all, it was Mr. Vajpayee who was instrumental in 
the removal of several travel restrictions between India and Pakistan during 
the Janata regime."^^ While other said, it is not necessary that we will 
support the Janata Dal in other constituencies. AMU Student's Union 
President Anwar Hussain said AMU students will support Janata Dal but 
not necessarily in every constituency because of JD's association with BJP. 
But they were sure, 'since the congress has completely deviated from the 
path of secularism. They should now ensure the defeat of this party.^ ^ It is 
clear that Janata Dai's electoral understanding with BJP alienated some 
Muslims but V.P. Singh stand on Ayodhya gave thenl some hope. Before 
Shilanyas V.P. Singh said he will visit Ayodhya on Nov.9, to ask VHP to 
57. Askari H. Zaidi, U.P. Muslims: confused and apprehensive; The Times of India, New 
Delhi, November 8, 1989, P. 11 
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59. Tariq Hasan; Muslim vote swinging Away from the Congress, The Times of India, 
New Delhi, November 16, 89, P. 11. 
142 
abandon their plan.^° Though V.P. Singh turned up in Ayodhya after the 
ceremony on Nov. 9, but it was still the beneficiary, as Praful Bidwai said: 
"the Dal is naturally capitalizing on its unsolicited gain among Muslims in 
the north (16 per cent of the vote) in a big way".^' 
Sudha Pai says in U.P., Mulayam Singh's strategy helped the 
Janata Dal to defeat both Cong (I) and BJP. It distanced itself from BJP by 
promising protection to the Muslims, in turn Muslim leaders supported him 
and secondly, it took advantage of the rapid caste, based mobilization, by 
forming the AJGAR (Ahir, Jat, Gujar and Rajput) caste alliance to 
strengthen its BC base while at the same time preventing the consolidation 
of the Hindu vote under the BJP.^ ^ It is also worth noting that during 
Mulayam Singh government in U.P, percentage of Muslims in the U.P. 
Government was 21.4% (see Table 1 in Ch.3). 
Though during 1989 Election campaign BJP agenda of communal 
politics was quite dominant, still BJP was not completely able to polarize 
Hindu masses. Alliance with Janata Dal helped it to gain much legitimacy, 
it needed as a political party but still it was not a political force in U.P. to 
reckon with. Zoya Hasan says In 1989 Lok Sabha Election, BJP's area of 
strength was not U.P. and 1989 election did not reveal strong evidence of 
Hindu vote in U.P, despite that the leading political parties tried to 
consolidate vote on those line." 
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V.P. Singh formed the Government in the centre and Mulayam 
Singh in the U.P. Both V.P. Singh and Mulayam Singh having a strong 
base of OBC in Uttar Pradesh were looking for a policy to strengthen it 
further. V.P. Singh announced in September 1990 that his government 
would implement the recommendations of Mandal Commission Report and 
will provide 27% reservation in education and government jobs to OBCs. 
BJP immediately opposed mandalisation of U.P politics because it could 
realize this plan can divide the Hindu community vertically between the 
upper and lower castes and BJP could not allow destroying its hard earned 
Hindu Vote bank. To counter the dangers of Mandalisation of U.P. politics 
as well as Indian politics Advani decided to launch his socalled Rath Yatra 
from Somnath (Gujrat) to Ayodhya, through ten states in August 1990.^ '* 
Advani started his Rathyatra in a very dramatic style, in a jeep which 
looked liked an ancient Indian chariot while members of RSS, VHP and 
Bajrang Dal joined him from all over the country. From Oct. 30, 1990 
onwards the country witnessed unprecedented communal violence. 
Hundreds were killed and burnt brutally. Hundreds of Bajrang Dal 
volunteers came with trishuls and offered a bowl of blood to show their 
devotion. Mr. Advani kept on claiming that no riots took place on the route 
of the yatra. Though India was burning every where. He tacitly avoided 
riots on the route of yatra but he knew well that riot prone areas can 
provide a huge vote bank. Asghar Ali Engineer says; 
"Every body knows the riots can not take place unless planned by 
some group or party .Mr. Advani knew riots on his route will be a great 
64. Partha S. Ghosh, op. cit No. 38, p. 94. 
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milestone around his neck. He wanted to scrupulously avoid such rioting 
on his path to make a rhetorical point when accused of communalizing the 
situation by his political opponent. But he was not averse to shedding of 
blood in places away from his route. More riots means greater 
consciousness about Hindutva,Hindu Rashtra"^ ^ He also condemned V.P. 
Singh and Mulayam Singh to was the Muslims and not to take an impartial 
stand. He further discussed communal riots all over U.P The major riot 
broke out in Bijnor in U.P. on 30"" Oct. Official sources admitted few 
deaths but unofficial sources claimed more than 200 deaths.^ Paul R. 
Brass said the riots before and during the campaign had three consequences 
in the state as a whole, all of which worked for the advantage of the BJP. 
First, concentration of Hindu voting for the BJP, secondly, a high turnout 
among Hindus as well, and thirdly, a communal polarization for greater 
than anything that has occurred since independence. From November 
1990 onwards U.P. witnessed violence and communal frenzy resulting in 
169 deaths from 7 to 20 Dec. 34 towns were under curfew, Confusion and 
disorder was every where.^ ^ Advani was not allowed to continue his 
Rathyatra in Bihar and he was arrested before reaching U.P. but Kar 
Sevaks continued their March on October 30. They gathered in Ayodhya 
violating curfew orders they also entered the Babri Masjid,their they 
hoisted the saffron flag on the Mosque and also tried to break its wall. 
Thereafter, the security forces open fire, 6 kar sevaks were killed and 84 
65. Asghar All Engineer (ed.) Politics of Confrontation, Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1992, 
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injured.^ ^ After this BJP withdrew support to the V.P. Singh government., It 
was sure of its success in the coming elections. Though Mulayam Singh 
government in U.P. could survive a little more under Chandra Shekhar 
Prime Ministership but soon both India and U.P. had to face fresh elections 
in 1991. 
Rathyatra and riots changed the calculations in U.P. Riots helped 
in consolidation of Hindu vote bank. During Rath yatra Advani called upon 
Hindus to demonstrate Ram bhakti (devotion) and lok shakti (people's 
power to bull dose his party to power). He held this yatra to undermine the 
danger of Mandal politics. Advani said that it had taken away the cynicism 
that was fostered by the Mandal commission. Before I started the rathyatra 
I knew I was right, and now I am totally convinced. 
Media also helped BJP in uniting Hindus and communalise their 
thought. Paul R. Brass also claimed that Hindi language press like Aaj, 
Amar Ujala and Dainik Jagaran took a deliberate decision to publish news 
that they either knew was false or that they took no trouble to verify. He 
said it is evident that these three newspapers and their journalist and 
editors fed into the institutionalised riot systems that exist in North India.^' 
The press council of India also discussed the media coverage and role of 
press in igniting tension and publishing false stories about Ayodhya.^ ^ 
BJP's main political agenda during 1991 Assembly Elections and 
parliamentary Elections was to implement uniform civil code. Though 
69. Rasheeduddin Khan, op.cit. No. 53, p. 247. 
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BJP's stand on Art. 370, Replacement of Ministry Commission by a 
Human Rights commission, implementation of Uniform Civil Code and 
Construction of Mandir, was anti-Muslim. It accused Congress of 
pampering Minorities or 'appeasing Muslims'. However several official 
documents suggest that Muslim minority is backward and poor in the 
country. In the name of secularism, Government only provided it security 
in the Hindu majority India. Though Other Backward Castes and 
Scheduled Castes could progress due to Affirmative Action Oriented 
programmes of the government but Muslims remained at the receiving end. 
Minorities Commission 1982/83 provided the facts that Muslim population 
in India was supposed to 11.2% while they are 4.41% in Employment 
(Central Government), Education (class X Examinees 4.00%, Finance 
(Loans from Banks) 5.06%, Services (Like IAS) 3.00% and Industrial 
Licences 2.00%." It is also believed that half of the Muslim population 
lives below poverty line. What kind of appeasement of minorities is this 
when even half of their population can not live normal life? In an interview 
to Paul R. Brass Abdul Khaliq, who defeated Navman in 1996 U.P. 
legislative Elections in Aligarh revealed that not only in Aligarh, but in 
India as a whole, wherever Muslims dominated economically, "the BJP, or 
say RSS want to disturb things".'''* Advani, by appeasement of minorities, 
meant Muslims are allowed to practice their personal law, can marry four 
wives while Hindus have to do with one. Asghar Ali Engineer says a 
number of surveys have established that bigamy is much less prevalent 
73 . Sarto Esteves, op.cit. No. 18, p. 42. 
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among Muslims than among Hindus, though among Hindus it is done 
illegally. Among Muslims it is about 4 to 4.5 percent whereas among 
Hindus and Jains it is 5 to 7 per cent.'^  Najma Heptulia argued that why 
Hindu law should be the prototype for any uniform civil codes, when it is 
discriminatory against women. It is noteworthy that Muslim women are 
given more rights in Islam as a religion and personal laws of the women 
according to Sharia then the Hindu women. 
Elections in 1991 were good for the BJP as it could secure a 
majority in U.P. Assembly Election. It could capture 221 seats with 31.5 
per cent vote share. Division of Janata Dal and SJP came to its aid. Muslim 
votes were divided between SJP under Mulayam Singh Yadav, Janata Dal 
and Congress. Even OBCs votes were also divided between JD and SJP 
and dalits votes were cornered by BSP. While Kurmis and Lodhas voted 
for the Kalyan Singh under BJP, it could also get a good amount of votes 
from Dalits. BJP was a big success because it could get vote from all 
sections of Hindu society. Upper castes Hindus supported it whole 
heartedly on the one hand and on the other hand it could get a good 
percentage of votes from OBCs and Dalits. BJP could also gain 120 seats 
in the Parliamentary Elections. Madhu Lindaye concludes that four factors 
were responsible to the U.P. elections results. One was the split of JD and 
SJD, second, the total repudiation of the Congress by the powerful upper 
castes of U.P., third was exclusion of the jats, sainis and other castes by the 
75. Asghar All Engineer (ed) Communalisation of Politics and 10th LokSabha Elections, 
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Mandal commission from the backward class and fourth was the rise of 
BSP7^ 
Once in power BJP could not lose the opportunity to do what it 
wanted to do and to become ruling party in the centre also Congress was 
ruling the centre but Kalyan Singh (BJP) was the Chief Minister of U.P. 
who promised the masses that Mandir will be made exactly where the idol 
of Ram emerged. 
In Dec. 1991, Murli Manohar Joshi designed an Ekta Yatra from 
Kanya Kumari to Kashmir.This yatra further increased communal tension. 
Murli Manohar Joshi could not become as successful as Advani because he 
was scared of entering Kashmir. Though he hoisted the flag at the Central 
La! Chowk in Kashmir but amidst tight military security. In 1991 BJP 
could rule the state through a "referendum on mandir". BJP mobilized 
masses by promising them a temple at the place of Babri Mosque. People 
supported BJP's view and electoral verdict confirmed their referendum in 
favour of the construction of Mandir.'^  Now, BJP had enormous pressure 
from RSS to build a Mandir. Though the Supreme Court directed the U.P. 
government to maintain the status quo till the court pass a judgement but 
Kalyan Singh was too eager to utilise the opportunity which he got as the 
Chief Minister of U.P. On December 6, 1992, 3,00,000 kar sevaks 
on 
assembled at Ayodhya and thronged the domes of the Babri masjid. This 
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Hindutva parivar which demolished Babri Masjid included, Advani, Murli 
Manohar Joshi and Uma Bharti.^' Narasimha Rao, did not do any concrete 
thing to stop the demolition, though he knew what was going to happen. 
But he allowed it tacitly and then lamented and blamed BJP for the 
misdeed. He knew well as BJP is in power of the state, it will be held 
responsible.^^ Nationwide violence occurred for the next five years. On 
Dec. 6, 1992, the kar sevaks torched the houses of Muslims. Stabbings and 
killings were rampant. 
Kalyan Singh resigned and Rao government also dismissed all the 
three remaining BJP governments in other states. BJP and especially 
Kalyan Singh was not sorry for what happened. He declared that day as a 
historic day and a pride for the nation. In 1993 fresh Assembly Elections 
were held in U.P. This time also though Muslim vote was divided but at 
large Muslims decided to vote Mulayam Singh to power. Though BJP 
received 33.3 per cent vote share (highest record since independence as 
BJS and BJP after 1980). It could receive 178 seats. It was the single 
largest party but was short of majority. Mulayam Singh's samajdwadi party 
could capture 109 seats with 17.8 per cent vote share. Yadavs and Muslims 
supported him whole heartedly. It entered into an alliance with BSP, which 
could gain 69 seats with 11.3 per cent vote share. All the parties supported 
SP-BSP alliance to stop BJP to come to power because it was a communal, 
81. Partha S. Ghosh, The Congress and the BJP, Struggle for the heartland in Ajay Mehra 
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exclusivist, majoritarian, fanatical and fundamentalist party having support 
of militant based organization like RSS and almost fascist in nature. 
So on secular ground all the parties extended their support to SP-
BSP alliance. Congress was again the worst loser. It could gain only 28 
seats with 15.0% vote share. Muslims knew well what Congress in power 
at centre did to the mosque. BSP could also gain votes from Muslims and 
other weaker sections that were anti-BJP. Its alliance with the SP also 
helped it to gain votes from all sections of the society. Once in power, race 
started between the two to increase their support base. BJP could 
understand that it can not do well if it will alienate Muslims and Dalits. 
The rise of BJP came through the Mandir-Masjid controversy where BJP 
aimed to unite all the Hindus under Hindutva ideology but polits of Mandal 
Vs Kamandal' alienated the OBCs later BJP found out that Dalits are also 
anti-Ram and they don't want to be a part of Hindu culture through 
Sanskritisation, Instead of that they are willing to support a party which 
can provide them with dignity and economic reforms. Now Dalits were 
more interested in asserting their identity and strength. 
Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mayawati could not continue for a 
long period. They both tried to expand their vote base later they both 
started to criticize each other for the OBCs and lower castes crisis in the 
state. Mulayam Singh was condemned for strengthening his Yadav base 
and his pro-yadav stands in policy making for the State. BSP took back its 
support from Mulayam Singh's government in June 1995 and Mayawati 
became the Chief Minister of U.P. with the external unconditional support 
of BJP. 
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Pro-Hindutva stance served BJP's purpose in early 1990s but mid 
1990s it realised the need to appease Dalits and Muslims too. In 1994 BJP 
urged the government to nullify the 1992s Supreme Court Judgement 
which stated that reservation for the SCs and STs pertained only to their 
recruitment and not to promotions, BJP General Secretary, K.N. 
Govindacharya argued that the 'life of an Indian citizen is to be governed 
by the Indian constitution and not by Manu-smriti or any other religions 
text. BJP also declared the week from 3 to 10 August 1995 as Samajik 
Samrasta (social harmony). Vajpayee also asked his party men to attract 
dalits. '^' 
BJP also started to woo Musloims. In 1994, Delhi's BJP Chief 
Minister Madan Lai Khurana hosted an iftar party at his home as a good 
will gesture. Before 1996 elections it announced a package as part of its 
campaign, which had offering (taaleem) (education), tanzeem 
(organization) and tijarat (employment) as its component to appease 
muslims. BJP also organized Muslim Sammetans (conventions), firstly 
held in Vadodra on 12 April 1995.^ ^ 
BJP and BSP's alliance also could not work for a long time. It 
broke in Oct. 1995. BJP could not stand for Mayawati's pro-BSP and pro 
Muslim policies BJP tried hard to improve its communal outlook but when 
it come to do things practically, it failed for the time being BJP forgot 
Mandir, Mathura and Kashi, but when these issues would re-emerge 
abruptly and no body knows. This is the fact that in early 1990s BJP could 
polarize Hindu votes on communal lines not only in U.P. but in whole 
India, which posed a danger for the minorities. 
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1996 ASSEMBLY ELECTION IN UTTAR PRADESH 
The U.P. assembly election of 1996 has brought forward many issues 
which need to be discussed in detail. This assembly election was different in 
many ways than the earlier one. Though 3Cs (casteism, communalism and 
coalition politics) dominated U.P. politics, but there was complete 
realisation on the part of the political parties that their sectarian appeals 
were not sufficient to get a clear verdict. Analysts have already declared that 
post mandal, post Mandir and post Bahujan phase has shown that major 
political parties in U.P. have realized that they have reached to a saturation 
point in appealing to their own communities support basis and are bound to 
look elsewhere. 
Parties like BJP, BSP and SP have structural limitations to their 
emergence as a broad based dominant party on the lines of the Congress 
before 1989. Congress has always been understood as a secular or a catch all 
party by different analysts. Rajni Kothari argued that this broad based 
consensus was achieved by an engineered 'Congress System', mobilizing 
different sections of the society on different sectarian basis and 
accommodating different interests.' Now, politics of redistribution, started 
by BSP and SP, by preserving interest of one caste or community at the cost 
of other, has led to the downfall of the Congress. 
It has been discussed in the earlier chapters also that the population of 
U.P. is heterogenous in nature, which is divided and subdivided into great 
I. For details, See, Rajni Kothari, The Congress 'System' in India in Zoya Hasan 
(ed) Parties and Party Politics in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2002 DD 
39-55. ' 
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multiplicity of castes, classes, tribes and religious sects. It was easy for 
newly emerging parties like BJP, BSP and SP to mobilize masses on caste 
and communal lines which led to the decline of congress, but no party could 
get enough popular mandate to come to power on its own. The consequence 
was frequent President's rules and coalition of different extremes which 
could not provide stability for a long period. The state witnessed many 
elections after 1991,and formation of different coalitions which led to poor 
governance and economic problems in U.P. 
Though BJP emerged as the single largest party in 1996 U.P. 
assembly elections it could not create a 'Hindutva Wave' as successfully as 
in 1991 U.P. assembly election, and witnessed a downfall both in its vote 
share and number of seats. Though Congress has been reduced to 
insignificance in the state, but caste based parties like SP and BSP pose a 
big challenge to BJP in ruling the State. BJP could not muster the support of 
OBCs, and dalits and this rigid caste based polarization prevented BJP from 
becoming a dominant party in U.P., like congress was earlier. 
1996 assembly elections in U.P. showed that in this multiparty 
competition, where voters were mobilized on caste and religious basis there 
was confusion with the caste and community appeal of their leaders and the 
outcome could not be claimed as popular verdicts. The voters were confused 
among the four dominant choices (BSP, BJP, SP and Congress) in the 
states, these parties were also confused on any clear cut ideology. Kanchan 
Chandra and Chandrika Parmar claim^ that political parties in U.P. 
2. Kanchan Chandra and Chandrika Parmar; Party Strategies in the Uttar Pradesh 
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attempted for ethnic mobilization but separated it from ethnic polarization, 
earlier with rath yatra of 1990s, a pro-Hindutva stance has gone hand in 
hand with an anti-Muslim one, with Mandal Commission Report, a pro 
backward caste position went with an anti-forward one and a pro-Bahujan 
platform with an anti Manuwadi one. But this trend was somehow absent in 
1996 U.P. assembly elections. In this election, SP (with its Yadav and other 
backward caste voters) BSP (with its Dalit Vote bank) posed a stiffer 
opposition to BJP without polarizing against upper castes. BJP also made an 
appeal to Hindus, without mobilizing them against Muslims. Congress, 
which could not make an overt appeal to any social group was left to pick up 
the leftover votes that the other political parties could not mobilize. 
In this chapter an effort has been made to analyse different issues 
before and after the 1996 U.P. assembly election. Why this election did not 
yield a decisive verdict? Why BJP could not secure a clear majority and the 
other national party, congress is facing frequent decline in the State? Why 
two state level parties BSP and SP could increase their vote share and what 
were their handicaps. 
Opportunistic alliances and instability in the State 
SP and BSP coalition fell in June 1995, due to the clashes between 
Mulayam Singh and Mayawati. Both were trying hard to increase their vote 
bank of Yadas and dalits, when they were in power. When they could not 
stand each other, the so-called secular alliance fell apart. 1996 U.P. 
assembly election shows that all the major parties realized that they can not 
come in power on their own on the one hand and on the other hand they 
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wanted to stop the BJP from capturing power in the state. As a result they 
entered in the contest with the alliances. Like BSP aligned with Congress, 
where Congress was a junior partner. BSP could achieve Dalit and Muslim 
votes while Congress a manuwadi party could appeal to Brahmins. SP 
became a part of United Front. This arrangement was very difficult for SP to 
materilise. It was given 260 odd seats to contest while JD settled for 65, 
Congress (T) for 3, BKKP-41 and the left 25.^  BJP was so sure of its success 
that it did not align with any other party. It could not afford to share its vote 
bank. While BSP knew limitations of the strength of Dalit votes and so 
aligned with Congress to change its anti-Manuwadi or upper caste stand. 
Sudha Pai said that a post-Bahujan phase has been inaugurated in U.P. 
Even these alliances could not prove a viable solution to the instability 
of U.P. 1996 U.P. assembly elections are significant for the study of 
opportunistic coalition politics, president's rule and for the exploitation of 
issue like caste and community, by various political parties. 
The elections to the state Assembly in U.P. were concluded on Oct 10, 
1996 on Oct. 17, the new house was supposed to be constituted and one year 
old central rule ended. But no party could secure a complete majority and 
president's rule was reimposed. The newly constituted assembly remained 
under suspension, with this the state came under central rule for the third 
time within four years. The three major parties were in search of allies. 
When no realignment could take place, president rule became a necessity. 
3. Ram Singh and Anshuman Yadav; Mulayam Singh, A Political Biography, Konark 
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The role of the Governor was also strongly criticized. This scenario also 
convinced many analyst to say that article 356 should be abolished. Romesh 
Bhandari, a Congress loyalist, became the Governor. His appointment as 
Uttar Pradesh governor was obviously intended to placate the Congress-
BSP alliance.^ 
Kamala Prasad said that Governor saw the opportunity to expand his 
role. He propounded the doctrine of political stability sensing that a split 
mandate was on the cards. He did not visualize alternatives to honour the 
split verdict through a constructive dialogue between the legislators. He did 
not consider the alternatives as indicated later by the state High Court. The 
"no other alternative syndrome was added to the old mind set of 
'bureaucratic dispensation'.^ 
In his book, (which is written by Romesh Bhandari, in his defense) 
Romesh Bhandari said that when no party could get clear majority and were 
unable to come with any post poll alliance, he had to look for the stability of 
the state and the President's rule was the only option.' Everything was left 
to the Governor by the Prime Minister in the State, though he did not 
represent any democratic mandate. This development was characteristic as 
illegal and it had no legitimacy. A Bench of three judges of State High 
Court, delivered a Unanimous verdict. It quashed the presidential 
proclamation as based on extraneous consideration or wholly irrelevant 
5. Op. citNo.3, p. 183. 
6. Kamala Prasad; Governor's Rule and Governance in Uttar Pradesh; Mainstream, Feb 8, 
1997, p. 22. 
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materials". Justice Katju observed that "our founding father, had great faith 
in democracy and that is why they provided for a democratic form of 
government in our constitution". The judgement also noted the fact that the 
Governor had not explored all avenues of installing a popular government 
which should have received his priority attention. The Apex Court has given 
a stay but with the condition that the Governor will continue his efforts 
towards installing a popular government which should have received his 
priority attention.^  
Sudha Pai argues^ that since 1992 to Oct 2000 UP had a total of 11 
government of which apart from the brief Kalyan Singh government with an 
average life span of less than two years, the state has gone through 
President's rule three time; In 1992 it was due to the demolition of the Babri 
masjid. In 1996 and 2002 it was because no party could form a government. 
Apart from the BJP government that lasted from 1997 to 2002 with the 
support of the defectors, no government was able to complete its tenure 
during the 1990s. No major policies or economic development programmes 
were opted because coalition government had large sized ministries and 
many ministers were defectors with little interest in formulating policies. 
8. See for details, op.cit., No.6 p. 23. 
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June 24 to December 4, 1992 
December 4 1992 to June 3, 1993 
June4, 1993 to June 3, 1995 
June3, 1995 to October 17, 1995 
October 18,1995 to October 17, 1996 
October 17, 1996 to March 21,1997 
March 21,1997 to September 20,1997 
September 21, 1997 to February 21, 
1998 
February 22, 1998 to November 
12,1999 
November 12,1999 to October 28, 2000 
October 29, 2000 onwards 
Note : All the four BJP governipents depended upon defectors from the 
Congress and the BSP 
Source : Ibid, No. 9 
When no party could form an alliance, president's rule became a 
compulsion. BSP was not ready to align with SP and even with BJP with 
whom she had 4 and Vi months experiment before 1996 assembly election. 
RSS put pressure on BJP to make an all out effort to link up with the BSP, 
even if this meant offering the chief ministership, a proposal with which the 
former chief minister Kalyan Singh was not happy.'*' BJP was seriously 
considering such a political strategy because both Vajpayee and BJP's 
general secretary met the BSP leadership. 
10. Partha S. Ghosh, BJ? and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism, Manohar Publishers, 
Delhi, 2000 
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In March 1997 both, BJP and BSP could strike a deal between them 
which allowed chief ministership by rotation. The BSP leader Mayawati 
being the chief Minister for the first six months (March 21 to Sept 20) to be 
followed by the BJP leader Kalyan Singh who had to take over for the next 
six months. It seemed to be a one year arrangement. The six months of 
Mayawati's reign were days of humiliation for Kalyan Singh. He was side 
lined not only by the BSP but within his own party as well. Kalyan Singh 
who is a backward caste leader had been opposing an alliance with dalits on 
the other hand; though he was a part of BJP but he could not become a 
choice for upper castes. Sensing the BSP's indispensability for the BJP's 
game plan, his internal rivals now sought to use the changed position to 
under cut him, both Lalji Tandon and Kalraj Misra emerged as new power 
brokers and confidence keepers of Mayawati, tacitly encouraged by Atal 
Behari Vajpayee." 
Mayawati knew that she was having very little time in power, so she 
rapidly started dalit development programes and implementation of policies. 
She also transferred dalit officers on high posts. When Kalyan Singh 
succeeded Mayawati, he reversed most of her decisions in the interest of 
preserving his political constituency. Soon conflict was so intense that mere 
four weeks after, BSP decided that it could not continue with this power 
sharing arrangement and on 19 Oct. 1997 she withdraw her support. On 
October 19, BJP was to prove its majority on the floor of the assembly, 
Kalyan Singh manipulated splits in many parties to attain majority. He 
I. Amaresh Misra; Transfer of power: permutations and combinations, Economic and 
Political Weekly, September 20, 1997, p. 2383. 
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managed support of 222 members which included three groups of defectors-
22 member UP Loktantric Congress, 3 members from JD (Raja Ram Pandey 
group) and 12 members who split from the BSP apart from Samata Party 
members and Independents.'^ 
Once in power, Kalyan Singh started promoting OBCs in his 
government. In 1991 his government had 19.35% OBCs than in 1997 the 
number was 26.1 percent.'^  This again alarmed BJP, Kalyan had to prove his 
strength not once but many times during this period. U.P. witnessed a time 
when there were two Chief Minister operating from one assembly 
Jagdambika Pal and Kalyan Singh.'"^  This struggle of power proved to be 
very disgusting for the people and It became clear that government during 
that time was opportunistic and not representative in nature. 
Role of caste in the Election 
The post congress polity in Uttar Pradesh has been marked by a 
participatory upsurge of lower castes. There is intense politicization of 
marginalized groups in U.P. Since independence caste has played an 
important role in determining the initial levels of support of different 
sections of the citizens to different political parties. Once these social blocs 
came into existence they tended to survive for several elections. If there was 
any change it was due to different situational factors. Mainly, the basic bloc 
formation took place between 1989-1991. With the decline of Congress, BJP 
with upper cast votes, BSP with Dalit and Samajwadi party with Yadavs and 
Muslims support, emerged as powerful parties in the states. 
12. Op.cit.,No-10,P. 122. 
13. J. Zerinini- Brotel's field work. See table 1 in Chapter 3. 
14. Op,cit.,No.7,pp.281-314. 
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By the time of 1996 Vidhan Sabha elections, the politics of caste 
polarization had reached its peak. The last few elections in U.P. have been 
characterized by a quest for moving beyond caste based vote banks. All the 
major parties and political actors realized that they have reached a saturation 
point of support within the caste community they were relying. As discussed 
earlier, the BJP has paid more attention to court, the OBCs other than 
Yadav, the BSP has focused on the lower OBCs and Muslims, and changed 
its rhetoric from being the party of the 'Bahujan Samaj' to that of 'Sarvajan 
Samaj'. The SP has gone for a broader strategy it has targeted a cross-
section of the voters, beside paying special attention to Rajputs. This quest 
also explains the search for new political alliances. SP used age old AJGAR 
combination with strong base of Muslims. It tried to expand its support base 
other than Yadavs. Ajit Singh's RLD (Rashtriya Lok Dal) has a strong base 
among the lodhes while Apna Dal has support of Kurmis and Koeris. 
Political parties are trying to expand their base beyond their known vote 
banks either by co-opting the leaders of other castes or by forming political 
coalitions. Voters are also trying to break free of their political bondages. 
Muslims are also searching for options as have many upper castes. 
While discussing decline of Congress, Anthony Health and Yogendra 
Yadav suggest'^ that earlier one important feature of congress support has 
been its evenness, both socially and geographically. It was drawing support 
equally from all parts of the spectrum, and this gave Indian politics the 
appearance of politics without distinctive social cleavages that Congress 
15 Anthony Heath and Yogendra Yadav; "The United Colours of Congress; Social Profile 
of Congress Voters, 1996 and 1998", Economic and Political Weekly, August 21-28, 
1999, p. 2518. 
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could draw almost equal support across the various social cleavages that 
have been articulated in the arena of electoral politics. In 1990s, the 
Congress could not stand the pressure given by the cleavage based 
formations. The rise of parties such as the BJP, BSP and SP which appeal to 
distinctive social groups, indicates the rise of cleavage politics in India. The 
decline of the congress illustrates the failure of a catch-all party to handle 
cleavage based pressures. 
In Uttar Pradesh, there is a four cornered competition, involving 
"Congress, the BJP, the BSP and the SP. But real competition in centered 
around the SP, BSP and the BJP. 1990s has already been declared as post 
congress era, it is post Congress in the sense that the Congress ceases to be 
the pole around which political competition is structured. Now, when 
distinctive parties are fighting for upper castes, OBCs, dalit and Muslim 
votes in U.P. These remained no major group supporting Congress. In 
community terms U.P. in the 1990s shows a more developed form of 
cleavage politics than any other Indian state. The same gets reflected in class 
terms to the extent to which these communities have a distinct class 
profile.'^ 55% rich voters voted for BJP that is why BJP is also said to be a 
party of bania class, even upper middle class support for BJP in 1996 was 
55% and SP could receive 21% support of upper middle class. Support of 
poor class was nearly even for BJP, SP and BSP, 20, 28 and 26 per cent 
respectively. The poorest support BSP more with 34 percent votes over and 
all INC remained a weak party in the sense that it could receive only 8% 
votes from these classes. 
16. Ibid., p. 2524. 
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Table 2. Congress vs 

















































































Source : NES 1996, CSDS, New Delhi. 
The BJP was rooted strongly, among the upper classes and the BSP 
among the poor. The SP tended to draw more votes from the lower classes 
but was not confined to them. Since the class profile of the OBCs and 
17 
Muslims is more diversified than that of the upper castes and dalits. 
Voting behaviour of Upper Castes: The two upper castes of brahmans and 
thakurs remain the largest and most influential caste categories in this state, 
the former com.prising above 9 per cent of the total population, the latter 
above 7 percent using the 1931 census as a basis for estimating their number 
17. Ibid., p. 2524. 
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today. Congress had enjoyed a strong support of brahmans because of their 
traditional allegiance to the Nehru family. Rajputs owed no loyalty to 
congress and contested for dominance in the districts with congress 
Bra:hman politicians as well. However, Rajputs have been second only to 
brahmans in their importance in Congress organization.'* The votes of these 
two most prominent castes have now been transferred to BJP for several 
reasons. Most important has been resentment of the backward caste parties 
and leaders in the state and the patronage given to Mulayam Singh Yadav 
during the tenure of the Rajiv Gandhi.'^ After Mandal these two castes were 
left with BJP. Ayodhya movement also helped BJP to capture support of 
these castes. 








































Source : V.K. Rai, In Search of a new balance; Caste, Region and Community in 
Uttar Pradesh; Economic and Political Weekly, August 21-28, 1999, 
D. 2405. 
18. Paul R. Brass; General Elections, 1996 in Uttar Pradesh, Divisive Struggles, Influence 
Outcome, Economic and Political Weekly, September 20, 1977, p. 2414. 
19. Ibid. 
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Source : V.K. Rai, In Search of a new balance; Caste, Region and Community in 
Uttar Pradesh; Economic and Political Weekly, August 21-28, 1999, p. 
2406. 
During 1996 U.P. Assembly Elections BJP + Samata coalition 
received 76.8 per cent support from the forward caste, INC + BSP could get 
only 6.7%. It is clear that upper caste could not bear congress alliance with 
BSP, a party of Dalits. This time coalition of extremes could not work. 
While UF could receive only 8.6% support from Forward castes. Among 
upper castes not only Brahmin supported BJP + Samata alliance with 74.4% 
vote but Kshatriya with 77.5% Kayastha with 83.7 per cent and Vaishya 
with 83.2 per cent support BJP. Congress became victim of the age old 
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conflict of upper and lower caste for making alliance with BSP UF could do 
even better than Congress while INC + BSP received 6.7% of Brahmin vote, 
UF could get 8.9% for INC + BSP Kshatriya voted 8.2% and for UF (United 
Front) 8.6% UF could receive a better share of Jat votes, 36% than BJP 
which could secure 32.8 per cent. Among the intermediate castes the Jats are 
the most important group in U.P. They represent only 1.6% of the state's 
population but are concentrated in western U.P. where they are from farming 
community and compete in many localities with the Rajputs for the status of 
dominant caste. 
Voting behaviour of Backward Castes : 
The loyalties of backward castes in U.P. arte also divided. BJP could 
receive 26.4% landed backward caste support, while (see table 3) INC+BSP 
- 12.2% and UF 51.8% support. Among OBCs, Yadavs overwhelmingly 
supported United front for Mulayam Singh Yadav. According to Christopher 
Jaffrelot and Jasmine Zerinini Brotel; the lower castes are either castes 
associated with service occupations, such as the Nais (barbers) or the Telis 
(toddy tappers) or cultivating castes (Kurmis, Lodhis, Koeris, Gujjars), or 
the postoral castes like the Ahirs or Yadavs (cowherds). The Yadavs on their 
own account for 8.7 percent of UP's population. '^ In U.P. Yadavs support 
Mulayam Singh and gave 73.8% vote to UF (see table 4). Due to rivalry 
between Yadavs and Kurmis, the later aligned more with BJP. Mulayam 
Singh does not provide enough space for Kurmis so that they can dominate 
20 Christophe Jaffrelot and Jasmine Zerinini - Brotel; Post 'Mandal Politics in Uttar 
Pradeshand Madhya Pradesh, (ed.) Rob Jenkins, Regional Reflections, Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi-2004, P. 145. 
21. Ibid., p. 145. 
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the party in future. In 1993 only 8% of his party MCAs were Kurmis (one 
third were Yadavs), and in 1996 the share of Kurmis was down to 3% (as 
against the one-quarter who were Yadavs)^^ (see table 4) 44.9% Kurmis 
voted for BJP in 1996 Assembly Elections and 41.5 per cent for UF. While 
78.2% Lodhs supported BJP because of Kalyan Singh so, as Yadavs are 
solidly behind SP because of Mulayam Singh Yadav, Lodhs are also giving 
full support to BJP because of Kalyan Singh, a member of their own caste. 
Amaresh Misra argued that Kurmis and Koeris are still without a 
stable political party and constitute a 'floating' vote bank. They form the 
group within the backwards who could not become the support base of any 
political party. Now in post Mandal phase all the three major parties are 
trying to woo them. According to Amaresh Misra, they constitute that 
crucial 'third' element which may tilt the balance of social forces in the 
state 
23 




















Source : Jasmin Zerinini Brotel's field work; in Christopher Jaffrelot, Jasmin 
Zerinini - Brotel and Jayati Chaturvedi; The BJP and the rise of Dalits 
in Uttar Pradesh (ed) Roger Jeffery and Jens Lerche; Social and 
political change in Uttar Pradesh, Manohar Publishers, New Delhi, 
2003, p. 157. 
22. Ibid., p. 159. 
23. Amaresh Misra, Kurmis and Koeris; Emerging 'Third' Factor; Economic and Political 
Weekly, January 4-11,1997, p. 22. 
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MBCs decided their support between BJP and BSP. The Ayodhya 
movement led by the BJP influenced the MBCs enormously. Sudha Pai 
suggests that^ "* these MBCs groups lack cultural movement like Dalits who 
through Amabedkarisation process (led by Mayawati) could attain a 
respectable identity and came forward as a United force to fight upper 
castes. She also maintains that these MBCs are educationally and politically 
more backward then dalits and can be easily communalized. Numerically 
these groups are much larger then lower castes but only Sainis form an 
effective political force in electoral politics. This is due to geographical 
dispersion and lack of any strong charismatic leadership who can convert 
then into a political force. With the disintegration of the congress, every 
constituent found its alternative in SP, BSP or BJP but MBCs could not find 
their adequate representation any where, MBCs remain neglected and their 
support has been dispersed. BJP targets some of these castes on selective 
basis, and by giving party tickles to their caste candidate in any district of 
UP, it is trying to built its support base among them. It is not possible for 
BJP to give representation to all groups of MBCs, it finds the ideology of 
Hindutva a useful tool which has appealed to them the most. 
In 1996 U.P. Assembly elections BJP could receive highest vote share 
of MBCs. It could get 52.2%, while INC+BSP 26.1 and UF could get 21.7 
of MBCs vote Koeli supported BJP with 49.1%, UF with 25.4% and INC + 
BSP with 20.8% votes. If any political party can provide then a way of 
development these castes can go behind that party as they could not get 
24 Sudha Pai, Politicisation of Dalits and Most Backward Caste;s State Politics, New 
Dimensions, Shipra Publications New Delhi 2000, pp. 100-101. 
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benefits of Mandalisation, and Mayawati remained only concerned about 
Daiitization. So at present they are not behind any particular party and every 
party is trying its best to woo them. 





















































































Source : Taken from Christophe Jaffrelot; India's Silent Revolution; Permanent 
Block, New Delhi - 2003 p. 362. 
Upper castes, OBCs and scheduled castes are three main castes which 
found enough place in Uttar Pradesh Assembly during the period of 1980-
96. In 1996 BJP and ESP were having alliance so 37.7% MLAs were from 
Upper castes and 21.2 MLAs were from Scheduled Caste. Muslim MCAs 
were only nine while they have 15.5% share in UP population. Moreover, 
upper caste MLAs still dominates the Assembly and OBCs and SCs are two 
important castes which are able to maintain their place in Uttar Pradesh 
Assembly. 
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Voting behaviour of Dalits : 
The Scheduled Castes Constitute 21 percent of the population of U.P. 
The Scheduled caste category in U.P. includes 66 individual categories 
(census of India - 1991). The two largest categories are chamars 56.6 and 
Pasis 14.6%." The chamar category in UP includes four categories -
chamar, Dhusia, Jhusia and Jatava. Koris who are 5.9% according to the 
census, and are listed separately also consider themselves as chamars. 
The Scheduled caste voters preferred the BSP to other political 
parties. The decay of Congress system and increasing lower caste 
moblisation gave way to BSP to mobilize SC voters in its favour. The 
chamars seem to be especially problematic for BJP, because they are 
adverse of Sanskritisation and Brahmanism.^ ^ They complain that 
Brahmanism is based on a hierarchy which exploits SCs. Dalits are also anti 
OBC that is why they are not ready to co-opt with either Kalyan Singh or 
Mulayam Singh because of Yadavisation. For them, the ultimate solution is 
to find shelter under the BSP which not only provides them a sense of 
cultural identity but also looks for the educational and economic 
development through Ambedkarisation and followers the path of 
Ambedkar's reformist ideology. Bulk of SC votes, more than 2/3*^  goes to 
the BSP among them chamars form the strong base for BSP. In an excellent 
work on ethnic parties Kanchan Chandra analyses '^ Why SC voters prefer 
25. Kanchan Chandra; Why Ethnic Parties Succeed, Cambridge University Press, United 
Kingdom-2004 P. 185. 
26 Christophe Jaffrelot, Jasmine Zerinini-Brotel and Jayati Chaturvedi; The BJP and the 
Rise of Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in Roger Jeffery and Jens Lerche (ed.), Social and 
Political Change in Uttar Pradesh, Manohar Publications, New Delhi-2003, p .163. 
27. Op.cit-25, pp. 241-242. 
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the BSP and why SC voters preferences translate into BSP votes. She 
argues "that for substantial numbers of SC voters, preferences do not 
automatically translates into vote. Though these voters prefer BSP, they are 
likely to vote for the BSP only when they expect their vote can install the 
BSP government, or to affect the victory or defeat of one of its competitors. 
Where they do not expect to be able to affect the outcome in one of these 
two ways, they are unlikely to vote for the BSP. The SC voters, in other 
words are strategic rather than expressive actors. In 1996 U.P. Assembly 
elections, BSP 57.6 percent voters made up their mind before the election 
campaign. /This expressive voting suggests that BSP is a natural choice for 
SCs while 32.4% of SC voters made up their mind during the campaign 
period and voted strategically rather than expressively. BSP entertains full 
support of SCs especially chamars and is likely to dominate U.P. politics for 
a long period. 
Table 7. Vote switching between Uttar Pradesh parliamentary and 
assembly elections, 1996 
Percentage who voted for other parties 
in the Parliamentary election but 
switched into the BSP-Congress alliance 
in the assembly elections 
Percentage who voted for the BSP or 
Congress in the parliamentary election 








Source : 1996 Post Poll Survey, 1996 exit Poll (Uttar Pradesh) CSDS, p. 242. 
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Table 8. Timing of decision, SCs in Uttar Pradesh 












©Weighted by sample size 
Source : 1996 Post-poll survey; 1996 Exit poll (U.P.) taken from Ibid, p. 238. 
Voting behaviour of Muslims : 
The Uttar Pradesh Asembly's average Muslim membership from 1952 
to 2002 has been about 8.49% whereas average share of Muslim population 
in the state is 15.59 per cent Thus there has been deprivation of 45.20 
percent in Muslim representation.^ ^ In U.P. upper caste votes are not 
sufficient for BJP to get clear majority, Dalit votes are also not sufficient for 
BSP to capture power and OBC votes are also inadequate for SP to come in 
power. Now, all the major parties have realized inadequacy of their basic 
vote base and every political party is trying to catch the left over and 
realized the importance of Muslim votes. 
The growth of Hindutva in 1990s, forced Muslims to participate in the 
elections in U.P. to check BJP to gain power in the state. After the 
demolition of Babri Masjid Hidutva forces proved that the state is not safe 
for Muslims under BJP and post Ayodhya era witnessed conscious 
participation on the part of Muslims to defeat BJP and Congress who were 
held responsible for demolition of the Mosque and insecurity and instability 
28. Iqbal A. Ansari, Political Representation of Muslims in India (1952-2004) Monak 
Publications Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi - 2006 p. 287. 
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in the State. Decline of Congress and Communalism in the state gave 
emergence to social and political forces like SP and BSP. In 1993 election 
enbloc Muslim voting led to the victory of SP-BSP alliance which was 
claimed as the victory of secular forces in the state. Muslims thought that 
the victory of BJP will provide legitimacy to the demolition of Babri-Masjid 
and so they overwhelmingly voted for SP-BSP alliance. Basically Msulims 
cast their vote in favour of Mulayam Singh's SP. Break up of the alliance 
not only annoyed the Muslims. They were also worried when BJP joined 
Congress to fight 1996 UP assembly election. Their natural choice again 
became SP. Though BSP was criticizing Manuwadi parties but it realized 
it's incapacity to go beyond its dalit base. It also realized the importance of 
Muslims in bahujanwad with MBCs. BJP also started to realize the 
importance of Muslims and tried to dilute its stand on Mandir issue. Though 
MBCs were also seen as a strong support base for future. 
Rana A. Siddiqui claims that in 1996 UP assembly elections out of a 
total of 67 districts, Muslim votes were decisive in 125 constituencies and in 
300 constituencies they had a say. He also suggests that the political affairs 
committee of the All India Milli Council has emerged as the new guiding 
body of the Muslims in the elections. This was clear from the fact that the 
Council's appeal that Muslims should neither waste not let their votes 
divide, was followed all over U.P. Also its appeal to Muslims to vote for 
Mulayam's SP, might have worked and the SP secured 70 percent of the 
Muslim votes as against 23% won by the BSP's Kanshi Ram on whose 
behalf Imam Bukhari appealed. 
29. Rana A. Siddiqui, Muslim Factor in UP Elections, Mainstream, Oct. 19,1996, p. 9. 
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Milli Council's and Imam Bukhari's appeal resulted in the division of 
Muslim votes. Only 33 Muslim candidate could reach Vidhan Sabha. Out of 
this 19 were from SP and 8 were from the rival BSP This time Muslims 
showed less political maturity in making the choice, than in 1993 assembly 
elections. They fell into the trap of those skillful poll managers' in various 
parties whose main aim was to divide the Muslim vote bank and nullify its 
strength. They divided Muslim votes by putting up Muslim candidates on 
rival tickets in the same constituency. So BJP could win 7 out of 12 
assembly seats in Moradabad district and six out of nine in Bareilly.'" In 
most constituencies, Muslims took into consideration the caste and religion 
of the candidates of the BSP, Congress and constituents of the UF barring 
the SP. That means they voted for only the Muslim candidates of the BSP, 
Congress and UF but Muslims voted for Mulayam's SP and its candidates 
irrespective of their religion or caste. '^ 
In 1996 UP Assembly Elections Muslim representation was 33 which 
was less then half of the expected. Major gainer were SP which won 19 seats 
of Muslim candidates followed by BSP which won 8 seats and congress won 
3 seats. Major political parties have given nomination to quite a few Muslim 
candidates. The BSP, SP and JD have nominated about 20%, 14% and 17% 
Muslims in 1985. The average of congress nominations from 1980 to 1993 
has been about 11 per cent, whereas average of Muslim population has been 
about 16%. 
30. Ahtesham Qureshy; UP Assembly Polls, Muslim India 168, vol. No. XIV, December 
1996, p. 543. 
31. Op.cit.No.29. 
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Table 9. Election nomination party ratio of Muslims (1993 & 1996) 
1993 
BSP - 9:3 (approx. 1:5) 
SP-8:35(approx. 1:4) 
Congress- 1:45 (approx. 1:45) 
JD - 4:47 (approx. 1:12) 
1996 
8:46 (approx. 1:5) 
19:46 (approx. 2:5) 
3:13 (approx. 1:4) 
0:7 900) 
Source : Taken from Iqbal A. Ansari, Ibid., p. 289. 
In 1993 BSP nominated 39 Muslims out of which 9 were elected in 
1996 it increased its nomination to46 but it could get 8 elected, its alliance 
with the congress annoyed Muslims. On the other hand SP (which 
nominated 35 Muslims and eight were elected in 1993) increased its 
nomination from 35 to 46 in 1996 and from then 19 were elected. Whereas 
in 1993, in Post Babri Masjid era, out of 45 Muslim Congress candidates 
only one was elected. Disappointed with Muslim votes the congress reduced 
its Muslim nomination to just 13 in 1996 out of which 3 were elected. In 
1996, Congress nominated 13 Muslims out its total nomination of 414 which 
means 3.14 percent, while BJP's nomination of Muslims was just 1 out of 
414 which means 0.24% nomination on the other hand BSP's total 
nomination was 296 among then 46 (15.54%) were Muslims. SP's total 
nomination was 281 and among then 46 were Muslims which means 
16.73%^ .^ Average Muslim population in U.P. is 15.59% so, we can say that 
SP and BSP provided sufficient nomination to the Muslims. 
A glance on the data of the Muslim share in the legislative Assembly would 
be fruitful for our study. 
32. Data has been taken from Iqbal A. Ansari, op.cit., No. 28, p. 292. 
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Table 10 .1 
1993 
1996 




















Source : Taken from Iqbal A. Ansari, op.cit. No. 28, p. 291. 
Muslim representation in 1993 was 25 out of 422 total membership it 
was suppose to be 73 and in case of 1996 it was 33 out of 424 and expected 
number was 74, according to the percentage of Muslim population in India. 
Amount of Deprivation is quite clear. BJS did not nominate any Member of 
Muslim community in 1989 and 1993. In 1996, its nomination was one but it 
failed to capture that seat also. Its predecessor BJP also did not nominate 
any Muslim from 1952-1967 first time in 1969 it nominated one and 6 in 
1974. 
Table 11. Uttar Pradesh legislative Assembly Party-wise Muslim 
Members 
1993 
INC- l ,BSP-9 , J D - 4 , IND- 1, 
CPI-1 SP-8,JP- l ,Total = 25 
1996 
INC - 3, SP-19, IND-1, BSP-8, 
BKKGP-2, Total -= 33 
Source : Taken from Iqbal A. Ansari, Ibid., p. 291. 
During 1980s, BJP not only took an anti-Muslim stand but also 
characterized the Congress as Pseudo secular party and described its policy 
as appeasement of Muslims. After the consolidation of upper caste's Hindu 
vote, it has started eyeing the MBCs and Muslims. Still it could secure only 
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2.3% Muslim votes. During 1980s, The BJP raised a slogan that 
'Mussalman, Jao Pakistan ya qabrastan' (Muslims, either go to Pakistan or 
to the cemetry) Bal Thackeray of the Shiv Sena also seriously doubted the 
patriotism of Muslims and used to denounce then as pro-Pakistani lot.^ ^ BJP 
created a minority cell at the time of 1996 elections, which prepared a 
comprehensive package offering the Muslims taaleem (education), tunzeem 
(organization) and tijarat (employment). It also organized Muslim 
conventions at various places and toned down its rhetoric about the 
reconversion of mosques into temples, evidently, nothing worked to register 
the support of the community.^'' BJP also condemned Congress that it has 
given lip service to the minorities and nothing concrete has been done on its 
part. BJP tried to convince Muslims that it can safeguard Muslim interest in 
a better manner. Muslims were of course, not convinced by the BJP. Even 
BJP is not herself clear about its policies about Muslims. Kalyan Singh said 
that "Unless there is a BJP government at the centre, the Ram Temple at 
Ayodhya can not come into being.^^ So, on the one hand BJP wants to attract 
Muslims and on the other hand it tries to control its Hindu vote bank. 
BJP suffered electoral reverses in Faizabad - Ambedkar Nagar, 
except for the lone Ayodhya seat, out of nine seats, the BJP could win just 
two including Ayodhya. It could win only 2 out of 8 seats in Bahraich and 5 
out of 11 seats in Gonda, though in 1993 the BJP had won seven of the 11 
seats in Gonda. Therefore, Ayodhya failed to prove a spring board.^^ 
33. Asghar Ali Engineer; Muslims BJP and Lok Sabha Elections, Economic and Political 
Weekly, February 7, 1998. p. 256. 
34. Parth S. Ghosh; The Congress and the BJP in Ajay K. Mehra (ed.) Political Parties and 
Party System. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 238-239. 
35. The Hindustan Times, 12 Oct., 1996 in Muslim India 167, November 1996. Vol. No. 
xiv. P. 495. 
36. M.A. Hafiz; On BJP Strategy in U.P. Elections. The Hindustan Times, 12 October 
1996, in Muslim India. Ibid. 34. 
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In an electoral analysis of Aligarh, Paul R. Brass said that BJP has 
failed to attain the dominant position for which it has striven. In the absence 
of powerful mobilizing issues that unite the upper-caste Hindu population 
and a major portion of the backward-caste population as well against the 
Muslims, the BJP cannot achieve a dominant position either in Aligarh or in 
the state as a whole. 
Steven I. Wilkinson discusses the prospects of Muslim voting, he 
said that if Muslims become more politically mobilized, wealthier, and make 
more demands for job reservations and economic benefits, they will become 
more 'costly' and so less attractive voters for majority parties to court, 
possibly even resulting in a resurgence of anti Muslim polarisation in State 
politics, but once electoral breakthrough is made by minorities, and majority 
parties all begin to court then as voters, it will become difficult for majority 
parties to go back to escape goating minorities overtly. 
At present Muslims are ready to support any party, which can give 
it security in the state. Muslims are supporting SP and BSP to check BJP. 
No, other issue whether it is education or employment, is more important for 
Muslims then safety in the State. May be in future, there will be an active 
and conscious participation on the part of the Muslims. 
Election Results 
U.P. is a state where electoral system is immensely competitive. It 
is not only having effective number of political parties to make it a 
37. Paul R. Brass; The Production of Hindu - Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, 
Oxford University Press, New Delhi-2003 p. 301. 
38. Steven I. Wilkinson; Votes and Violence, Electoral Competition and Communal Riots 
in India, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2004, p. 170. 
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multiparty democracy but it has also shown different patterns of coalition as 
compulsion where single largest party needed to align with a small party to 
stay in power. 
Table 12. Comparative study of UP Vidhan Sabha 1993, 1996 
elections, party wise performance. 
Total seats 
Total electorate 
Total votes polled 



































































Source : CSDS data Unit, Statistical Supplement, Journal of Indian School of 
Political Economy, vol. XV, Nos. 1 and 2, January and June 2003, pp. 
439-440. 
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In 1996 U.P. assembly elections, Congress could gain five more 
seats from 1993 but it was loser in true sense because its vote share declined 
6.67% (from 15.0 to 8.4%), this was the lowest since 1952. This showed that 
even an alliance with BSP could not increase its popularity and congress 
witnessed frequent decline in the state. Congress could retain only 9 seats 
from 1993 (see table 13) which means that 19 old constituencies did not 
deliver for Congress this time. It could gain 24 new seats that could have 
been the result of new alliance with BSP. 





























































Source : Adopted from V.K. Rai, In Search of a New Balance; EPW, August 21-
28, 1999, p. 2404. 
'Of its 1993 tally of 177 seats, the BJP has lost 93 seats - 41 to the 
SP, 20 to the BSP, 13 to the congress, five each to the JD and BKKP, and 
the rest to others. Of the 91 new seats which the BJP has gained, 37 were 
with the SP, 29 with the BSP, 12 with JD, and nine with the Congress.... 
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The SP could retain merely 36 of its 109 seats of 1993, the BSP only 18 of 
its 69 seats, and the Congress just nine of its 28 seats. Apart from their 
losses to the BJP, the SP has lost 23 seats to the BSP whereas the BSP has 
lost 15 seats to the SP. Whereas the BSP has lost 15 seats to the SP. The 
biggest.... setback has been BJP's. Just six months after it led in 235 
assembly segments in the Lok Sabha's elections, it has seen its tally being 
limited to 124.^ ^ In 1996 elections BJP lost 4 seats, and it realized that it had 
to change its electoral approach to capture majority in the state. The BJP's 
alliance with BSP should be seen as a part of this realization and an attempt 
to increase its vote bank. 
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Note : *BJP won 174 and Samata 2 seats 
+1NC won 33 and BSP 67 seats 
#SP won 110, JD 6, CPl 1, CPI(M) 4, Congress(I) 4 and BKKP 8 seats 
V = Votes; S = seats 
39. India Today, 31 October 1996, pp. 29-30 in op.cit. No. 10, pp.120-121. 
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SP could also perform more or less in the same manner as in 1993. 
In 1993, it got 109 seats and in 1996 it captured 110 seats but its vote share 
increased by 4 percent (17.8 in 1993 and 21.8 in 1996). SP could win one 
seat in Uttarakhand.'*" Though, Uttarakhand is a stronghold of BJP, BJP 
received only 44.7 percent votes from this region, but 17 out of 19 seats. UF 
and BJP, both could perform neck to neck in West, central and Poorvanchal 
region while INC + BSP could gain 10 seats in Bundelkhand and 29 in 
central region, much better than other competitors. SP could not gain much 
success being in the alliance of United Fronts. The BKKP which contested 
41 seats failed miserably and won only eight seats. The Janata Dal contested 
65 seats and gave its poorest performance ever, winning only 7-seats. If JD 
had not bargained for such a large number of seats and had given SP some 
3 5-odd seats out of the 65 it contested, the UF tally would have definitely 
gone up by 25-seats.'" 
One of the major gainer in 1996 assembly election was BSP, though 
it could gain 67 seats in 1996 while in 1993 the number was 69. It increased 
its vote share from 11.31 percent to 19.64%. BSP not only aligned with 
Congress and increased its support base, it also aligned with BJP when no 
party was able to form the govt. With the "Decline of Congress" there had 
been resurgence of lower caste parties in the state. One major outcome of 
1996 election was that these parties realized that they are bound to change 
old pattern of mobilization to increase their support base, if they wanted to 
secure clear majority. 
40. Op.cit.No.3,p. 187 
41. Ibid. 
CONCLUSION 
Uttar Pradesh has always occupied an important position among 
Indian states. It has evolved from one party dominant system to a multiparty 
system. During 1990, UP has shown different pattern of mobilization. Voters 
have been fragmented and mobilized around four major players in the state. In 
1996 U.P. assembly election, two national and two state level parties were 
engaged in fierce competition where voters were mobilized on the basis of 
caste and religion. In UP identity politics gave rise to regional, communal and 
caste politics. Post-Mandal political scenario showed political mobilization on 
the basis of ethnic identities. Lower castes, which were targeted under 
Congress system' have now found their emancipation in the caste based parties, 
who promised to fight for their causes if they come in power. 
Post Mandal politics witnessed a dramatic upsurge of caste based 
politics. Mandalisation of U.P. politics provided backward caste with 27% 
reservation in jobs and converted the OBCs into a polifical force. BJP 
permanently an upper caste party, which was opposed to the Mandal politics 
and scared of polarization of oBC votes for JD came up with mandir issue and 
converted the lower caste movement into a Hindutva force. But Hindutvising 
these groups did not help BJP for long, later they found place in their own caste 
based parties because Sanskritization* was not a solution for them. They 
wanted to preserve their own identity which was given to them by these caste 
based parties, with a sense of dignity. This is borne out by the fact that in 1980, 
Sanskritization is a term coined by M.N. Srinivas, to denote the process by which castes 
placed lower in the caste hierarchy seek upward mobility by emulating the rituals and 
practices of the upper or dominant castes. 
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BJP could get any 10.8% vote share and 11 seats but in 1991, using Mandir 
issue, it increased its vote share upto 31.5% and 221 seats were captured. In 
1993 and 1996 BJP could manage to retain its vote bank but could not secure 
complete majority because in 1993 and 1996, SP and BSP witnessed rapid 
growth. 
One person who was the political beneficiary of the Mandal politics 
was Mulayam Singh Yadav, who became successful in organizing a powerful 
intermediate peasant caste of Yadavs and attracted Muslims who completely 
shifted from the congress for practicing self Hindutva. Election data shows that 
in the wake of Mandal Mandir controversy, the Janata party could capture only 
34 seats with 12.5% vote share in U.P. But, SP of Mulayam singh could 
capture 109 seats in 1993 with 17.8% vote share, while in 1996 it could capture 
110 seats with 21.8% vote share. Mulayam Singh could mobilize the winning 
formula of AJGAR plus Muslims in his favour. 
Rise of intermediate peasant castes like Yadavs became a danger for 
dalits and SCs who are having age old tussle with backward caste peasantry in 
the state. This gave a chance to BSP, a party of dalits, to take advantage of the 
gap created by Mandal Mandir politics. Now, real center of politics became 
Mayawati-Mulayam and Kalyan Singh, while Congress remained completely 
marginalized. While SP, BSP and BJP were able to project popular chief 
Ministerial candidates if they came to power. Congress was not having any 
charismatic leader who could lead it. Void created by Nehru family is also an 
important factor in the decline of Congress in the state. Congress has been 
using caste and communal politics in the past but this was not done so overtly 
185 
as these parties (SP and BSP) openly claimed to be a well wisher of a selected 
section of society and against others. Oppressed and oppressor politics led to 
the fragmentation of the society. Now there is not only caste vs caste 
competition but sub-castes are also fast gaining prominence in shaping U.P. 
politics. 
Now, these caste based parties like, BSP said that its main aim is 
social transformation at and economic emancipation of Dalits. And this can be 
fulfilled through capturing political power. As, BSP came in power and enact 
many laws in favour of dalits. To come in power it aligned with BJP, so that it 
could fulfill the promises made to the Dalits. Though all the major parties gave 
tickets to the dalit candidates, but dalits as a vote bank are behind the BSP. 
BSP not only aligned with major political parties but also became successful in 
aligning different sections of the society under bahujanwad. Alliances with 
Manuwadi parties put a question mark on BSP but it became successful in 
cutting across the vote bank of both Congress and BJP. Thanks to the 
opportunism in politics, Muslims are with SP which is carrying an image of 
secular party. However, BSP proved that it could preserve interest of dalits, 
even in the alliance of manuwadi parties. Over and all, it became successful in 
consolidation of dalits vote in its favour and giving stiff competition to the 
other political parties. It is also improving its performance year after year. The 
BSP's vote share showed a steady increase as in 1989 its vote share were 9.4% 
and in 1996 it became 19.6%. Basically it gained prominence after it became a 
part of a winning coalition with SP, based on lower and middle caste support. 
During 1990s, all the parties realized that they could not come to 
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power at the national or state level on their own and coalition politics has 
become a compulsion. Though coalition governments were not stable and 
unable to govern because political parties charged their loyalties so rapidly that 
gave doubts about the viability of coalition politics in the state. Not only 
Central governments were falling within days and months but at state level 
these were frequent president's rule, breakup of alliances, defection, formation 
of new alliances, leaving the state in the situation of flux. This was because 
voters were unable to give a clear mandate. They did not find any issue where 
they could consolidate. They were fragmented on the lines of castes. 
With the decline of congress, and emergence of multiparty system, 
other caste based parties found their place in the state. Congress is facing 
frequent decline, it also failed to revive in 1996 assembly elections. Being a 
victim of caste based politics in the state it fought as a secular party to retain its 
old catch-all party image but it scones that Congress has no future in the State. 
BJP also failed to secure absolute majority in the state and realized the 
limitations of Hindutva politics. As a whole, no strategy of any political party 
succeeded in securing majority and expanding their base. All the parties 
realized that they have reached a saturation point of their own caste and have a 
need of consolidation and expansion, difficult task to materialise. 
Only SP and BSP - two state level parties were able to increase their 
vote bank but failed to form govt on their own. These state level parties 
emerged as a force in the state and made fast in roads in the support base of the 
BJP and Congress. Both the parties, together, could change the equations in 
their favour and they were able to mobilize OBCs, Muslims and dalits, the 
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marginalized in the state. In 1996, they fought the elections against each other, 
which not only helped BJP as they were strong poles against Hindutva, It also 
helped B P because later BJP could align itself with BSP, which to the dilution 
of pro-Hindutva image. Though clash of BSP and SP did not provide BJP with 
any additional vote and its fate in the state is fast becoming like congress. BJP 
in 1996 tried to mobilize most backward castes in its favour and also tried to 
won the Muslims. Elections after elections, BJP leam't the shortness of 
Hindutva ware but also confused about its fiiture strategy. Whether to go for 
Hindu nationalism and once again use Hindutva ware by promising Mathura 
and Kashi to Hindus or to comer Muslims and dalits by making 'coalition of 
Extremes ( unification of upper caste and dalit votes by malignity with BSP) 
As Brahmin-basis votes are not sufficient to capture power. 
All the parties polarize their earlier vote bank but did not mobilize 
masses against the other group in the state so that in future, the left over can be 
appease. In 1996. No anti-Mandal, anti-upper caste, anti-Muslim or anti-
Manuwadi rhetoric's were used to impress the voters. Political parties were not 
ready to mobilize one or alienating the other groups. 
Caste based politics have provided SP and BSP with solid and stable 
support base. It became very difficult for any other party to rob BSP with its 
dalit base, same, dilution of Yadavs vote is very difficult, who vote enbloc for 
Mulayam. Muslims have also consolidated their vote bank in favour of 
Mulayam Singh and overtures by Congress have failed. In 1996 also, they 
divided their vote between SP and BSP. Though OBCs and dalit voters also 
voted for the candidate of their own caste irrespective of their party, but this 
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tendency is more visible in Muslims in U.P. At present, both BJP and Congress 
appear to have lost the faith of the Muslim voters in the state. 
SCs and OBCs have found their proper representation inSP and BSP 
but MBCs are still without any party who can take sole responsibility of their 
development. They are anti-Yadavisation and Dalitisation. Though BJP could 
corner them because of the broader appeal of the Hinduvisation. All the major 
parties are trying to won them to expend their stagnant support base. While 
communal politics helped BJP to raise in power but caste politics proved to be 
more viable and stable in the state. There can be many issues and strategies in 
future in state politics but caste politics seems to stay in U.P. for long. It seems 
that there will be cleavage politics and struggle of power between OBCs, upper 
caste and dalits in the state. Mayawati said that Jiski jitni sankhya bhari, uski 
utni sajhedari. Now lower castes are conscious of their numerical strength and 
ready to dominate state politics. 
Like Congress in the past, since 1990s all other major parties in the 
state have realized their limitations in their emergence as a single dominant 
party in the state. One major trend which emerged after 1996 elections, was 
that they overtly stopped playing one caste or community at the cost of 
other, while preserving their own vote bank. These parties began trying to 
make a broader appeal to mobilizes different sections of the society. BSP's 
co-option of Brahmins is the outcome of the realization of inadequacy of 
Dalits vote in capturing power. To strengthen the party in future elections, 
BSP altered its anti-Brahmin, anti-upper caste political position and came 
forward with Dalit-Brahmin bhaichara (Dalit Brahmin Brotherhood) 
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formula. New slogans were raised like "Hati nahi Ganesh hai", to appeal to 
Brahmin voters. Appeal to Bahujan Samaj has been converted to 'Sarva 
Samaj' to show the other sections like upper castes and Muslims, that if BSP 
comes to power, it is ready to serve the interest of all. Since long, parties in 
the state have been manipulating social cleavages to win power, however, it 
is difficult to assume that it is easy to preserve Dalit and Brahmins 
(combination of highest and the lowest in the socio-economic hierarchy) 
together for a long time. 
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